FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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
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Edited by
David M. Kemme and Andrzej Rudka
INSTITUTE FOR EAST-WEST SECURITY STUDIES
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

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

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Norman J. Ornstein

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 1992 ELECTION

Presidential elections rarely revolve around foreign policy. At the same time foreign policy issues are rarely absent as pivotal points in presidential campaign give-and-take. Narrow or broad, event-driven or character-motivated, questions of how Washington will deal with external threats or will shape America's role in the world somehow surface in the build-up to presidential elections.

The grounds for an urgent examination of America's role in the world are especially great. The end of the Cold War has thrown our existing assumptions and most of our traditional political divisions into turmoil. We have a new, key question: What does a superpower do in a world no longer dominated by superpower conflict? There is no obvious or easy answer, and a substantial and broad-based debate will be necessary before any kind of consensus can emerge.

Yet the climate for such a debate could not be worse. The question about what role America plays in the world comes at a time when America has no appetite for it and instead is turning inward, yearning to solve festering domestic problems. Equally significant, Americans are simultaneously feeling more unhappy with their own political system and policymakers than at any time in modern memory. The campaign agenda, such as it is, has been dominated not by questions of budget deficits or national defense, but by "issues" of personal scandal and institutional wrongdoing, along with complaints about undeserved perks and privileges for pampered officials.

Cutting through the static to focus on the real themes seems an impossible task. Yet, erratically, in a largely subterranean way, it is beginning to happen; some rough sense is emerging as to what America is likely to do. What will happen, who will benefit politically and how this might affect America's role in the post-Cold War world are the subjects of this essay.

Norman J. Ornstein is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. Copyright © 1992 by Norman J. Ornstein.

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II

Disgust, disaffection, disarray—these are terms that best characterize the state of American politics in 1992. They express the profound paradox of our time. In a most basic way this ought to be a celebratory moment. The singular goal sought by America for more than four decades—a goal that dominated public discourse, demanded huge sums of money and large numbers of lives, and made leaders and governments rise and fall—was achieved in an incredible fashion, with unbelievable ease. The spread of international communism and the threat of an "Evil Empire" that consumed our spirit and values ended, with barely a whimper and nary a bang.

The Soviet Union did not beat a tactical retreat to regroup or turn resentfully in defeat and proclaim that it would be back to fight another day; rather, its citizens rejoiced in the victory of the values of the West and the defeat of their own. It is nearly impossible to walk the corridors of the Capitol without bumping into a delegation from Russia or an east European country seeking to learn from the exemplar how the American political and economic systems work, so as to emulate their successes.

But if others view the American system with awe and respect, Americans do not. Rather than rejoicing in the streets over their victory in the Cold War, they are bitterly unhappy over the failures of the political and economic processes at home and pessimistic about the future. The post-Cold War era has brought with it not the thrill of victory, but the agony of victory. The 1992 election campaign should be about reconciling these seemingly contradictory developments, redefining America—and American politics—to fit the new world.

In part the public reaction to the end of the Cold War was an understandable one, grounded in human nature. As Oscar Wilde said in 1892, there are two great tragedies in human existence: one is never to get one's dearest desire—the other is to get it. Winning the Cold War meant that the driving sense of purpose that had pervaded American society and politics since the late 1940s was suddenly gone, leaving a vacuum and uncertainty in its place.

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III

The resulting disorientation has become a pervasive reality in the American political arena, at many levels. For 45 years, anticommunism defined not only American foreign policy but also the competition between the two political parties. From the 1950s (remember the 1952 G.O.P. slogan "Korea, Communism and Corruption"?) to the 1960s (the "missile gap") to the 1970s (the flap over whether Poland was "free") and the 1980s (Reagan the "warmonger," the Strategic Defense Initiative, the contras), when presidential campaigns turned to foreign policy, they turned on approaches to the Soviet threat or on how to negotiate with Moscow.

The anticommunism that went along with the Cold War was more than a simple, pragmatic reaction to a large, ominous and implacable outside threat. Anticommunism evolved into a multifaceted value in American life, not simply an issue position. Times Mirror polls in 1987 found that 70 percent of Americans not only identified themselves as strongly anticommunist, but their positions correlated strongly with a series of other viewpoints, such as American exceptionalism and the need to ensure peace through military strength. Anticommunism, the value, in other words, had both a negative side—the struggle against a common enemy—and a positive one—a celebration of our own values of freedom and democracy against the counterpoint of the set represented by communism.

The departure of anticommunism as a serious force has left Americans without either the negative bond of a common enemy or the positive momentum of a sense of common purpose to unite them. The resulting vacuum has left the country off balance and uneasy. To be sure, the victory over Soviet communism has not been the only, or the major, force behind the feelings of malaise, despair and outrage Americans express in 1992 toward politics, politicians and the state of the nation. The economy and the national obsession with scandal have contributed immensely. Indeed in April 1992 four-fifths of Americans surveyed said they believed the country was seriously on the wrong track, the highest number since 1973.

The end of both the Gulf War and the Cold War focused American attention back on the domestic agenda, which meant, perforce, on the protracted recession. And this recession has had distinctive political effects. By every objective

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economic standard the 1992 recession has been considerably milder than the last major downturn, in 1982. But every subjective indicator, from consumer confidence, to belief that the country is on the right or wrong track, to optimism about one's own financial future, is far worse today than a decade ago. In February the Conference Board's measure of consumer confidence registered its lowest level in 17 years. In other words the psychological component of this recession is as important as the economic one.

The middle-class impact of the 1992 recession contributes to the public pessimism. So too does a decade of mergers, buyouts, bankruptcies and retrenchments that has removed all meaning from the term "blue chip," squashed any sense of security from people in the automotive, airline, computer or financial services industries, among others, and left most working people feeling vulnerable to the loss of health and pension benefits, if not their jobs.

For a public uneasy about its safety net and economic security, the image has been of a government unable to move the country forward, to return some measure of economic confidence or even show appropriate levels of concern for its problems. A decade of regular annual displays of ineptitude in dealing with the single domestic problem most identified by governing elites as the sine qua non of governing—the federal deficit—underscored the incapacity of our governors to govern. Bringing international communism to its knees somehow did not come across as a victory to offset the failure to balance the budget, but rather as a gift handed to the United States and the West.

Any residual confidence in government has been erased by the near-constant drumbeat of individual and institutional scandal, true or false, proven or alleged, big or small, that has dominated press coverage of politics for the better part of a decade. John Tower, Jim Wright, Tony Coelho, Iran/contra, the Keating Five, Mike Deaver, Lyn Nofziger, Dave Durenberger, Barney Frank, Al D'Amato, the October Surprise, Chuck Robb, John Sununu, Thomas/Hill, check overdrafts, the House post office, the White House credit union, Bill Clinton, Jerry Brown—allegations and rumors of any number of things have been front-page and prime-time stories in unprecedented numbers, each time reinforcing an image of a

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political system rife with corruption and of smug and cosseted politicians playing by rules unavailable to the rest of us.

The whole American political process is under intense assault this year. The politics of rage have resonated with citizens around the country. It is no simple coincidence that every presidential candidate, including incumbent George Bush, is running this year as an outsider, and none have emphasized either Washington experience or foreign policy expertise. True, unhappiness with American politics, while deeper than usual this year, is almost always cyclical and easily cast aside when another issue or crisis intervenes; witness the Gulf War, which resulted in a sharp upsurge in confidence in all political institutions. But the current resentment, building through increasing oscillations over several years, may result in a huge turnover in Congress, surprising success for H. Ross Perot's independent presidential candidacy and significant restructuring of government.

The public and media vilification of politicians in Congress, in the Executive and on the White House trail has taken its toll on the system and the individual actors. Demoralized and angst-ridden, worried more about the next press report of alleged scandal and the next 30-second attack ad, hypersensitive to every current in public opinion but incapable of focusing on public needs, American policymakers are much less likely to support foreign aid, controversial defense programs or any proposal that smacks of overconcern for foreigners at the expense of American taxpayers. The distraction created by the negative campaigns this year makes it difficult for policymakers to prepare for a serious debate on America's role in the post-Cold War world, even if it is forced upon them.

IV

The debate, such as it is, has surfaced in one major area. The 1992 campaign has already seen a struggle over whether another common enemy will emerge to replace the old one.

Japan appeared early on as the major contender—signaled by President Bush's clumsy cancellation of a long-planned trip to the country in November 1991, and then the even more clumsily rescheduled trip in January. As the presidential campaign got under way, Republican challenger Patrick Buchanan called for abrogation of the U.S. mutual security treaty with Japan; Democrats Tom Harkin and Jerry Brown used exceptionally harsh, anti-Japanese language when talking

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about American trade failures; Democratic Senator Bob Kerrey briefly shot to national prominence with a television spot in New Hampshire, set in a hockey rink, where he warned that if Japan did not open its markets to American products, America reciprocally would close its markets. Kerrey's spot was produced by the same consultants who had created Congressman Richard Gephardt's tough, trade-oriented commercials in Iowa in the 1988 race.

Candidates have taken on anti-Japanese rhetoric because they have found some receptiveness among voters. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found in 1991 a significant decline in "warm feelings" toward Japan among Americans; it was given a rating of 52 degrees on a scale from 1 to 100, a drop of nine degrees since 1986. In 1990, according to Times Mirror, only eight percent of Americans spontaneously identified Japan as America's greatest security threat; even though the Cold War was conspicuously thawing at this time, 32 percent named the Soviet Union. By March 1992 only 13 percent picked the former Soviet Union—but a full 31 percent tabbed Japan.

Nevertheless candidates who emphasized anti-Japanese stances have not fared well on the campaign trail. Kerrey dropped his hockey rink commercial after New Hampshire; when asked why during a debate, he responded: "Because it didn't work." Like candidate Gephardt in 1988, candidates Buchanan, Harkin, Kerrey and Brown in 1992 found that Japan-bashing provided early notoriety and an emotional boost, but few votes in primaries and caucuses. Even for those voters who feel threatened by Japan's economic power, it is not a high enough priority to supersede other worries, from the domestic economy to general concerns about leadership among the candidates. When voters were asked by Roper right before the 1990 elections which two or three issues would have the most to do with their voting decisions, America's trade situation with Japan got 3 percent, compared with 35 percent for inflation, 30 percent for jobs and 24 percent for curbing drug abuse.

To be sure, a *Time*-CNN poll in January showed that two-thirds of Americans believe that Japan's unfair trade practices are a major reason for America's trade imbalance. But three-fourths of Americans in the same survey singled out

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poor management by American business leaders to explain the trade problem.

The potential of Japan as a clear-cut common enemy is limited, in any event, by its status as an economic adversary. A military enemy can be easily envisioned in zero-sum terms: you win if they lose. But an economic contest becomes more complex: if they lose, you may lose as well. Every measure of protectionist sentiment in the American public is balanced by one of fear of the economic repercussions of protectionism. The linkage between Japanese capital investment in America and American economic performance, and between American and Japanese markets, makes it clear that we are not in a zero-sum struggle; Japan's current economic slowdown is no cause for American rejoicing.

This will not stop presidential candidates and other politicians from bashing Japan or exploiting the frequent combative or insensitive statements made by Japanese politicians. Nor will it stop continued congressional efforts to pass punitive legislation against Japan for its trade practices or pushing tough protectionist measures aimed primarily at the Japanese, although their success will likely remain limited. The resentful calls for more burden-sharing, while not limited to the Japanese, will clearly increase in intensity. But Japan will not cut it as a replacement for the old Soviet Union.

If Japan cannot readily fill the vacant role of common enemy, who can? Perhaps nobody. Iraq is obviously not a candidate with any legs, nor Libya, Syria, North Korea, Cuba or Iran. The elimination of all serious outside threats is obviously good for American well-being. But it may well prove to be a longlasting and nettlesome problem for American politics and society. A common enemy provides glue that binds society together and reason to overcome doubts and resentments about other forces and decision-makers.

The response to this new situation has blurred the lines between and within the parties. Each is struggling to define a new worldview, and to differentiate its view from that of the other party. In both parties different forms of isolationism and internationalism have evolved as contenders, along with a grab bag of new issues emerging in the wake of anticommunism.

From the 1940s to the mid-1960s Democrats were united around a strong anticommunist approach to the world, coupled with a Rooseveltian, internationalist outlook best expressed in John F. Kennedy's Peace Corps. Vietnam fractured

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the Democratic worldview consensus, creating the deep divisions into anticommunists and anti-anticommunists, as reflected in the 1968 Chicago convention and George McGovern's nomination in 1972. It also set the party down a road toward a quarter-century disadvantage with the public over its perceived weak position on national security and defense. The end of anticommunism as a potent political force removed one of the great sources of the Democrats' internal division, only to see further strains surface with the debate over the use of force in the Persian Gulf.

The gulf is no longer a salient source of strain in the party, and Democrats have determinedly avoided some of the pitched ideological battles over foreign policy that were typical of past nomination contests. But the desire for a quick and easy unity on worldview has not been achieved. From trade to aid Democrats saw their candidates in 1992 run the gamut of issues without a central hinge.

Republicans fit a different pattern, but with similar results. In the 1930s it was Republicans and conservatives who were most prone to represent isolationist, protectionist views, as a counterpoint to FDR's internationalist foreign policy. But anticommunism altered that, providing a forge to unite disparate G.O.P. and conservative viewpoints by the 1960s into a strong and steady anticommunist internationalism. Old-line conservatives, aristocratic conservatives, libertarian conservatives, religious conservatives and neoconservatives had cultural and political differences but came together in their ardent desire to counter the massive Soviet threat wherever it emerged.

The departure of the prime communist threat has caused the conservative movement to splinter, allowing the centrifugal forces of culture and ideology to overwhelm the weakened centripetal force of anticommunism. Buchanan's campaign has been, as much as anything, an effort to allow his brand of traditional, isolationist conservatism to prevail over Reagan's 1980s-style internationalism in the future of the conservative movement.

For Democrats isolationism emerged early, in the campaign theme "Come Home, America," articulated by Harkin. His outlook was echoed even more stridently by Brown, who expressed his views to a crowd in New York: "The reason we have bombed-out buildings is that you have the mentality of Bush and Clinton that are more interested in a new world

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order 10,000 miles away than they are in a full-employment economy." Brown has said that, as president, he "wouldn't give a penny for foreign aid until every small farmer, businessman and family [in the United States] are taken care of."

On the Republican side Buchanan picked up the 1930s-style perspective of Father Coughlin, expressing an isolationist, nativist and protectionist worldview. Buchanan has called for an end to all foreign aid, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe and South Korea, the dissolution of Washington's mutual security treaty with Tokyo and an end to U.S. payments to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

In the spring of 1990 Buchanan argued that America no longer has any interests to defend abroad, and thus the defense of our nation should end at our national borders. As for an American role in establishing, enhancing or maintaining democracies abroad, Buchanan said, "How other people rule themselves is their own business. To call it a vital interest of the United States is to contradict history and common sense."

Putting America first is a persuasive theme at a time when Americans are looking inward and feeling economic pain and frustration over domestic problems long unsolved. In the important special election for a Senate seat in Pennsylvania in November the surprise winner, Democrat Harris Wofford, used the theme "It's time to take care of our own," to great effect.

Among Republicans an "America First" theme appeals not only to an isolationist base but dampens the unease many conservatives have felt about a strong and aggressive national security state as simply another form of Big Government. Among Democrats the America First theme has appeal because it puts the focus back on ground they find less shaky: the domestic agenda, against a president whose greatest success and enthusiasm has been in foreign affairs. In an interesting survey in December, *Americans Talk Issues* pitted President Bush against a generic Democrat; against a Democrat running on a domestic platform, stressing education, health care and tax relief for the middle class; and against a Democrat running on a new world order platform stressing cooperation among nations in stopping aggressive dictators, world environmental pollution and the spread of nuclear weapons. Bush led the generic Democrat, 39 percent to 27 percent; lost narrowly to

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the Democrat stressing the new world order, 41 percent to 37 percent—but lost soundly to the Democrat stressing domestic affairs, 54 percent to 31 percent.

While this suggests a Democratic emphasis on domestic priorities over a heavy focus on America's role in the world in the coming election, it also suggests that an internationalist position helps, rather than hurts, a candidate. Indeed substantial survey evidence indicates that the American public is not isolationist. Last October a CBS/*New York Times* survey found roughly two-thirds of Americans agreed with the statements "Now that relations with the Soviet Union have improved, the United States should assert itself more than ever," and "It is still important for the United States to be on guard with a strong military." The same number disagreed with the proposition that the United States "should go its own way in international matters without worrying what other countries think." A Times Mirror survey in December found a striking 92 percent in agreement that "It is best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs."

The other Democrats who entered the primaries adopted variations of internationalism, with Kerrey mixing his occasional anti-Japanese rhetoric with calls for a new post-Cold War world order, including an activist role for America in expanding trade and technology, and in supporting and enhancing the republics of the former Soviet Union. Paul Tsongas also supported an active U.S. role abroad, rejecting protectionism and emphasizing democracy and human rights abroad.

Clinton, far more than his Democratic rivals, focused his campaign on a comprehensive worldview and articulated an assertive internationalist approach. In a major speech at Georgetown University in December and another in New York in April he stressed linking domestic needs with foreign policy. He detailed policies to meet three objectives: restructuring our military forces to counter our post-Cold War threats; promoting democracy around the world through working for demilitarization in the former Soviet Union, through private investment coordinated with conditional aid to the republics and to eastern Europe, and through the formation of a Democracy Corps that would send American volunteers abroad; and finally, restoring America's economic leadership by expanding

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trade, increasing American exports and capitalizing on emerging technologies.

Clinton's themes in many respects echo those of President Bush, although the incumbent has been surprisingly reluctant to emphasize his worldview as either a campaign or presidential theme, doing so only in response to outside events or pressure. Stung by the charge that he has no domestic agenda, moved by polls showing intense public desire to focus on internal problems like the recession, President Bush decided early in the campaign year to portray himself predominantly as the activist, the caring domestic president.

After criticism from former President Nixon for moving too slowly and cautiously in providing aid and assistance to Russia and other former Soviet republics, President Bush responded with a broad-ranging foreign policy address at a Nixon Library conference on March 11, and then on April 1—at the same time as a major Clinton foreign policy speech—with a detailed plan on Russian aid. Clinton lauded Bush's plan as adopting many of the Arkansas Democrat's own ideas for aid to former Soviet republics while criticizing the president's move as too little, too late and, in its timing, politically motivated. Encouragingly, Bush followed up a week later with his most visionary speech so far, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington.

V

While President Bush and Governor Clinton differ in some areas of emphasis, it is nonetheless clear that both of the major party leaders share an assertive, internationalist, free-trade-oriented and activist vision for America's role in a post-Cold War era.

But if it is the two internationalists (the only two candidates who supported the use of military force in the Persian Gulf) who have emerged for both the Republican and Democratic parties, that does not guarantee a full-blown, engaged debate in the fall about the American position in a new world order.

There are still divisions within the parties to consider. Clinton will still have reason to avoid emphasizing an area where his ideas are unmatched by any measurable level of experience, that is, compared to a president with a lifetime of training and background in international affairs. President Bush continues to feel vulnerable on his domestic flank and, hence, continues to downplay his obvious tilt in interest and

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enthusiasm toward international affairs. And both major party candidates, in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots and in face of deep public outrage about the very legitimacy of politics, may hesitate to talk about an active government role abroad that emphasizes transcendental, value-laden questions about American responsibility to others, when it is much easier and more tempting to please voters by emphasizing what can be done for them directly and immediately.

The role of independent Ross Perot in this debate provided another interesting factor. The Texas billionaire has expressed no interest in or concern about America in the post-Cold War world; indeed he has candidly admitted that he has little expertise on most domestic issues, much less the range of international ones. When asked by CNN's Larry King about the Middle East, Perot offered no specific ideas on what to do; he responded that he would send expert negotiators to the region and keep them there, rather than shuttling them back and forth, until they could emerge with a reasonable peace settlement.

The closest Perot has come to addressing the post-Cold War world has been in his proffered solution to the budget deficit. Besides $180 billion in savings from waste, fraud and abuse, and the $100 billion from improved tax collection efficiency via a new computer system, Perot suggests that $100 billion come from equal contributions to the U.S. Treasury from the Japanese and Germans to defray the costs of their defense.

The other candidates, especially Clinton, will no doubt respond with burden-sharing ideas of their own, but in general any political success on Perot's part, emphasizing as he will the anti-Washington insider theme, will make it more difficult for the presidential candidates to emphasize international issues.

Of course events in the campaign year may dictate the tone and direction of the political debate. A violent crackdown in Peru, further bloodshed in Bosnia or Alma-Ata, political instability in Russia or Ukraine, a provocative or hostile move by Saddam Hussein or Muammar al-Qaddafi (or an allied military preemptive strike at Iraq or Libya), a breakthrough or breakdown in Middle East peace talks—these possibilities among many others could force discussion of specific policies or broader issues and themes.

What is particularly needed is vigorous give-and-take on how best to fill another large vacuum: that of a new common

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purpose for America. Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) has spoken of the need for America to pursue a "Big Ambition," a transcendental goal that affirms to us our special status as a society and as a force in the world. On the surface it might seem that the climate is inhospitable for a new Big Ambition, but in fact it could be a political plus, not a minus. Finding a formula to link domestic and foreign policy in a positive fashion can be not only a persuasive campaign theme—attracting voters looking for inspiration, excitement and change—but also a way to connect with a series of other attitudes held by clear majorities of Americans. A concern with domestic priorities and a belief that we must continue to play a significant and pro-active international role are not mutually exclusive.

Here is one alternative: a new Big Ambition, tailored to inspire and excite, begins with our values—democracy, freedom and free markets—which indeed won out in the broader ideological struggle with Marxism-Leninism and totalitarianism. We have an obligation to protect and enhance those values as they take root around the world, but first and foremost we need to exemplify them better than anyone else: to be, in James Fallows' phrase, "More Like Us."

It must start with a recognition that we need to invest in America if we are to continue to exemplify anything to the rest of the world; that it is not a question of combating an enemy but competing with partners who can also be competitors, to channel our competitive spirit in a positive way to accomplish twin goals of worldwide economic growth and robust domestic economic growth. Lester Thurow has noted:

> American investment is simply not world-class. Plant and equipment investment per labor-force member is far below that of either Germany or Japan; nondefense research and development spending is 40 to 50 percent less than that of Germany and Japan; physical infrastructure investments are running at half the level of the late 1960s. While Europe embarks on an ambitious high-speed rail network to link its major cities, unspent funds pile up in highway and airport trust funds in the United States. Japan has a plan for rewiring itself with fiber optics (building the electronic highway of the 21st century); America does not.[1]

Reining in Japan and Germany is not the answer to Thurow's

[1]Lester Thurow, "Money Wars: Why Europe Will Own the 21st Century," *The Washington Post*, Outlook Section, April 19, 1992.

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challenge; rebuilding our own economic base is. In addition to turning our attention and resources to redressing these deficits, a new Big Ambition should also mean a new spirit applied to political reform, workplace reform, school reform, urban reform and other changes that make institutions more responsive to workers, parents, teachers and others, along with a renewed commitment to public service and to rebuilding our capital stock, environment and services to make it all possible. An investment in America will cost money, to be sure, but a country with a nearly $6 trillion economy can easily afford the one to two percent of gross national product necessary to enhance its infrastructure and research and development capability.

A commitment to making our democracy and market economy the vision for others is neither liberal nor conservative at its core; it can involve borrowing ideas from wish lists of liberals and conservatives, from Bob Kuttner and Robert Reich to Jack Kemp and Stuart Butler. But what makes this focus a Big Ambition is the recognition that a renewed focus on building American democracy is not at odds with a commitment to play an active role in promoting democracy abroad.

In this post-Cold War world Americans do not want to shoulder the burden themselves. But recognizing America's special role, they do not want to abandon the burden either. They clearly want more attention to be paid to long-neglected domestic problems, but they also believe in an active interdependent role for America, working with the United Nations and other transnational organizations, to clean up the environment, to invest in energy efficiency worldwide, to eliminate all chemical and nuclear weapons and to expand peacekeeping. Americans do not shrink from military intervention against a dictator practicing policies inimical to their values, if it is done in a cooperative, multilateral way; 79 percent believe that the United States and the United Nations should be willing to intervene militarily and engage in combat against an aggressive dictator, if diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions fail. To be sure, they do not favor ambitious new aid programs abroad, but neither do they want to dismantle what we have established. They did not rise up in angered opposition to an ambitious aid package to the former Soviet republics, especially when it was explained as much in terms of American self-interest as simple altruism.

An active American role abroad is neither liberal nor con-

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servative; it fits Reagan's tradition as much as Kennedy's. It does not require a large financial investment nearly so much as it does a clear and inspiring appeal to American values and self-interest. Although surveys tell us that Americans will not recoil from this kind of vision, it is obviously not the only one that could be presented or accepted. Even if it were to prevail, there are still many hard questions to confront. Americans may favor an active role through multilateral cooperation, but what if that cooperation is not forthcoming? Or what if multilateral organizations want to act in a fashion that is not in America's self-interest? The post-Cold War world will not be a simple one, and the difficult trade-offs ahead need to be raised for public confrontation and argument.

Both George Bush and Bill Clinton are capable of laying out such a role for America—combining assertive domestic and activist foreign policies, and engaging the broader society in the debate. But in this angry and scandal-driven year the odds are against it. Perhaps it will not matter all that much; the appropriate role for America may develop in a hit-or-miss fashion, shaped by events and by the predilections of both the next president and the public.

But just as likely, no clear role for America will emerge, and we will continue to flounder, with policy ping-ponging between isolationism and internationalism, driven more by the momentary whims of public opinion and the tactics of various and sundry politicians than an intelligent and developed concept of where to go and what to do.

The real danger may come if the election outcome in essence reflects the status quo, at least in terms of partisan power alignments. For all the turmoil in American politics the single most likely outcome in November is the reelection of George Bush combined with a continuing, albeit somewhat smaller, Democratic majority in both houses of Congress. Disaffection and all, the electorate does not accept the judgment of many elites that we need a period of unified party control after a decade of divided government; two-thirds of Americans still say they prefer to have one party control the White House and the other the Congress, to keep all sides honest and in check.

A reelected George Bush would be made an instant lame duck by virtue of the two-term limitation. He would be made even weaker by the perceived weakness of his running mate; on November 4 the Republican Party will begin to break down

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into factions for Quayle, Buchanan, Cheney, Baker, Kemp, Gramm, Gingrich, Weld, Wilson, Alexander, Bennett and others, all with an eye focused more on 1996 than on the Bush agenda in 1993.

A continued Democratic Congress under these conditions would be weaker yet. A party that has lost the White House for the fourth consecutive time, after getting close once again, would be bitter and recriminative. It would also have to cope with 100 to 150 new members whose core agenda for change will be, as retiring Republican lawmaker Vin Weber has observed, the pledge not to put money in a House bank that no longer exists and to forego free Capitol parking and the use of the House gym. The constituency for farsighted post-Cold War policy will be limited and hobbled, at best.

Thus the need for a vigorous debate over the future role of America in the world is even greater right now, to provide some groundwork for policy and some mandate for the next president and Congress. The candidates should be pressured relentlessly to provide it, through questions and themes in the presidential debates and by press coverage of the campaign.

The role of opinion leaders in this process becomes especially crucial. Reporters, editors and producers require their own form of relentless peer pressure, to move the focus of press coverage away from its obsession with petty personal scandals and toward the key questions of governance for the 21st century. Media decision-makers should be subject to withering criticism from those they respect if they continue to report the campaign in the vein of supermarket tabloids.

At the same time, if the candidates and parties do not want to emphasize questions of America's role in the post-Cold War world, that vacuum should be filled by others. Conferences in a variety of settings, aired on cable television and covered extensively in the press, are excellent efforts to turn the country's attention to these key issues. Such conferences and seminars, along with op-ed pieces, essays, television specials and editorials ought to be everywhere in the next several months. America might stumble into an appropriate and positive role for the next few decades, but there is no good reason to rely on the whimsy of fortune.

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James A. Leach

A REPUBLICAN LOOKS AT FOREIGN POLICY

Perspective is always difficult to apply to events of the day. Centuries hence, however, historians will surely conclude that this generation of Americans stood poised on a hinge of history. Beginning with the east European revolutions of 1989 the world has witnessed an astounding cataract of events, the triumphant culmination of forty years of steadfast alliance diplomacy.

America's principal adversary, the once-formidable Soviet empire, has collapsed from without and within. Militarily the threat of sudden Muscovite aggression and of nuclear Armageddon has diminished to imperceptibility. Philosophically communism is in retreat, pell-mell. Economically the liberating logic of the free market has challenged the world's remaining Marxist governments with contrasting models of such greater efficiency and opportunity that the demise of centralized-planning regimes is heralded, with only the time frame in doubt.

Through a strategy of economic development and political containment the United States and the community of free nations have achieved a more decisive victory over Bolshevism than could ever have been gained through war.

Meanwhile only one short year ago in the Persian Gulf, President Bush assembled an unprecedented international coalition to uphold the rule of law. For the first time since Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, an American president has defined his presidency with a theme—New World Order—developed in action (or more precisely, reaction) rather than as campaign sloganeering.

II

Absent stark Cold War contrasts, the challenge for American leadership in the decade ahead will be to chart a course that is inclusive, not exclusive, of perspectives developed

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beyond our shores. America must look to constructive internationalism; to Pacific-ism, rather than pacifism; to Atlanticism rather than mere alliance-ism; to leadership of the Americas, rather than insular America First-ism.

The politics of hard times at home, however, has led some in American public life to suggest myopically that Russian roulette be played with our economy and national security by retreating from larger world affairs. At a time when public frustration with Congress has never been higher, a legislative branch on trial has caused members to become overwrought with concern for political survival; courage and largeness of the human spirit are not hallmarks of a legislative body fighting to reestablish both public and self respect.

The consequence of the American people's dwindling confidence in Congress is the potential breakdown not just of bipartisan but bi-institutional foreign policy. The demoralization of Congress has led to another Dullesque reappraisal of U.S. foreign policy, which is potentially most troubling in the area of commerce, where the Constitution gives the legislative branch a larger role than in state-to-state political relations.

The combination of political institutions in disrepute and an economy without growth has resulted in a dispirited civil polity, increased partisanship and pressure from the extremes of the political spectrum to play ostrich politics, to construct a Fortress America, to revive lost causes and lost illusions. However seductive, the lure of neo-isolationism—the dream of returning to relative economic autarky and somnolent continental security—appeals to the nostalgic instincts of the American public, much as do Norman Rockwell's depictions of the American character.

The danger of this contemporary "America First" movement is neither its premise nor its romanticism, but its implications: that the United States has nothing left to gain from or contribute to international peace and prosperity; that America should be an observer rather than a leader of the world; that political ambition can best be advanced by manipulating parochial fears rather than enlarging the human horizon.

Key leaders in Congress, largely Democratic, continue to peddle a protectionist insularism that amounts to a gospel of retreat from progressive foreign policy values. Frustrated by a dozen years of Republican control of the White House, theirs is the easy wisdom of those without accountability, the irresponsibility of semi-permanent foreign policy opposition.

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Hence the vacillation implicit in the refusal to endorse the president's approach to the Gulf War, and exasperated opportunism reflected in vehement anti-foreign aid pronouncements coupled simultaneously with criticism of the president for lacking the vision to present a forthcoming Soviet aid package. Hence also the hypocrisy of claiming to desire warmer, more respectful relations with Latin America while placing a series of delaying roadblocks in the paths of President Bush's North American Free Trade Area proposal and of his debt forgiveness and debt-for-nature swap programs that, with his investment program, comprise the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.

On the Republican right, protest candidate Patrick A. Buchanan defines himself more in the tradition of Father Coughlin than Robert Taft. Repudiating core tenets of Nixonian and Reaganite foreign policy, Buchanan mixes diplomatic disengagement, economic protection and appeals to a new American nativism into a political apostasy rooted more in the nineteenth-century anti-immigrant biases of the Know-Nothings than the Lincolnian model of societal sacrifice to broaden the scope of individual rights and social tolerance.

In foreign policy the twentieth-century Republican tradition includes Theodore Roosevelt's brand of principled brigandage, Harding's coolness to the League of Nations and Wendell Willkie's "one worldism." In its history the G.O.P. has been isolationist and interventionist, unilateral and multilateral. Out of power, or at least outside the executive branch, it tends to intemperance. In power, in the last half century, with the possible exception of Reagan's first term, it has been professional, prepared and progressive.

President Bush has had the good fortune to oversee and lead a world in transition. The thaw in East-West relations has precipitated the winding down or conclusion of a number of bloody regional conflicts—from Afghanistan to Angola to Cambodia to Nicaragua and, at long last, war-torn El Salvador. And, in the cauldron that is the Middle East, the United States has embarked on a high-risk strategy to facilitate a process that could lead to a comprehensive peace.

Writing in 1950, Reinhold Niebuhr noted that the price of survival was our ability to give leadership to the free world. Today the price of the prosperity of the free world still depends on our ability and willingness to lead. No other society has the capacity or inclination to light freedom's lamp

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in quite the same way; nor is any other as capable of combining self-interest with a genuine historically rooted concern for others. For the United States to deny its transnational responsibilities and thwart the development of internationalist approaches to problem-solving is to jeopardize a future of peace and greater prosperity.

No principle of American foreign policy, no understanding of American history or the American people, no sober appreciation of the limits of our power or moral authority commends a Pax Americana. By the same token no prudent statesman, surveying the breadth of our international interests and responsibilities, could find security or virtue in a new isolationism.

III

Few issues are more important to our long-term national interest than the future of democracy and free enterprise in the former Soviet Union and former Soviet bloc. President Nixon was correct when he observed in March 1992 that concern for the fate of the political and economic reforms in Russia had been a casualty of the early presidential primaries.

It may be ironic that it was Nixon who staked out the moral high ground on such a crucial strategic issue (and doubly so that it was a former manipulator of wage and price controls who expressed such telling criticism of politicians in both parties for pandering to voters in an election year). Nevertheless, while the greatest unfought war in history may be won, peace remains elusive. Failure of the West to engage in helping alleviate the problems in the wake of communism's demise carries as many liabilities today as failure to contain communist expansionism would have forty years ago.

Establishment thinking in Washington for much of the last decade centered on the dubious assumption that American interests were intertwined with those of Gorbachev and his commitment to preserve the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's claim to historical significance cannot be denied—primarily because like Tokugawa Keiki, the last shogun of Japan, he chose to yield rather than confront popular sentiment with the force of arms. Yet the weakness of Gorbachev's political mandate was revealed by the speed with which he, titular head of the world's largest army and internal security force, went from being a

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leader without a constituency to almost irrelevant status as the former chief of state of a nonexistent country.

While startling and unexpected in its swiftness, the collapse of the Soviet empire is a historical turning point that Americans should understand more profoundly than any other society, because the self-determination asserted by the newly independent states is rooted in the principles of our Declaration of Independence.

Seldom has there been a more profound conjunction of American philosophy and American national interest than in the self-determination issues involved in the splintering of the Soviet state. Despite the fact that nuclear weapons management has become more complex and that irredentism and violent ethnic prejudices, repressed for almost three-quarters of a century, have resurfaced as if merely buried in a time capsule, the threat of dealing with 15 democratizing republics has to be considered less challenging to American national interests than that emanating from a single united despotic state. There simply could be no better safeguard for our national security than the development of a multiplicity of independent Eurasian governments accountable to free peoples.

Marx notwithstanding, the real opiate of the twentieth century is intolerance, the instinct for hatred that becomes manifest in the individual and is unleashed in society when governments fail to provide safeguards for human rights and fail to erect civilizing institutions adaptable to change and accountable to the people. As the old world order passes and a new one is experimented with, policymakers have an obligation to look beyond the balance-of-power politics to a new civil community. The wolf is still at the door in relations between states, between peoples of differing ethnic and religious composition, and among the economic have-nots of the globe.

The immediate challenge for America is to craft techniques that nurture democratic values and retard the prospect of regression to police-state controls and aggressive foreign policies on the Eurasian land mass. Winning peace is always less costly than waging war, but it is not cheap; nor in some instances is it easy to justify to political constituencies. Yet, as Washington well understands but not so well dares to explain to the public, little is more worrisome than punitive indifference, as the victors of World War I applied to Germany. Likewise, little in retrospect appears more successfully enlight-

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ened than the more generous approach taken toward the losers of World War II.

In the long run, free enterprise and trade are the only answers; in the short run, a modest amount of humanitarian, technical and international financial assistance to the former Soviet republics may be the cheapest national security insurance policy the United States can consider taking out. Direct U.S. aid ought to emphasize exchange programs, humanitarian assistance—principally food and medicine—and help in dismantlement of nuclear weapons systems. For economic development and financial assistance, the West should rely primarily on the three relevant multilateral institutions: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the newly created European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The role of the multilateral institutions should be stressed for three reasons. First, reliance on international institutions implies shared rather than singular U.S. aid responsibility; our European allies and Japan will provide the majority of financial resources. Second, in addition to leveraging dollars, these institutions allow the West to leverage principles. Few governments are prone to bow to pressure for market-oriented reform coming from a single country. Many, however, will institute politically difficult reforms as prerequisites for IMF and World Bank support. Third, in most cases the international financial institutions make loans rather than grants and have a far better record of receiving repayment than any individual country. Indeed, in the 1980s the United States earned over $600 million a year through participation in IMF loans.

While Americans may differ on the role and composition of foreign aid, consensus should be obtainable on the notion that progressive change can most likely be institutionalized through expanded trade and investment ties. Aid without trade is a prescription for dependency, not self-sufficiency. Likewise aid without the development of a free-enterprise psychology and legal infrastructure will be of fleeting significance. Unless laws are developed that protect property and provide incentives for entrepreneurship, all of the newly established states of the former Soviet Union and erstwhile Soviet bloc will likely stagnate for decades with per capita GNP wallowing at the level of less developed countries. What the former socialist states need is a cultural reordering of attitudes toward the relation of the state and individual. This can only

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occur through the widest possible contact with the West, particularly America.

What the West must do is conjoin political and economic principles, emphasizing that democracy and free enterprise go hand in hand and that those states that move the most progressively in tandem are likely to be recipients of most public assistance as well as private investment. In this regard the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union should be singled out for sympathetic concern, with the new leaders of the Kremlin put on frank notice that efforts to thwart independence movements, whether in the Baltics, Ukraine or Georgia, will be looked on with political disfavor carrying negative trade and investment implications.

Social dislocation too often leads to scapegoats and easy solutions, to a search for a strong man, a Ukrainian Mussolini or a Russian Milošević. Likewise the pace of reform itself may lead to disillusionment, like that expressed by Russian nihilist Dimitri Pisarev, who suggested in the mid-nineteenth century that a pair of boots was of more intrinsic human value than all the plays of Shakespeare. If communism is not simply to give way to nihilism, hope must be provided in democracy, market economics and trade.

The United States should not shy away from offering free trade agreements to the countries of east-central Europe and the Baltic. Such agreements would assure market access to the United States, stand as a beckoning incentive for foreign investment, counterbalance potential German dominance of the region and serve to undercut from behind any exterior trade walls the west Europeans might consider erecting.

IV

Nationalism may be an instrument for liberty. It may also be a harbinger of intolerance that must be vigilantly guarded against, especially in the part of Europe that has given birth to the two epochal conflicts of this century.

In Europe George Kennan's historic policy of containment represented a near-war defined as a Cold War response to the aggressive tendencies of a powerful totalitarian adversary. Premised on that containment doctrine, NATO's strategic policy and deterrence posture successfully thwarted any expansionist ambitions in Europe that may have been entertained by the Kremlin.

The very success of NATO ironically jeopardizes its future.

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But as new doctrines are considered care must be taken that NATO be sustained with a structure and a mission that provide security for the preservation of liberty in central and eastern Europe. While progressive winds continue to blow from behind the collapsed iron curtain, NATO must be prepared to deal with contingencies that may develop from a shift in these winds, accidental escalations or political misjudgments.

Unity based on common threat is easier to obtain than one based on common aspirations. The immediate challenges to NATO are likely to come more from within than without, from ethnic and nationalist discord and emerging parochialism on trade, with the resultant danger that a global trading system may collapse at precisely the moment when the peoples of east-central Europe need open markets most.

In 1944 Walter Lippmann coined the term "Atlantic Community" to convey America's strategic interest in the successful postwar reconstruction of Europe. Almost fifty years later, and half a world away, it is time for the United States to help establish a "Pacific Community," to convey our political and economic interests in the Far East and in reawakening south Asia.

The linchpin of American policy in the Far East is our relationship with Japan. The good news in the relationship is that, despite a hiccup in 1991, the bilateral trade deficit continues to decline, and that at long last American business has begun to warm to the task of competing and winning in the difficult Japanese market. The bad news is that in tough economic times national moods take on an uglier, more pessimistic tone, manifested in Japan-bashing and, across the Pacific, in *kenbei*.

Yet despite the rising tension America and Japan continue to share a remarkable coincidence of interests. All the United States asked of Japan at the end of World War II was that it be democratic, oriented toward free enterprise and peaceful. The competitive concerns Americans evidence today stem from the Japanese heeding our advice too well rather than too little.

The United States and Japan represent 40 percent of the world economy; neither can allow trade disputes to poison this relationship. The best way to keep simmering tensions manageable is for the two countries to work together to defend and expand a free world trading system and for Japan, preferably of its own free will, without foreign pressure or *gaiatsu*, to

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become a model of free trade internally as well as an advocate of the same abroad.

If history is a guide protectionism belies its name. It provides job security for candidates, not workers. Just as, in Pogo's terms, the enemy too often is us, in trade policy the enemy is politicians, usually one's own. As the world moves from a half century of obsession with geopolitics to stress instead geoeconomics, the challenge for all peoples and all political systems is to avoid the easy trap of economic nationalism.

For America the trade issue for the last decade of the twentieth century is not so much figuring out what new arrows should be added to the bulging quiver of existing sanctions, it is in selecting the right marksman with the right judgment to understand when and where to aim, with the first concern being to avoid at all costs driving a shaft into the heart of the U.S. and world economy.

One of the lessons of the 1930s was that protectionist legislation, such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff, lengthened and deepened the Great Depression. By reverse logic, in recessionary times, promoting policies that impel the growth of international trade is likely to serve as an economic stimulant. Hence the importance of advancing the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the negotiation of free trade agreements, first with Mexico and other Latin and east European countries, but eventually with the European Community and selected south Pacific and Asian countries.

V

Historically the strength of American foreign policy has been most evident when we have stood solidly for advancing abroad the principles and ideals upon which our society is based. Principles should not be sacrificed for shortsighted objectives or shortsighted leaders. In reflecting societal values no country should be more confident. After all, the philosophical taproot of the changes taking place in the world—from central Europe to the Baltic states, from Afghanistan to Tiananmen Square, from Nicaragua to South Africa—is a happy recognition that it is Jeffersonian democracy that provides the boldest and most humane model for political and economic organization in recorded history.

Conservative Republican thinking has two philosophical bedrocks. The first is a Burkean emphasis on respect for

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existing social structures: the assumption that for change to be effective it must be gradualist. The second, a Lockean emphasis on definable rights, is more radical and uncompromising.

President Bush in general is Burkean in temperament, emphasizing dialogue with the leadership in Moscow, Beijing and Pretoria, even when, for instance, a case might be made that in his Kiev speech of August 1991 he embraced Gorbachev beyond his due and his time.

Tiananmen produced stark challenges to conservative sensibilities about the rights of individuals. The president, however, has concluded that the maintenance of communication and trade not only advances short-term American interests on issues such as the Gulf War and peacekeeping in Cambodia, but in the long run bolsters the position in China of a Western-oriented entrepreneurial class that holds the best chance of promoting a regime more attuned to human rights concerns.

South Africa presents a similarly troubling philosophical dilemma for any conservative administration in Washington. While the first Republican presidency chose to risk war rather than compromise principles to end extremist apartheid—slavery—the last two Republican administrations have preferred to work with rather than against the government in Pretoria in an effort to help abolish apartheid in as civil and bloodless a way as possible. Fortunately, Washington has found in F. W. de Klerk an establishment leader heroically inclined to change and in Nelson Mandela a uniquely martyred aspirant. In competitive combination they give promise of an unusually civilized political phenomenon—evolutionary revolution.

VI

President Bush's critics have frequently gibed at him for problems with "the vision thing." Episcopalian in attitude as well as religious conviction, Bush eschews philosophical and even policy articulation, emphasizing reasoned decision-making and good judgment as contrasted with philosophical explication.

The Dutch architect Mies van der Rohe developed a theory of architecture around simplicity of design and the observation that "less is more," that is, the cluttering of design with fixtures and flourishes too often represents imperfection. Likewise, less can sometimes be more in public policy. In a

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

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variant of Teddy Roosevelt's "speak softly but carry a big stick" theme, President Bush's approach appears to be to speak little, sometimes in a convoluted fashion—with the manner more than the substance of his comments inducing confidence that he leads an administration capable of crafting reasoned responses to challenges of the day.

Instinctively, Bush at his low-key best appears to be attempting to follow the advice of Thomas Paine that "moderation in temper is always a virtue; moderation in principle is always a vice." To the extent the president attempts to appeal in public pronouncements to wider constituencies, his higher charged patriotic rhetoric often shields a deep-seated internationalism.

If one American political party has been historically identified with the advocacy of collective security and the multilateral diplomacy it implies, it is the Democratic Party. Collective security was the watchword of Woodrow Wilson, who literally drove himself to death defending the principle against strident critics. Franklin Roosevelt, arguably the greatest president of this century, insisted that collective security principles be espoused in the Atlantic Charter, in authoritative statements of American war aims in World War II and ultimately in the Charter of the United Nations.

Yet today it is a Republican president who, in opposition to both the isolationist and go-it-alone interventionist themes that have ambivalently represented much of this century's conservative tradition, is in the vanguard of constructive internationalism and credible collective security endeavors. Such is the implication of the extraordinary international coalition that Washington led in the Gulf War. Such is also the meaning of U.N.-sanctioned peacekeeping initiatives in Cambodia and Yugoslavia.

In a strategic sense, there have been three defining events in this century: World War I, World War II and the Cold War. The role of American soldiers and American military preparedness was crucial in winning each. Were it not for the American G.I., there would be no collective security. The only competition in the world today would be between the totalitarianism of the left and totalitarianism of the right. Europe would be freedom's toxic dump. Either the Nazi or the Soviet jackboot would be the symbol of order. The land mass that produced Montesquieu and Locke, Beethoven and Descartes

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would find its libraries filled with the class conflict implications of *Das Kapital* and the hate-ridden dogma of *Mein Kampf*.

While it would be overly optimistic to conclude that the wars of this century were wars to end all wars, it would be overly pessimistic to fail to recognize the extraordinary opportunity presented to the United States to advance verifiable arms control and strengthen collective security arrangements.

Seldom has a benchmark policy been less theoretically defined, but it would appear that what President Bush is attempting to develop in his New World Order theme is the precedent that aggression will not be rewarded; that countries should be expected to follow core precepts of international law; that countries distant from areas of conflict should be prepared to contribute to the preservation of worldwide norms; that international institutions and multilateral arrangements will be used to the maximum in developing collective approaches to common concerns.

Some 39 years ago President Eisenhower proposed an initiative called Atoms for Peace, a plan for the United States and the Soviet Union to dedicate fissionable materials from dismantled nuclear warheads for peaceful uses. Given the current momentum on arms control, the timing could not be more propitious for Russia and the other Soviet successor states to work with the United States to ensure that weapons-grade materials will not become "loose nukes" or recycled back into other deadly warheads, but instead that their awesome destructive potential will be converted to humanitarian purposes.

The 21st century can be looked to with an understanding that what distinguishes this generation of citizens from all others is that we are the first to have the capacity not just to wage war, but to destroy civilization. As Einstein once noted, "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking." If war is a constant of history, the greatest political science quandary of all time is how to develop techniques to make it obsolete.

Avoiding a nuclear exchange implies the need to pay greater attention to the causes of war, such as impoverishment, as well as to the development of instruments of war. To halt the scourge of nuclear proliferation, arms control on a global as well as regional basis is a self-evident societal imperative.

Erecting effective barriers to the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction demands that restraint be

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accepted by the United States as well as developing countries. The first business of a new world order should be negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. In addition the United Nations ought to be mandated to develop a more rigorous International Atomic Energy Agency inspection regime than has heretofore been contemplated, and to authorize appropriate sanctions for regimes like that of North Korea.

The time is also ripe for the United States and the world community to consider creating within the U.N. system an international criminal court or courts, to hold accountable international criminals who violate specific international conventions such as those related to terrorism, drug trafficking and crimes against the peace. Such a court system would be complementary to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, which exclusively adjudicates disputes between states. There could be no more appropriate potential defendants to proceedings of this nature than Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein and Abu Nidal.

Since one of the most effective antidotes to the irrationality of ancient enmity is the swift justice of the law, a turn (or in the case of the United States, return) to the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court would appear to be one of the most appropriate and achievable objectives of the decades ahead.

Any credible post-Gulf War scenario for encouraging peace and stability in the Middle East must include unprecedented multilateral restraints on the transfer of advanced conventional arms. If there is any lesson of the gulf conflict it is that the West was responsible for the creation of the armed camp known as Iraq.

Nevertheless the triumph of collective security in the Persian Gulf gives hope that a new international order will be established, with the understanding that peacekeeping is peacemaking. As Winston Churchill observed in his famous Iron Curtain speech some 46 years ago, U.N. peacekeeping efforts to be effective require "sheriffs and constables."

With the United Nations finally beginning to function as its framers intended, it is time for the United States to lead in the creation of a modest U.N. rapid-deployment force. Logistical and certain intelligence capabilities could be shared with the United Nations by the member states, as Congress originally contemplated in the 1945 U.N. Participation Act, and by U.N. members as a whole by "special agreements" under Article 43

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of the charter. Likewise either the moribund Military Staff Committee needs to be revived or a new system established.

There is an ambivalence, if not tension, in the American psyche between isolationism and internationalism, between hubristic leadership and team playing. Given the traumas of post-World War II interventions, the American people are reluctant to assume the lonely and costly role of policeman for the world. On the other hand, they accept as a credible obligation that the United States should play a significant part with others as international highway patrolman.

Continued expansion of U.N. responsibilities, however, cannot be contemplated without adequate financing. It is ironic that as American policy and American interests are progressively being advanced by the United Nations, the United States has become the institution's single biggest deadbeat, with arrears in excess of $400 million. For Congress, it is not a proud moment that legislators are so stumped by a stultified appropriations process that peacekeeping in areas of the world as explosive as Cambodia, Yugoslavia and the Golan Heights does not receive the highest priority. Likewise, for the executive branch, it is not a proud moment that policymakers are so stymied by the domestic abortion debate that traditional American leadership in international family planning has ignominiously collapsed.

VII

Finally, a note about this century as it is beginning to unfold into the next. The twentieth century, like those of all recorded history, has been marked by war. For the first time, however, mankind has come to contemplate reasons why war should become obsolete and rational approaches to ensuring that such a prospect becomes possible. The existence of weapons of mass destruction gives unprecedented and compelling reason to work to ensure that they not be employed. The creation of international institutions—most importantly the United Nations—the expansion of international law and the demonstrated will of the international community to participate in collective security arrangements give hope that the next century will be marked by a dramatic diminution of cross-boundary conflict.

The simplest, although most dangerous, part of the Cold War is over. Now the complicated work begins. If the nascent experiments in democracy and free enterprise collapse in the

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former Soviet Union and central Europe, the potential ramifications for the national security of the United States—in dollar costs for military preparedness and human costs due to unanticipated threats and conflicts—could be staggering.

The challenge of our time is to grasp the opportunity created by the end of the Cold War. If America leads wisely, new wells of creative energy can be opened up and mankind's untapped productive potential released. The world can be enriched with a renaissance of the human spirit. If, on the other hand, America fails to secure the peace so many citizens have sacrificed so much to achieve, the mantle of 21st century leadership will pass to other less charitable societies and less liberal philosophies.

The weight of historical judgment is on our shoulders. As Dwight Eisenhower declared in his first inaugural address, "the faith we hold belongs not to us alone, but to the free of all the world."

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Lee H. Hamilton

A DEMOCRAT LOOKS AT FOREIGN POLICY

The world has turned upside down, but U.S. foreign policy has been slow to change. We have failed to develop a coherent strategy for the future—a successor to containment. A Republican sits in the White House, but Democrats also bear responsibility for foreign policy inertia. Democrats have ceded the field of foreign affairs to the president, let him set the agenda and not challenged him often enough on the specifics of policy. The result has been drift.

It is now up to Democrats to articulate a more compelling American foreign policy. Democrats have the opportunity to redefine the concept of national security and to strike a better balance between domestic and foreign affairs, and between leadership and partnership. The issues are no longer communist expansion and nuclear survival, but economic competitiveness, weapons proliferation, support for democracy, protection of the environment and the fight against human misery. The task is one of redefining America's role in the world.

II

America is the preeminent power today. Its economy is still the world's most productive. Militarily it is the world's only superpower. Countries and peoples around the world still admire its democratic political system and free-market economy.

Nevertheless, while we find reasons to celebrate our foreign policy successes, we find ourselves threatened at home: by recession, crises in our cities, in our education and health care systems, persistent budget and trade deficits, and a growing sense of political paralysis.

Domestic problems have made the American public ambivalent about the U.S. role in the world. Americans are proud of their country's international leadership, but they worry about its burdens. They want to see greater contributions from our

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Lee H. Hamilton, Representative from Indiana, is a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

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

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allies. They are convinced that we could better solve domestic problems if we scaled back commitments overseas. Public opposition to foreign assistance is strong. Calls for deep cuts in defense spending are growing. Yet, when asked, Americans say they do not want the United States to relinquish its special place in the world.

How can these views be reconciled? My sense is that the American people intuitively understand what the present administration does not: the link between domestic well-being and America's role in the world. Americans recognize that the fundamental purpose of our foreign policy is to promote conditions abroad that protect and improve the quality of life at home. In turn they understand that our ability to solve problems abroad depends on our domestic vitality.

Many Americans sense that President Bush has had his priorities wrong. The first claim on his time, energy and skill has been foreign affairs. He has neglected the economy and domestic policy. Americans are hard-pressed to identify the president, now in his fourth year of office, with any successful domestic or economic initiative. He has failed to understand the linkage between the economy and American leadership.

What we are hearing from Americans today is first and foremost a demand to address problems at home. They are not calling on the United States to bring home all its troops or sever diplomatic and economic ties with the world. Rather, their plea—and the plea of Democrats—is for a better balance.

Disengagement is not possible in a world of instantaneous communication and economic interdependence. Neither isolation nor withdrawal is an option for the United States. If we forget about the world and focus only on our domestic problems, they would grow worse. The question is not whether we should participate in world affairs, but how.

The president so far has failed to instill a new sense of mission in American foreign policy. He maneuvered well in the waning days of the Cold War, but he is now without a new organizing principle. The administration's main effort to put together a blueprint for the post-Cold War era has come from the Pentagon, which argues for a one-superpower world. The president has yet to state his position on the Pentagon proposal. He has not articulated an answer to the real foreign policy question: What are the new threats to U.S. interests, and how should our foreign policy be reconfigured to defend those interests?

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III

Our interests may be permanent, but the threats to them have changed. The demise of communism means we need to focus on new challenges and priorities. We must continue to be prepared to defend our vital economic and security interests—in Europe, east Asia, the Persian Gulf and areas directly adjacent to our borders. Now that the Soviet threat has vanished the dominant security threat comes from the breakup of states and the proliferation of deadly weapons and technologies. The United States needs a more effective policy in the 1990s to deal with both regional instability and aggression, as well as renegade states and groups that seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

The draft Pentagon planning paper leaked to the press in February is dead wrong in promoting the notion of a sole superpower dominating the rest of the world. The key to U.S. security is sustaining the democratic alliances that have been shaped over the last half century. We cannot build a new world order if our allies believe our foreign policy is designed to turn back any power that challenges our leadership. We will need to remain the world's strongest military power, but there is no contradiction between collective security and military preeminence—as the Gulf War illustrated.

Economic power is the new determinant of international stature. The restoration of U.S. competitiveness is critical not only to our domestic economy but to our foreign policy as well. Our economic problems are limiting the reach of our foreign policy at a time when the rest of the world is looking to the United States for leadership.

We need domestic policies that restore the foundation for U.S. competitiveness and economic growth—more private and public investment, better education, job training and health care—and a foreign policy that promotes open markets for U.S. goods and services. American voters have consistently rejected protectionist trade policies, but they insist on a level playing field.

We have a golden opportunity to foster the spread of democracy and free markets. But President Bush has been too selective in his application of democratic principles, forgetting them when it comes to China or the Middle East. He has been too focused on stability instead of the pursuit of freedom, self-determination and justice. There is no conflict between

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these values: promoting democracy builds long-term security. We should provide concrete political and economic advice and across-the-board assistance to struggling democracies. We need to keep American values where they belong—at the heart of our foreign policy.

Finally, we must address issues that pose a direct threat to our prosperity and quality of life. The president speaks expansively about the role of the United States in the world, but he has defined that role too narrowly. We are deeply involved in issues such as aggression in the gulf, but great problems such as the environment, energy use, population growth, hunger and health have been neglected. We also need to pay greater attention to the growing gap between rich and poor. Democracy cannot flourish in human misery. Economic growth in the world's poorest countries will have a direct, beneficial impact on our long-term national security. The end of the Cold War gives us an opportunity to focus on these neglected and vexing problems.

The new challenges to U.S. interests will require two adjustments in U.S. foreign policy. First, we need to achieve a better balance between leadership and partnership in our foreign policy. American leadership is necessary but no longer sufficient to solve many international problems. We are first among democratic equals and must recognize the limitations of unilateral action. Addressing new threats to peace and prosperity—nationalist conflict, arms proliferation, the consolidation of democracy and free markets, and environmental, health and population problems—will require unprecedented levels of international cooperation.

Second, we need a better balance between our domestic and foreign policies. The former affects the latter. If we do not provide Americans with quality education, health care and jobs, we will soon find that we lack the human and material resources required to fulfill our still necessary role as world leader. If we wish to lead abroad tomorrow, we must focus on our domestic problems today.

IV

U.S. economic performance is troubling. Economics can no longer take second place to national security in setting U.S. government policy. Under President Bush, U.S. gross domestic product has grown less than one percent annually. This is the worst economic performance under any president since

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Herbert Hoover. During the 1950s and 1960s America's economic growth was vigorous—averaging 3.9 percent in the 1950s and 4.1 percent in the 1960s. Growth slowed in the 1970s to 2.8 percent, and slowed further in the 1980s to 2.6 percent. In the 1990s growth all but stopped.

Due to sustained high rates of productivity growth, Japan and the European Community are rapidly closing the economic gap with the United States. Some experts predict that one or both will replace the United States as the world's leading economy. Both Japan and Europe have high savings rates and are making the investments in people and infrastructure that will help them ensure sustained improvements in living standards in the 1990s and beyond. Their foreign economic policies are just as effective. By 1993 the EC will be the world's largest trading bloc. Japan is weaving a web of trade and investment ties throughout the Pacific Rim, the world's most dynamic economic region. These ties will strengthen its economic position for years to come.

Economic weakness undermines the ability of the United States to achieve its foreign policy goals:

—We supplied the bulk of the military forces in the Persian Gulf, but the war was financed by payments of $54 billion from friends and allies. There is no guarantee that these partners will be so generous in future crises. When we rely on others to finance our foreign policy, we put it at risk.

—Sophisticated electronic components in weapons that performed so well during the Gulf War were manufactured abroad. A failure to maintain competitive high-technology industries will erode future U.S. military strength.

—U.S. inaction on the International Monetary Fund quota increase undercuts the ability of the IMF to support market economic reforms in eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.

—Persistent arrears in our share of financing the United Nations harms the ability of that organization to carry out vital peacekeeping missions.

Strong and balanced economic growth would make it easier for Americans to deal with both domestic and international problems. In the 1950s and 1960s the United States was the engine of growth for the world economy and a force for promoting both democracy and more open international markets. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl boasts that the 1990s will be the "Decade of Europe," and it is commonplace now for

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Japanese politicians to speak of U.S. economic decline. If we do not deal with our domestic economic problems, they will be right.

Americans understand that an economy that performs below its potential will, over the long run, fail to provide quality jobs and high living standards. As a result, worries about foreign economic competition are growing. The lack of an effective strategy to improve the performance of the economy is stimulating protectionist sentiment.

No foreign competitor provokes greater concern than Japan. To be sure, Japanese policies and business practices have limited our business opportunities and hurt some U.S. industries. Many of these policies and practices are unfair, and other nations share our concern about them. International pressure remains necessary to end these practices and further open Japan's lucrative domestic market. Indeed, exports have been a major source of U.S. economic growth in recent years, which underscores the value of an aggressive trade strategy.

Yet our bilateral trade deficit with Japan was about $44 billion in 1991, less than one percent of our total output of $5.7 trillion. We exported $591 billion of this output, just over ten percent. These figures suggest that it would be a mistake to overstate the adverse impact of foreign trade restrictions on our economy, or the favorable impact of loosening those restrictions. Our current recession and competitiveness problems were not made in Japan or anywhere else. Primary responsibility for our economic problems—and for their solutions—rests with the policies of the U.S. government and the performance of U.S. firms. Scapegoating Japan or other countries is counterproductive: it increases trade tensions and diverts precious attention from the domestic sources of our economic problems.

Japan's economic challenge is, at root, a domestic challenge. It requires a strong domestic response. Too much of our national output is devoted to consumption and too little to investment, both public and private. To boost productivity, we need more saving and more investment—in better educated and healthier workers, in improved plant and equipment, and in science and technology. Government policies should encourage lifelong opportunities for education, job training and retraining to provide for a highly skilled work force. Without compromising free-market principles we can strengthen exist-

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ing mechanisms for cooperation among universities, laboratories, industry and government.

Our economic performance would also be improved by a more aggressive response to foreign competition. With additional staff and resources U.S. embassies could do a far better job of promoting U.S. business abroad. Government and industry need to work more closely to identify and cultivate potentially significant technologies. U.S. trade negotiators should be given additional clout, which they need to pry open closed markets. We should insist on reciprocal treatment for U.S. exports.

The president needs to educate Americans about the nature of our international economic predicament. He should describe the extent of U.S.-Japan economic interdependence and the costs of a rupture in the relationship. He should try to persuade Americans that many foreign economic policies and practices, while different from ours, are not necessarily wrong or unfair. We could usefully adopt some of these policies and practices, and the president should help us identify them. Finally, the president needs to explain the structural features of the American and Japanese economies that will make it difficult in the near term to balance our bilateral trade.

The condition of American society also influences our role in the world. The example of America as a successful society has been a traditional source of U.S. influence abroad. Over the past two centuries many countries have tried to emulate our democracy, economy and society. But persistent poverty, the world's highest levels of violent crime and drug abuse, resurgent racial tensions and other problems suggest that the quality of American life today leaves much to be desired. The riots in Los Angeles have tarnished America's image. The president speaks of domestic problems, but the record of his administration in solving them is unimpressive. The deterioration of American society handicaps our ability to lead by example.

The president has a unique ability to focus public attention and to set the nation's priorities. Throughout the Cold War fighting communism invariably prevailed over domestic needs. Now this president—or the next—must shift the balance back to the home front if America is to rebuild its strength and continue to play an important role in the world.

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V

The choice before the United States is not whether it should repudiate international commitments and responsibilities. It is, again, a question of balance: between domestic and international priorities, and between U.S. leadership and partnership.

U.S. participation is still necessary to solve international problems. Yet the United States alone is no longer sufficient to get things done. Achieving our foreign policy objectives will require new forms of leadership and cooperation. This becomes clear when we look at several of the key challenges on the international agenda.

The United States should retain the capability to assure its security, but not every threat to international peace or stability will require a U.S. military response. The United States cannot, and should not, act as a global policeman or mercenary. But it is in our interest to take the lead in organizing collective responses to threats to peace.

When possible, Washington should try to respond to threats to collective security through the United Nations. If that body is recalcitrant or unable to respond, then we should try to build a coalition outside it. We should act alone only if we cannot find friends and partners with whom to work.

The Gulf War is both instructive and deceptive as an example for the future international security role of the United States. It is instructive in that only the United States had the ability to assemble an international coalition to oppose, and then reverse, Iraqi aggression. It is deceptive in that few threats to the peace will be so clear-cut and will so galvanize the United States and the international community as a direct military threat to the world's supply of oil.

Future threats to security are likely to be more complex and ambiguous: the messy breakup of states (the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union), internal conflict (Somalia) or massive violations of human rights (Iraq). Internal upheavals threaten to spill across borders and directly challenge international peace and stability.

When states break up, the United States and the United Nations should not work on behalf of the political status quo, but on behalf of democracy, human freedom and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The use of force for domestic repression, or to change boundaries in former multiethnic states,

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must be condemned by the international community. Washington should be in the forefront of efforts to involve the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or other regional organizations to keep the peace. The question for the future is whether and when the international community should intervene in circumstances where internal policies or human rights violations threaten international peace and stability.

The enduring lesson from the Gulf War should not be the military campaign, but the unprecedented cooperation that occurred within the Security Council. At last the United Nations is beginning to fulfill the security mission its founders intended. In Afghanistan, Namibia, Central America and Cambodia it has played a central role in ending East-West confrontation and brokering regional peace settlements. The United States should strongly support efforts to expand the U.N. peacekeeping role. The president's statements on funding the United Nations are positive, but his leadership is weak. He has not fought for his two-year, $700 million peacekeeping funding request and has not produced the congressional votes from his own party. Unfortunately, the Democratic Party has not been much better, and peacekeeping contributions this year are likely to fall short.

In order to assist peacekeeping activities, the United States and other permanent members could share intelligence with the U.N. secretariat. Peacekeeping efforts would benefit as well from increased financial and personnel contributions by Japan and Germany. The contribution of helicopters and aircraft by Germany to the work of the U.N. inspectors in Iraq is an important first step that should be replicated elsewhere.

VI

Arms control is also an area where U.S. leadership is necessary to promote international peace and stability.

The greatest security danger of the 1990s is weapons proliferation. The first step is to gain control over "loose nukes" in the former Soviet republics. Second, the United States, Russia and Ukraine should cut strategic nuclear forces to levels far below those agreed in the START treaty. What we do not need are Pentagon experts trying to find new targets and adversaries for existing nuclear weapons.

Washington should also move far more aggressively to use the $400 million appropriated by Congress for the disabling

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and dismantling of nuclear and chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union. Congress took this step five months ago, without any help from the president. The administration has yet to spend these funds. We should act now, while we have influence with Russia and the new republics. Delay increases the chances that these weapons will be used by renegade states or terrorists or in interrepublic disputes.

Washington should also revive efforts begun by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty. Stopping nuclear testing is central to our efforts to counter nuclear proliferation and is a solemn obligation undertaken by the nuclear signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty. We must ask ourselves whether we have anything to gain from continued testing, in contrast to the powerful political example of stopping nuclear tests. If we want to stop others from acquiring nuclear weapons, we must uphold our part of the bargain.

We need to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency. We should support the IAEA's right to unlimited inspection without advance notice when violations of the Nonproliferation Treaty are suspected. We should also push for an international agreement that requires full-scope safeguards on all nuclear facilities within a country before that country may obtain nuclear technology from any source.

America also needs to strengthen its intelligence capabilities to detect covert weapons programs. We and our allies should make sure the IAEA has early warning of suspect activities. Concerted international pressure will be needed to contain nuclear programs in countries that remain outside the nonproliferation and safeguards regime (North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel) and those whose adherence to its requirements is suspect (Libya, Iraq and Iran).

The spread of nuclear weapons and technology, unfortunately, is only one part of the proliferation problem. Western suppliers provided Iraq with the bulk of the components and critical technology not only for its nuclear program but for its chemical, biological and ballistic missile programs. The United States must work to develop an effective international policy for controlling the export and reexport of all sensitive technologies and materials related to weapons of mass destruction. We need to tighten restrictions on these exports through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control

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Regime and the Australia Chemical Weapons Suppliers Group.

The proliferation of conventional weapons is also a threat to peace and stability. The five permanent members of the Security Council are the world's five largest arms sellers. They account for 80 percent of all weapons sales to the Third World. If we are to curb conventional weapons transfers, the suppliers must act—and the United States, the biggest exporter, should lead.

The United States is missing a unique opportunity to encourage arms restraint where the problem is the greatest—the Middle East. With less than three percent of the world's population the Middle East accounted for 45 percent of Third World arms purchases in the 1980s, and $150 billion in sales by the "big five" arms suppliers.

The president's May 1991 decision to convene a conference of major Middle East arms suppliers is only a small step in the right direction. It is doubtful whether the U.S. proposal for prior notification and consultation on arms sales will restrain the arms trade. In fact the major thrust of U.S. policy is precisely in the wrong direction. Since September 1990 the United States has gone ahead with over $22 billion in government-to-government military sales to Middle Eastern states and issued licenses for up to another $6 billion in commercial sales. Other arms sellers are complaining that aggressive U.S. marketing is closing them out of Middle East markets. We will not foster arms restraint by leading the way with arms sales.

The United States should challenge other suppliers to join in a multilateral moratorium on Middle East arms sales. During such a moratorium Washington and other weapons suppliers should adopt tough, permanent limits on the quantity and quality of arms transfers to the Middle East. Without American leadership on arms restraint, arms suppliers and recipients will continue to conduct business as usual in the Middle East arms bazaar. That will set the stage for future Middle East wars.

VII

The dramatic events in the former Soviet Union last year, in eastern Europe three years ago and in Latin America over the past decade show that the values of political and economic freedom are ascendant. The key policy question for the

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United States and other nations is how to help consolidate democracy and free-market economic reforms.

With respect to eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, the United States is an important player, but by no means the only one. To date, Europe has provided most of the economic assistance. Nonetheless the United States has an indispensable leadership role to play, and the president has been timid and slow. In eastern Europe, Congress pushed the president to act. With respect to Russia, Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton pressed the president and made the case for assistance. The purpose of such assistance is to ease the pain of transition, to buy time for democratic and economic reform.

Successful reform in eastern Europe and in the former Soviet republics would make an enormous contribution to U.S. security. It would reduce U.S. defense expenditures, the nuclear threat, arms exports and the risk of environmental disaster. It would give the United States access to vast natural resources through peaceful commerce. It would redirect human talent to peaceful pursuits, open new markets for U.S. exports and promote world economic growth.

The president has now renewed his call for funding an IMF capital quota increase and has expressed his support for a currency stabilization fund for Russia tied to implementation of an IMF reform program. The United States along with the other Group of Seven leading industrial nations are now planning to provide $18 billion in balance-of-payments support and $6 billion for a stabilization fund to assist Russia's reform program. The proposal is a good one. But it is unclear how Washington will be able to play a leadership role on aid to Russia when, as the president says in this election year, such assistance can be provided with no new appropriations.

America and the EC must open their markets and give these new democracies an opportunity to export and grow. A successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade would be a big boost for reformers in eastern Europe and Latin America. A GATT agreement that cuts deeply into agricultural subsidies, starts to dismantle the EC's Common Agricultural Policy and opens up the world market for farm produce would go a long way toward getting these economies back on their feet. Poland, Romania and Ukraine were once the breadbasket of Europe, and they can become so once again. What is required of these nations are reforms of their own, matched by an opening of

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world markets, especially the EC market. What is best for eastern Europe, former Soviet republics and Latin America is what is best for the GATT membership as a whole: an open, liberal economic order. The talks have been dragging on for seven years, and the president must press for their successful conclusion.

Trade liberalization will also enhance the prospects for successful reform in Latin America, to the benefit of the United States. Open and growing economies in this hemisphere would provide exceptional opportunities for U.S. trade and investment. Sound, market-based economies will help reduce corruption and maintain political stability, which would reinforce U.S. security. The United States and other countries can make the reforms more tolerable and reinforce democracy by providing larger markets for Latin American exports and by further reducing debt burdens.

President Bush's 1990 Enterprise for the Americas Initiative was welcomed in Latin America as a sign of renewed interest in the region's economic future. The initiative, which has yet to be fully implemented, contains trade, debt and investment components. The debt component addresses only government-to-government debt, and more needs to be done to encourage reductions in commercial debt payments. The administration has also completed preliminary agreements providing for free-trade negotiations with most countries in Latin America, but all free-trade talks are on hold until the completion of negotiations on the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement among Mexico, Canada and the United States.

The NAFTA talks could provide a model for free-trade accords with other Latin American countries or the foundation for a hemispheric free-trade area. Freer trade would boost growth in countries that engage in it, but congressional concerns about specific economic and environmental consequences of free trade with Mexico will make final approval of a NAFTA agreement difficult. Much is riding on the success of the NAFTA talks, which increases pressure on the administration to produce an agreement Congress can support.

VIII

Elsewhere the United States has been too selective in encouraging democracy. We need a more balanced approach.

We have pressed for democratic change in former commu-

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nist countries, but those countries seen to have strategic importance—including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, China, Indonesia and Turkey—have escaped strong pressure on democracy and human rights. We have not even called for democratic change in Iraq; U.S. sanctions are tied only to Saddam Hussein's ouster.

Moreover our foreign policy has focused too much on governments, instead of on the consequences of our policies for people. We should not permit short-term considerations of order and stability to override long-term interests in expanding freedom, democracy and basic human rights. For example the Algerian army intervened to prevent an Islamic party from winning recent elections. Because the Bush administration had misgivings about the party, it did not speak out in favor of the democratic process. The United States thereby supported the army's moves to undercut democratic rule.

Democracy promotes, rather than undermines, long-term stability. Democratic governments are more peaceful than authoritarian ones. They make better allies and more reliable partners in international affairs. The denial of basic political rights often leads to violent upheaval. When we promote respect for human rights, civil liberties and the rule of law, we build a better foundation for long-term security and prosperity.

No country can make another democratic, but democracy can be cultivated where the desire for it exists. Established democracies such as the United States can help in this effort. Conversely, we should reduce—if not eliminate—assistance to governments that oppose democratic change or suppress human rights.

Countries in need of democratic assistance fall into three broad categories: those still under authoritarian rule, those in transition to democracy and those with new democratic governments.

In countries still under authoritarian rule, such as China and Cuba, we should try to sustain and strengthen democratic forces. Our policies should seek to increase the likelihood of a leadership succession that produces a more democratic government. We should increase personal and professional exchanges, step up radio news broadcasts and help democratic activists—openly if possible, secretly if necessary.

Countries making the transition to democracy need several kinds of assistance. Initially they may need help monitoring

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internal settlements and organizing elections. They often need help providing basic services—food, health care, law and order—until elected leaders are in place. Multinational efforts are necessary. Wealthy Asian nations such as Japan should provide the major share of funding for the U.N.-sponsored transition in Cambodia. As civil wars in El Salvador, Mozambique, Angola and Liberia wind down, these countries will also need help. Too often assistance has been ad hoc, uncoordinated and inadequately funded. The United Nations, the United States, Europe and Japan should sort out and share responsibilities.

One important area is in public administration. The United States can provide excellent assistance to new officials with no experience in democratic governance. In eastern Europe, U.S.-funded nongovernmental organizations are advising parliaments and municipal and regional governments. These programs should be expanded elsewhere. Expatriate communities in the United States and other countries are another source of valuable assistance to new governments.

IX

International environmental problems demand complex multilateral negotiations and a willingness to make short-term sacrifices. Both require active U.S. leadership. In recent years the United States has too often served as an obstacle to, rather than a catalyst for, effective international action. Scientific research and citizen action have expanded the international environmental agenda:

Global warming. The production of carbon dioxide and other "greenhouse gases," primarily through the burning of fossil fuels, is causing world temperatures to rise. This warming trend could swamp coastal areas, destroy fragile ecosystems and harm agriculture.

The ozone layer. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), chemicals used as coolants and in industrial processes, are depleting the stratospheric ozone layer that shields the earth from ultraviolet radiation. Increased exposure to ultraviolet radiation could increase skin cancer, damage eyesight, degrade human immune systems and disrupt food production.

Deforestation. The clearing of forests for timber, pasture and dwellings is causing soil erosion and destroying plants that

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soak up carbon dioxide. The burning of tropical forests also accounts for 25 percent of world carbon dioxide production.

Biological diversity. Human activity is destroying thousands of plant and animal species annually. One-fourth of current species could be extinct by 2020. The loss of plant species will harm crops and deprive the world of future medicinal advances.

International action on the environment is likely to succeed when the United States strongly backs it, and founder when we oppose it or sit on the sidelines. Active U.S. diplomacy was pivotal to the completion of the 1987 Montreal Protocol and subsequent agreements setting targets for reduced emissions of CFCs. In contrast, U.S. opposition prevented agreement last year on a permanent moratorium on mining in the Antarctic. The U.S. leadership deficit has been most glaring, and potentially most costly, in preparations for the June 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Brazil.

Preparations for the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro highlight the growing rift between the world's industrialized and developing nations on the costs of environmental cleanup. Many developing countries say industrialized countries must provide financial aid and advanced technologies if they are to implement UNCED commitments. Aid pledges by industrialized nations for environmental cleanup are far short of what developing countries say is needed.

U.S. intransigence has weakened what was intended to be the UNCED summit's most important achievement: the treaty on global warming. For several years Washington's resistance to formal targets on reducing carbon dioxide emissions has slowed efforts to negotiate a climate treaty. Officials defended U.S. policy by citing conflicting scientific data and the cost of limiting emissions. Yet on this the administration is isolated. Every major industrial country except the United States has now pledged to limit emissions of carbon dioxide to 1990 levels by the year 2000.

Developing countries may not be persuaded to use alternative fuels or costly technologies if industrialized countries are unwilling to take tough steps to control their own greenhouse emissions. Some developing countries have also said they will withhold cooperation on forest protection efforts until the United States agrees to formal limits on carbon dioxide emissions. U.S. foot-dragging on carbon dioxide restrictions is thus

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impeding international action on global warming and deforestation.

The global warming issue underscores the linkage between domestic and foreign policy. Since Europe and Japan use energy more efficiently than we do, they find it easier to commit to reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. Our lack of effective energy conservation policies not only increases U.S. energy dependency, it also undercuts our ability to lead on an environmental issue in which we have a substantial long-term interest.

U.S. policy on world population growth also has been disappointing. We have slighted international population issues and allowed domestic politics and ideological issues to stand in the way of consistent funding for key family planning organizations, including the U.N. Fund for Population Activities. This will have harmful consequences for the international environment and for our own long-term quality of life.

In sum the United States has failed to lead—through diplomacy or by example—on multilateral efforts to address new threats to the international quality of life. Policy prescriptions for the government are clear. We should commit ourselves to specific targets and timetables for reductions in U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. We should work with other nations to devise promising approaches to the funding of environmental programs. We should seek to strengthen multilateral institutions that coordinate environmental research and programs. Funding for population programs should be increased and directed to organizations with demonstrated effectiveness. Funds for these initiatives should be drawn, in part, from money made available from defense spending cuts around the world.

X

The gulf crisis showed the president's weaknesses, as well as strengths, in making foreign policy. His performance during the war was impressive. But his policies prior to the war failed, and his follow-through afterward has been disappointing.

The president did not focus on the problem of Iraq soon enough. Iraqi policy became increasingly bellicose in the late 1980s, and the United States did not react. Indeed, U.S. policy may have emboldened Saddam. Washington continued to share intelligence with Baghdad, allow the export of goods with potential military use and provide Iraq with export credit

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guarantees. Until August 2, 1990, it was official U.S. policy to pursue good relations with Iraq. War might have been avoided if Washington had made crystal clear that it would oppose with military force an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Yet only two days before the invasion U.S. officials stressed publicly that we had no commitment to defend Kuwait.

The president deserves credit for assembling an anti-Iraq coalition and for leading a military victory, but we now risk losing the peace. Saddam remained in power long after his defeat in war. Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions is minimal. Political reform in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is unimpressive. Gulf states are failing to build new security structures. Arms sales to the region are escalating. President Bush and Secretary Baker have started direct Arab-Israeli peace talks—for which they deserve praise—but those talks lack momentum.

The Gulf War shows that the president often reacts well to crises. He also gets high marks for his deft handling of German unification. But he and his inner circle hold the policy reins too tightly. They seek little advice from the Foreign Service or the rest of the government. As a result they often do not see problems coming and, subsequently, do not pay enough attention to them once they are off center stage. Iraq is only one example; the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union did not draw attention from senior policymakers until it was too late. Issues no longer in the spotlight, such as Panama, suffer from inattention: drug trafficking in Panama remains endemic. The president's preoccupation with crises means that long-term issues—the Uruguay Round, energy security, the environment, the implications of EC-1992 and the Maastricht summit—are neglected at the top.

The overcentralized, crisis-oriented approach has also meant the neglect of special relationships that need constant care and attention. Frictions with Israel—some minor, some not—have been allowed to fester. Also at risk are U.S.-Japan ties. No relationship is more important to either country, yet the president has done little to arrest deterioration.

XI

President Bush has yet to reshape the institutions and programs that carry out U.S. foreign policy. They need an overhaul. The intelligence community is oriented to a world that no longer exists. Foreign aid reflects Cold War priorities

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and domestic political concerns. The defense budget does not correspond to current international threats.

If the U.S. intelligence community is to serve U.S. interests in the 1990s, it must be reformed. The intelligence community must focus on new challenges, including proliferation, economic and environmental issues. Better assessments will require improved information from human sources. Duplication of effort within and between military and intelligence agencies must end. The president has opposed a broad organizational overhaul of the intelligence community. He should tap more outside expertise to help with reform.

The foreign aid program's guiding principle is inertia. The president has been unwilling either to lead, or to support with enthusiasm, efforts to reform foreign aid. In fiscal year 1992 we are spending over $7.4 billion—more than three-fifths of all bilateral foreign aid—on military and economic assistance to countries deemed to be of strategic importance. The top three recipients of aid—Israel, Egypt and Turkey—receive nearly half of all U.S. bilateral assistance. Developmental assistance totals $2.15 billion, or less than one-fifth of all bilateral aid.

A bias toward security assistance and a skewed distribution make the U.S. foreign aid program look increasingly irrelevant. New transnational population, health and environmental problems threaten long-term stability and prosperity, but the focus of U.S. foreign aid continues to be Cold War security concerns. The poorest nations, which need help most, are getting least.

U.S. defense programs have also lagged behind political change. The central rationale for a $300 billion defense budget—the defense of western Europe against a Soviet invasion—has vanished. Steep spending cuts beyond the 25 percent reduction outlined in the Pentagon's five-year plan are possible and necessary. We may be able to cut defense spending by 50 percent over the next decade without harming U.S. security.

The Pentagon keeps searching for threats to justify its budget. A recent Pentagon document outlines seven war scenarios, including a Russian invasion of Lithuania that NATO would rush to reverse. It is hard to take such scenarios seriously when the White House has not bothered to coordi-

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nate them with either the State Department or the CIA. These are unconvincing exercises to justify the defense budget.

The United States also continues to bear a disproportionate share of common defense burdens. There is no longer any reason why the United States should devote a larger portion of its gross domestic product to defense spending than its wealthy European and Asian allies. These countries are capable of paying more for their own defense and supplying their own troops to replace U.S. forces.

Defense reform will require strong presidential leadership. It will require shutting down weapons production lines, closing military bases and cutting manpower. It will require worker-retraining and base-conversion programs. Budget cuts will impose pain in every state and congressional district. Only the president is in a position to rise above local interests to restructure the defense budget. But his approach has been to trim budgets, not to rethink manpower and weapons needs from the bottom up.

XII

The Cold War is over, but the United States has been slow to react. We now have a unique opportunity to redefine the purposes of American power.

We need a better balance in the making of foreign policy. Policy under President Bush has been too reactive, centralized and personalized. We need less emphasis on crisis management and more on long-term U.S. interests and American values. All institutions that carry out U.S. foreign policy need reform and overhaul.

Finally, we need a better understanding of the purposes of American foreign policy. It is to improve life at home, to build a stronger American society and economy, and to build a safer and more stable world. To serve these ends we need a foreign policy that recasts old notions of national security, retools outdated institutions and establishes new patterns of international partnership. We need to redefine America's role in the world.

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David L. Boren

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: HOW CRUCIAL?

Nothing is harder to change than our basic idea of the world and our role in it. That is why many American policy-makers initially reacted with alarm at the rapidity of change in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Changes were not happening on our timetable. Ironically the instincts of many top government officials actually led them to feel more comfortable with order than with freedom because it was more predictable.

Even today there are those in the intelligence and foreign policy establishment who long for the old days of the Cold War because its challenges were easier to define. In many ways this is the greatest threat to our own national security: the failure to change our thinking to coincide with all of the changes in the world.

History teaches us that the disintegration of multinational empires or the liberation of culturally diverse states often creates a period of instability. In many ways the world of the 1990s resembles more the world of the 1920s than that of the 1980s. It would be foolish to believe that amid the ruins of a major empire and the creation of new nation-states we will not see continuing conflict, at least on a regional basis.

Yet it is clear that to remain a world leader in the next century the United States will require a very different set of assets from those used previously. In the past, military strength was at the heart of our political influence because our allies around the world needed our protection against the Soviet threat. But as our friends feel less threatened militarily, they also will be less willing to follow our lead. Economic and social strengths will in many ways become the primary determinants of world influence.

The implications for America's intelligence community are clear. The most sweeping changes since the beginning of the Cold War call for the most sweeping changes in the modern

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David L. Boren, Senator from Oklahoma, is Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

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

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intelligence apparatus of the government since the Central Intelligence Agency was erected by the National Security Act of 1947. If the intelligence community fails to make these changes, it will become an expensive and irrelevant dinosaur just when America most needs information and insight into the complex new challenges that it faces.

II

Some argue that instead of changing the intelligence community we should simply eliminate it. They sing the siren song of "America First" and call for the United States to disengage from the rest of the world and start taking care of Americans alone.

Those who preach this new isolationism mislead the American people with the false notion that there is a conflict between what we need to do at home and what we need to do abroad. These are not competing goals but complementary ones. Shutting ourselves off from the rest of the world will not assure our safety. Rather we must prepare ourselves to live constructively and, when necessary, to compete effectively in the new international environment. Playing the right kind of role in the world will help us rebuild our strength at home.

With our economic well-being so dependent on exports and on the movement of international capital to finance our debt, withdrawal from the international community could so severely damage the economic health of our nation that we might never recover.

Nor can we afford to ignore the economic effects of foreign aid being used by our competitors who give credits instead of cash to areas like eastern Europe. They do so in an effort to put their products into the newly developing infrastructures, creating markets for their goods and services in the future. The United States should do the same. Placing our equipment into the infrastructure of other countries will not only create jobs here at home but also create a future market for our products, spare parts and services.

Those who advocate withdrawal and deny the need for timely intelligence about global developments show a total ignorance of history. America's withdrawal from Europe after World War I certainly did not enhance world peace and stability or its own national security. Surely a nation that has been spending $300 billion each year on an arms race and diverting capital needed for projects at home must monitor

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developments in the former Soviet Union. Surely the United States has an interest in keeping from power extreme nationalists who might reignite the arms race.

It is clear that as the world becomes multipolar, more complex and no longer understandable through the prism of Soviet competition, more intelligence—not less—will be needed.

But even among those who concede that there is a continuing need to invest in intelligence collection and analysis, there are those who contend that America no longer needs a separate intelligence community. Some, for example, have suggested abolishing the CIA and placing all intelligence functions under the State Department. Such a move would be unwise for several reasons.

First, it would endanger the arm's-length relationship between those whose job is to provide objective information and those charged with making policy. Certainly intelligence produced by separate agencies sometimes misses the point that policymakers need addressed. However, if the collection and analysis of intelligence is totally dominated and overseen by the policymaker, there will be too great a temptation for intelligence to "serve" or to "sell" policy rather than to "inform" policy.

Second, some intelligence collection methods are inappropriate for diplomatic missions, and therefore for the State Department. Finally, the State Department is not organized to put intelligence into a form useful to the military in time of conflict, a concern even in this new world environment that will produce more than its fair share of low-intensity and regional conflicts.

If the State Department is not equipped to take on the role of lead agency in intelligence, neither is the Pentagon. With nonmilitary factors becoming more important to national security, intelligence created solely from a military perspective would be far less relevant than at the height of the Cold War.

The answer is not to dispense with intelligence or to eliminate a separate intelligence community, but rather to change the existing community, including the CIA. Change must come in two major areas: new priorities and a new structure better suited to those priorities.

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III

The intelligence community was built primarily to target the "closed" societies of the Cold War world, which accounted for as much as a third of the world's landmass. Today that target has shrunk considerably. To be sure, the intelligence community must continue to acquire information that is not available publicly about threats to U.S. security and well-being. Its geographical focus on closed societies, however, has shifted to topical areas of concern—such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and counterterrorism—wherever they may occur. The community's methods of operation also must change.

A major priority of the new intelligence community will be its emphasis on human source intelligence. With a smaller American military force positioned around the world, earlier warnings of the hostile intentions of potential adversaries will be essential. While satellite photographs and other technical data can reveal military movements before an attack, they cannot provide early warning of an enemy's intentions. They are probably even less useful in the unpredictable Third World than against the former Soviet Union, where troop movements and technology redeployments occured on a larger and more detectable scale.

Moreover the warning provided by military movements often comes too late to give meaningful options to policymakers. Had President Bush known the intentions of Saddam Hussein, months before instead of only days before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he might have had the opportunity to consider other options that might have prevented the war altogether.

Human sources are also the most effective intelligence collectors in other areas of collection. While signals intelligence is a great aid to human source collection, human sources are critically important to the penetration of terrorist organizations and drug rings. A satellite photograph cannot detect the actions of a terrorist making explosive devices in an abandoned building. Nor can technical systems provide the insight necessary to understand and cope with foreign efforts to gain economic or commercial advantage over the United States.

Not only will we need better human source intelligence, our intelligence officers will need different skills. With perhaps half our intelligence resources previously targeted on the

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Soviet military threat, we urgently need to shift priorities toward people who understand public opinion and mass movements in those areas of the world where power has become much more decentralized. We will need more economists and business school graduates who understand commercial competition and fewer experts on military technology or the Soviet order of battle.

In addition to improving the collection of human source intelligence, we must also improve the analytical functions of the intelligence community. Analysis must make better use of open sources and must be more interdisciplinary, with more use made of reports from commercial and political officers overseas.

The community must also stop trying to reach overly cautious, caveated and consensus-oriented intelligence estimates, which General Norman Schwarzkopf described as "unhelpful mush." Concise, usable majority views should be presented without precluding a full and spirited presentation of minority views. Instead of trying to accept minority views by watering down the majority report, it would make much more sense to provide a candid majority report with actionable conclusions. A separate minority report could then be attached, much like dissenting views in a Supreme Court decision, that would give the minority a chance to fully outline its point of view. Spending billions of dollars on intelligence collection is useless if the analysis of the information is not both clear and objective. It must also be the product of the best minds in the country in the relevant fields, both inside and outside government.

To this end it is important to implement the National Security Education Act, passed last year, as soon as possible. The act will help provide the new talent pool needed for the U.S. intelligence community and American society as a whole to function in the new international environment. It sets up an endowment fund of $150 million that will encourage the next generation to think internationally by providing much greater opportunities for undergraduate study abroad and language and area studies programs in American colleges and universities. The act also provides new graduate fellowships in fields where there is a shortage of expertise, not just in the intelligence area but in diplomacy, commerce and education as well.

Stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must also be a top priority for American intelligence. These

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weapons are even more dangerous in the hands of unpredictable governments facing internal economic and political upheaval than they were in the hands of superpowers in the past, where at least each side appreciated the consequences of its actions and its failure to impose prudent, fail-safe controls.

CIA Director Robert Gates has indicated in public testimony that more than 20 nations now have or are developing the capacity to create nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. In most instances effective action to stop proliferation must be multinational. NATO and the United Nations have yet to realize their potential as institutions effectively involved in this effort.

Areas such as weapons proliferation, international terrorism and worldwide environmental problems require that the intelligence community serve not only U.S. national needs but the needs of multinational organizations as well. Effectively sharing information with the United Nations, for example, will become more important as it undertakes the enforcement of arms compliance agreements similar to the one imposed upon Iraq. It is possible that the United Nations will eventually become the truly international force that President Truman envisioned at the inception of the world organization. A structure must be put in place to share intelligence with others without compromising America's own national security.

IV

As world leadership comes to depend more and more on economic strength, serving the economic interests of the United States will become an increasingly important priority for intelligence. Defining the appropriate limits of economic intelligence will not be an easy task. Some priorities, however, are already clear.

Counterintelligence efforts to deter the theft of private American commercial and industrial secrets by other nations must be intensified. Current laws need to be reviewed since most penalties apply only to the theft of government military secrets. When foreign intelligence services penetrate governments and companies in other nations that may be potential customers for U.S. goods and services in order to give a competitive bidding advantage to their own national firms, the United States must be prepared to cope with these tactics.

We also need to take a closer look at the economic negotiating strategies of our competitors. Just as it is important to fully understand the military strategies and goals of oppo-

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nents, we need to know at least as much about the game plans of competing countries in the economic arena as they know about ours. We must also better understand the collusion between foreign governments and their indigenous firms that results in improved competitive positions. In short, American intelligence assets should be used to level the playing field and give American companies an equal chance to compete.

Theft is not the only way we lose technology to foreign competitors. We need the ability to identify those exclusively American technologies that should not be allowed to fall into foreign hands through the purchase of our companies on the open market. While the president has the power to delay such acquisitions, that authority is rarely used and there is no effective system to alert the president to such imprudent transactions.

To be sure, caution must be used in the area of collecting economic intelligence. Spying on foreign companies to give a commercial advantage to a particular American company would clearly compromise U.S. values and the free market system. Nations with highly nationalized, monopolistic industries do not face as acute a dilemma: if a country has a single computer producer, for example, there is no doubt to whom spy-acquired computer technology will go. In the United States, however, it would not be appropriate to favor one company like Apple, IBM or Hewlett-Packard over the others by making it the beneficiary of such secrets. It is important for policymakers to delineate the boundaries of economic intelligence activities. The intelligence community to date has received very little guidance in this sensitive area.

V

To implement new priorities as well as to cut costs, it will be necessary to change the structure of the intelligence community. Just as many private companies have had to restructure and downsize to become more productive and competitive, so must the intelligence community. In short, the community will be required to produce better intelligence at lower cost.

While the final details of an appropriate structure are still being debated and negotiated, several common themes have emerged in both the findings of the Executive Branch Task Forces empaneled by Director Gates and the proposals made in the Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992, which I introduced along with Representative David McCurdy (D-Okla.),

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chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. The high level of general agreement, thus far, is encouraging.

As expected there are differences between the two branches as to the amount of legislation required to bring about the necessary changes. The executive branch prefers to make all changes through executive orders and directives without any legislation. The two committees generally support more statutory reforms to assure that change will actually take place and will survive successive administrations. It should be possible to find a middle ground where legislation is passed that is broad enough to allow the president to make mid-course adjustments in the plan when experience demands them.

One emerging element of the new structure will be a closer relationship between civilian and military intelligence. Financially the nation can no longer afford two costly and competing empires that often find it difficult to work together in times of crisis. To bring about closer integration, it is necessary to give one person the power to coordinate and set priorities for the entire intelligence community—whether that person is called the director of the CIA or the director of national intelligence. The leader of the community must be able to set budgetary and programmatic priorities for the entire community. The director must be able to reprogram funds and rechannel them from one area or agency of intelligence to another, whether the agency is in the defense or civilian area, authority that he does not have today. This means that the present intelligence community staff must be revitalized and restructured to allow the director to serve a function for intelligence not unlike the director of the Office of Management and Budget. Without the ability to set the budget for the entire community, the director will not be able to shift priorities in a meaningful way.

More personnel should be interchanged between the two sectors. A good example of this is the recent move to place uniformed personnel in the positions of deputy director of the CIA and deputy director for operations. Another example is the joint exercises that will be held in the future involving military commanders and civilian intelligence leaders. In this way military leaders will become more aware of civilian intelligence assets available to them and the civilian agencies will become more sensitive to the form in which intelligence is most useful to the military commander.

In addition the new structure must allow the director to have a role in the appointment of the heads of military

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intelligence agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. While the director of the CIA can task these agencies regarding intelligence collection missions, their top officials owe their appointments solely to the secretary of defense. Lacking the ability to hire or at least veto selections for these positions, the CIA director cannot expect to have their full cooperation.

To assure greater efficiency and accountability, there should be one coordinating point for each of the three major areas of intelligence collection—signals intelligence, imaging collection and human intelligence. Currently only signals intelligence is structured to achieve a high level of coordination through the National Security Agency.

In the very costly area of imagery, which includes photography and other sensing techniques, there are too many different groups involved in collection. Overlap and confusion of authority between users, designers and processors of systems have led to inefficiencies, intelligence failures, delays and large cost overruns. With authority so dispersed it is difficult to fix responsibility for shortcomings. After-action studies of Operation Desert Storm recently made public point to intelligence failures in this area, including the inability of the systems to produce common data that can be used and understood by both civilian and military leaders. Reforming the imagery bureaucracy will be complicated by resistance from well-entrenched interests in the defense establishment; it is imperative, however, that a new imagery agency be established to coordinate and synchronize this critical activity.

The third major collection area, human intelligence, also demands more coordination and different assets in this new era. Intelligence gathering needs to be evaluated in one place so that region-by-region decisions can be made to ascertain the best and cheapest approach. For example, it may no longer be necessary in newly opened societies to have large clandestine collection efforts led by CIA officers. Perhaps a military attaché, a commercial officer or a foreign service political officer at an embassy could collect the needed information with less risk of national embarrassment and at less cost. Director Gates has proposed making the deputy director for operations at the CIA the human intelligence (Humint) manager for the entire intelligence community. Wherever the function is ultimately located, there must be a Humint manager with enough political influence and backing from the director and the president

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to reach out across departmental lines in order to best allocate human intelligence missions.

The last major area requiring restructuring is intelligence analysis. Again, huge expenditures on intelligence collection will be of little benefit unless there is an objective and high-quality analysis of the information presented in a timely and usable form to policymakers. In a rapidly changing world it is important that analysis be farsighted in its perspectives. National security can no longer be considered solely from the point of view of military motivation or political maneuvering. Economic, cultural, educational and many other developments can have a major influence on national security. This means that the structure established for analysis must be as broad and as open as possible, drawing together all of the resources from every segment of government and the private sector. It should not be a process dominated by one agency such as the CIA or the Department of Defense.

In essence the policymakers charting a new course for the nation in the next century should be served by the best "think tank" in the world. This world-class think tank should be able to utilize the best talent available in America to focus upon issues important to policymakers.

To ensure that the process is not dominated by the CIA, especially by the operational division that might be tempted to influence analysis to justify its current operations, the Intelligence Reorganization Act is designed to separate analysis from the CIA. Several experts with long experience have suggested such a move may be too extreme. They point to the necessity of cross-fertilization between analysts and operators, which is beneficial to both. For example, the best analyst is often one with field experience. There are also advantages to having the encyclopedic function of intelligence analysis for the entire government housed in a separate agency like the CIA, which does not have a policymaking function.

While it may not be wise to divorce the analytical function from the CIA, there clearly must be changes made in the current structure of the National Intelligence Council. In theory it brings together analytical assets from all agencies to prepare major intelligence estimates, but it is in fact largely dominated by the CIA. The council is even housed with the CIA at Langley, Virginia; its administrative functions are provided by the CIA and it is largely staffed by CIA personnel.

To become an interdisciplinary think tank the council must

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have a separate and distinct existence from the CIA. It must be housed and administered separately. It must have a core support staff much like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made up of those assigned from other departments who temporarily put on the "purple" uniform of a joint assignee to serve the entire community. It is imperative that other agencies including the State Department and the Commerce Department assign the best possible advocates of their own perspectives to represent them in preparing intelligence estimates.

Finally, the newly constituted National Intelligence Council should be open and flexible enough to attract the good minds on college and university faculties and in the private sector for short-term assignments on specific issues. It should be given the recognition, prestige and independence sufficient to attract outside experts who might have been hesitant to be openly associated with the CIA in the past.

It is clear that the expertise needed to meet future challenges no longer solely resides in the government. To attract the very best we should reevaluate the overly intricate security clearance process that deters some of our most creative minds from any kind of affiliation with the intelligence community. Director Gates has wisely supported a proposal that the deputy director of the council should be from outside the government, but more needs to be done.

VI

There is no time to waste. The decisions that we make now may well define our nation's place in the world for decades to come. It is a turning point we cannot avoid. History will hold us accountable. But this is not a moment to be dreaded—it is an opportunity to be seized. Those who were present when the current intelligence community was formed in the aftermath of the Second World War still recall the excitement and vitality of that time. In many ways our task is even more meaningful. They created an intelligence apparatus designed to contain communism, fight the Cold War and maintain a stabilizing balance of power. Our opportunity is to create an intelligence capability that can help America play a role in leading the world to a far better future.

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AMERICA AND THE NEW WORLD

Report of the Carnegie Endowment National Commission

The end of the Cold War has loosened the moorings of American foreign policy. Gone are the great ideological and territorial fault lines that defined America's global role, its primary preoccupations, its allies and adversaries. What are the implications of change for the United States? How should America react as a nation? These are some of the questions addressed by this bipartisan blue-ribbon National Commission. The Commission, composed of 24 prominent national leaders and chaired by Winston Lord, former U.S. Ambassador to China, examines America's purpose and place in a radically changed world. It identifies the bedrock principles that can define America's approach to the new world and enlist public support for a responsible American role.

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Ernest R. May

INTELLIGENCE: BACKING INTO THE FUTURE

Congress is considering legislation to reorganize the U.S. intelligence community. As currently drafted, the pending bills would solve problems of the past, not problems of the future.

The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency. That act and later executive orders govern what is called the intelligence community, which extends far beyond the CIA. Early in 1992 the chairmen of the Senate and House intelligence committees, David Boren and David McCurdy (both Democrats of Oklahoma), introduced nearly identical bills designed to replace those mandates and reshape the structure of intelligence.

The Boren and McCurdy bills call for replacing the current Director of Central Intelligence with a Director of National Intelligence. This DNI would preside over four separate agencies. There would be one for each major category of collection—human intelligence, signal intelligence and imagery—and a fourth agency to produce analysis of the intelligence received. The DNI would also control most of the government's spending for all kinds of intelligence.

Both Boren and McCurdy hope for debate. Neither proposes that his bill be enacted exactly as is. This is sensible. The 1947 charter did duty for 45 years; any new charter should also last.

II

The main premises and objectives of the two bills are clearly right. The world has changed; we nevertheless need secret intelligence. We also need to ask, as do both bills, whether in this changed world the intelligence community will serve "the needs of the government as a whole in an effective and timely manner."

Ernest R. May is Charles Warren Professor of History at Harvard University. He directs the Intelligence and Policy Program at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government and is Chairman of the Board of Visitors of the Defense Intelligence College. This article is adapted from testimony before the Senate and House intelligence committees.

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First, *change*. Both bills say that a new era is opening. The Senate version allows only that the threat from the former Soviet Union has "considerably diminished." The House bill acknowledges the "end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union."

In actuality, three changes have occurred; all are potentially revolutionary. The virtual disappearance of the Soviet threat is only one. A second change is the near disappearance of *any* comparable threat. Before the Cold War, after all, there were the Axis powers and fascism and, earlier still, monarchism. Americans now face no menace from any foreign military power or any hostile ideology.

The third change is in warfare. Strategic intelligence has become tactical intelligence and vice versa. In the Persian Gulf War satellites that had originally been lifted to track Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles provided target data to tank commanders and pilots. Field operatives' reports on morale among Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard meanwhile influenced presidential decisions in Washington on suspending hostilities. The odds are that in future conflicts front-line commanders will be demanding satellite imagery while White House staffers plead for intelligence information cables.

Second, *continuing need*. Absurd as are recently leaked Pentagon fantasies about future wars, Americans would be foolish to forget how little can be foreseen. When the *U.S.S. Lexington* was launched in 1927 almost no one imagined its need 15 years later, in the Coral Sea, to check Japanese conquest of the mid-Pacific. Given the revolution in warfare Americans would be doubly foolish not to ensure that, if peace fails, American battlefield commanders have eyes and ears more keen than any enemy's.

The premises of an impending new era, however, imply other secret information needs. These include intelligence on sub-rosa flows of narcotics, weapons and associated money, perhaps cross-checks on other data about trade, the environment, migration or disease. Serving "the needs of the government as a whole" implies generating information and analysis about new subjects and for new consumers.

III

Certain features of the Boren and McCurdy bills, however, are at odds with these premises. Those features include provisions regarding the National Security Council, budgets, a

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revamped CIA and the proposed new analysis agency. These provisions of the bills look backward rather than forward.

Provisions of the bills referring to the NSC assume the intelligence community will serve the same consumers as in the Cold War. The community would not only remain under the NSC; it would look to an NSC subcommittee for "overall policy direction" and determination of "overall resource needs." These provisions suppose that the NSC will remain the paramount policy forum for the president. That may prove untrue.

The NSC is in some respects an anachronism. It was established in 1947 to satisfy a demand of the military services for a voice in diplomacy. Arguing that the State Department ignored the costs of diplomatic commitments, the armed services had begged since 1919 for a consultative committee like the British Committee of Imperial Defense. In the 1950s, when arms competition came to dominate the Cold War, roles reversed. The State Department sought a voice in defense policy. The NSC provided a forum. Presidents meanwhile found the NSC increasingly convenient for guiding both Defense and State. Under Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the NSC became a superdepartment. For more than a decade, however, the organization has not been what it then was. If the national agenda changes, the NSC may cease even to be primus inter pares of White House staffs.

The NSC has not dealt well in the past with nontraditional issues. In the early 1980s default on debts by foreign governments was one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security. Outstanding loans, chiefly to Mexico and Brazil, equalled over 200 percent of the capital of America's nine largest banks. Insiders at the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board feared a financial collapse worse than 1929.

The NSC's senior director of economic affairs tried to get a warning before the president. CIA analysts helped him build a case. But it took more than two years to place the matter on the NSC agenda. By that time, luckily, the danger had lessened. Neither the Treasury nor the Federal Reserve had seen the NSC as a natural venue for a problem in their domains, and neither agency had or has a comfortable relationship with the intelligence community. They succeeded in keeping their worries to themselves.

The NSC has since shown no sign of becoming better able to seize economic issues. The unhappy history of President

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Bush's January 1992 trip to Japan is evidence. Staff work even approaching that on Cold War political-military issues would surely have forestalled the president's appearing as a tour guide for corporate campaign contributors. Nor does the NSC show any ability to plan a "war on drugs" or prepare for international negotiations about the environment.

In the future the NSC may handle traditional political-military issues. Other staff groups parallel in stature may handle other matters. In that event the head of the intelligence community would carry a disability if defined by statute as "intelligence adviser to the National Security Council." He would be even worse off if beholden to an NSC subcommittee for guidance on policy and resource allocation. It would be better if new legislation separated the intelligence community from the NSC. The most that is needed is statutory provision for a "principal intelligence officer for the president."

IV

The second backward-looking element in the proposed bills concerns the intelligence budget. The Director of Central Intelligence was originally expected to coordinate spending, but no DCI has actually ever done so. Signal intelligence remained with the Department of Defense in what became the National Security Agency. As satellites and other high-cost collection systems came on line, the Defense Department managed them as well. One-time DCI Richard Helms once estimated that the secretary of defense controlled 85 percent of all intelligence spending.

The Boren and McCurdy bills would put the whole intelligence budget under the new DNI. The secretary of defense would become "responsible for ensuring that the policies and resource decisions of the director of national intelligence are implemented by elements of the Department of Defense."

At the beginning of the missile and satellite era such a policy might have been wise. In a period of spending cutbacks the contrary may be true. Collection systems would fare less well as big items in a small intelligence budget than as small items in a big defense budget.

An intelligence tsar could find himself in the situation of the old Atomic Energy Commission. Congress gave that agency all responsibility for nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion; the armed services could thus make demands on it without counting the costs. The AEC became little more than a caterer.

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An intelligence tsar could likewise end up spending money mostly to satisfy requests from the Pentagon. Either way, the nation could lose. There could be too few systems to satisfy battlefield commanders. Or there could be plenty of systems but little capacity to make sense of what they collect.

Experience in the Gulf War suggests that the military establishment should retain collection systems with tactical military uses. If intelligence analysts deal increasingly with nonmilitary issues, they may have less use for signal intercepts or imagery. The president's principal intelligence officer may need only the power to ask from Defense what his analysts wish to hear or see.

V

The third backward-looking element in the pending bills concerns the CIA. The agency would evolve into what is now its dubious image: an organization for spies and "dirty tricks." The large components of the CIA that do analysis would move elsewhere. All that would remain would be the clandestine service and a small staff to coordinate other human intelligence resources (such as embassy attachés).

At the height of the Cold War this change, too, might have made sense. When Congress studied the CIA in the mid-1970s it saw an agency dominated by operators. Allen Dulles, director through most of the 1950s, had been called "the Great White Case Officer." The career men who later headed CIA, Helms and William Colby, came from the clandestine service. While analysis was not distorted, it was sometimes muffled or mischanneled. In 1961 the CIA's analysts knew that Fidel Castro was popular in Cuba. They got no chance to report this until after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. During the Vietnam War analysts poured out reports on potential military targets. Few studied the politics that might affect decisions in Hanoi. In those years independence for the CIA's analytic directorates might have given them greater status and voice.

But the 1990s are not the 1970s. In fact the 1980s were not the 1970s. The Iran-contra affair was probably the last heave of a slain dragon. Within the CIA, by all accounts, the directorate of intelligence more than pulled abreast of the directorate of operations. Centers that focused on terrorism and counternarcotics made analysts and operators into colleagues. As director, William Webster put analysts in key managerial posts, and his successor, Robert Gates, himself comes from the

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analytical side of the agency. There is every sign that Gates will continue to make analysis—the *use* of intelligence—the agency's controlling mission.

Today the relevant question is different. What becomes of the operators if they are cut adrift from analysts? Absent the preoccupying task of combating communists, how does one choose collection targets? In the CIA prefigured in the Senate and House bills the clandestine service would get nearly all guidance from the very top. That is not enough. Knowledge of the analytical issues before decision-makers needs to influence human intelligence collection at every level, from the stations on up.

This is not to argue for leaving the CIA just as it is. Both its operators and analysts come from cultures conditioned by the Cold War. The former think of penetrating police states and coping with conspiracies; the latter think of piecing together rare facts, like archaeologists. Neither group may successfully adapt to a world more like that of a Washington news reporter, challenged not to find information but to avoid being inundated by it.

In business corporations, attempts to change cultures usually fail. They may fail in the CIA. It may prove better to create a new clandestine service and a new corps of analysts, bringing in veterans only as and if they meet newly defined needs. The Cold War CIA took shape in that fashion, for Harry Truman had shut down its predecessor, the World War II Office of Strategic Services. Though new managers took in some OSS hands, they picked and chose. Even in radical reculturing, however, operators and analysts ought to be kept together.

VI

The fourth feature of the bills that is at odds with their own premises is the grouping of most analysts now in the CIA, NSA and elsewhere into a new autonomous Directorate for Estimates and Analysis. While this proposal looks more forward than back, it focuses on too short a distance in the future.

The general goal of the Boren and McCurdy bills is to organize intelligence for a new era. The goals served by bunching analysts in one agency are symmetry and economy. A box for analysis on the same plane as boxes for human and signal intelligence and imagery will make for a neater organization chart. Consolidation could save a few dollars; the CIA

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and other elements of the community have overlapping analytic offices.

Here, however, a backward look ought to warn against such a change. For any example of wasteful duplication, a counterexample shows the value of competition. The CIA deflated military intelligence estimates of a "bomber gap" in the 1950s. In 1973 NSA analysts noticed signs of an approaching Middle East war that analysts in other agencies ignored. The "Team B" exercise of the mid-1970s found estimates of Soviet missile programs by the Defense Intelligence Agency to be better than any others.

An example nearer the new agenda is the misgauging of the Soviet economy. From the 1950s onward CIA economists described the Soviet economy as comparatively robust. They had all the available data, and they worked from a complex input-output model. Their periodic reports, published with the imprimatur of Congress' Joint Economic Committee, acquired the status of scripture.

Emigrés' tales did not jibe with these reports. They said, for example, that economists overestimated Soviet production of television sets. While the numbers might be accurate, they left out large numbers of sets that blew up and caused fires. Emigrés also said that the CIA had misjudged Soviet agricultural output. Economists counted potatoes harvested but not the quantities that ended up as rotting landfill. Since economists could not fit such anecdotal data into their models, they mentioned them in fine-print footnotes on "externalities."

Late in the Gorbachev era outside analysts challenged CIA estimates. Then the Soviet Union collapsed. The whole world saw its hollowness. Competition among analysts—including competition from noneconomists—might have made the revelation less astonishing.

While competition does cost money, it does not cost much. As CIA veteran George Carver said at a House Intelligence Committee hearing, the entire community-wide budget for analysis could be covered by mere rounding off in the defense budget. Analysts can help collectors get the most out of their expensive hardware. Electronic eavesdroppers and overhead picture-takers need guidance just as much as do case officers. If a key aim is closer integration of intelligence and policy, the case is also strong for scattering analysts of intelligence in among the users.

To argue that all analysts should not be segregated is not to

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oppose the bills' proposal for a quasi-independent National Intelligence Council. That could be a useful body. Boren and McCurdy propose pulling analysts out of the CIA partly because they think that many of America's best and brightest may be averse to working in an organization that also handles spies and covert operations. Most of that concern comes from memories of bygone times; nowadays CIA recruiters generally find a welcome on college campuses. The concern is not entirely baseless, however, and a wholly separate National Intelligence Council might indeed attract analysts whose image of the CIA is still influenced by "Missing" or "Three Days of the Condor." Such a council could also be an easier home for analysts on leave from universities or laboratories, especially if it required no polygraph tests.

To be most useful, a small new National Intelligence Council should be different from the existing council in at least three respects.

First, a new analytic agency should use a wider range of talent. The existing council is organized to emphasize political-military analysis. Its prize product in the past was its annual estimate of Soviet strategic forces. In the future such expertise will still be in demand, but less so. For analysis and estimates the council will need more men and women familiar with matters such as banking, immigration, disease, climate and police procedure.

Second, a new council should scan more widely. For new issues much information is in open sources. Much analysis is done outside the government. Future intelligence officers will more often have to specify the increment in understanding that secret intelligence provides. Decision-makers will want to be told tersely and exactly what is *not* in *The New York Times* or on Cable News Network.

Third, and most important, a revamped council should have continuous communication with intelligence users. That probably entails including among its staff analysts who head liaison offices such as those in Treasury, Commerce and the Office of the Special Trade Representative. That would be only a partial step; some liaison offices are little more than mail boxes. Few have even the fitful access to the policy process of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Nonetheless those intelligence officers who regularly see top decision-makers should get some sense of what is on their minds or, at least, on their calendars.

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A complementary step would place intelligence officers on decision-makers' staffs. The new national agenda calls for imaginative policy planning, such as that of the 1940–41 Rainbow planners or George Kennan and Paul Nitze in the early Cold War State Department. This time intelligence ought to help. There need not be repetition of mistakes, such as first underestimating the Japanese, then overestimating the Russians.

Yet another link could run through think tanks. A model is the Rand Corporation of the 1950s. While analysts in its strategic studies wing did classified research, few had access to intelligence data. Those that did tactfully steered their colleagues so that Rand reports implicitly took account of, for example, U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and intercepts from tapped telephones in East Berlin. Those specially cleared analysts also carried questions back to the intelligence community. That could happen in the future in, for example, panels of the National Bureau of Economic Research or committees of the National Institutes of Health.

The head of the intelligence community must also identify needs that decision-makers do not see. He has to do the equivalent of launching the *Lexington*. But he must have many lines reaching into operating elements of the executive branch and Congress if, in either the short or long run, the intelligence community is to meet "the needs of the government as a whole in an effective and timely manner."

VII

New legislation for the intelligence community should equip it for the future. It should provide for a principal intelligence officer not necessarily linked to the NSC. While it might create a National Imagery Agency as a counterpart to NSA, it need not move either agency out of the Defense Department. In no circumstances should Congress strip the collecting agencies of their analysts. In fact analytical staffs should probably increase. The more attention paid to *reasons* for collection, the more the nation is apt to get its money's worth from high-cost hardware. A new analytical agency, if any, should serve the mission of making intelligence maximally useful for policy.

New legislation may be needed for subjects not touched by the current bills. The boundary between foreign and domestic intelligence is one example. Because of the march of technology, threats to privacy constantly increase. Limitations that

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worked when the major threat came from communists in Moscow may not work, however, when the enemies are moving drugs or migrant workers or hot money or are themselves viruses or ultraviolet rays.

Other equally difficult subjects include classification, clearance and dissemination. In the past secrecy has limited the usefulness of intelligence. Flag and general officers routinely complain of not even knowing what they *could* have been told. If the operational uses of intelligence expand, the problem will change in kind, not just degree. If the ultimate actors are local law enforcement officials or bankers or businessmen or doctors or scientists not even in government employ (perhaps not even U.S. nationals), effective dissemination is going to require new rules. That may mean new statutes.

Most of what is needed, however, does not call for legislation. The president and others in the executive branch have to establish processes to cope with the new challenges. Congressionally mandated organizational changes could make this harder, not easier. The intelligence oversight committees can give most help by prodding the executive to prepare for the future instead of just conserving what was built up in the past. To do that the committees themselves need to keep their eyes on the horizons. Judging from the current bills, they are still backing into the future.

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

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

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

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Dimitri K. Simes

AMERICA AND THE POST-SOVIET REPUBLICS

For the second time since World War II the United States must make historic choices about dealing with the Soviet/Russian challenge. This time the issue arises from the collapse of the former enemy, and the new geopolitical situation is a mix of enormous opportunity and tremendous danger. As before Russia may well be central to the future of world politics and, as before, in this realm there is no substitute for American leadership.

Only fatalists would dare to predict the shape this vast area of Eurasia will take by the beginning of the 21st century. While a devastating earthquake is in progress—with the possibility of multiple aftershocks compounding the damage—forecasting becomes highly unreliable. Three aspects, however, are already fairly clear. First, there is a wide range of possible outcomes: the restoration of the Russian empire under an authoritarian, xenophobic, anti-Western regime; the splintering of the region into different groupings with widely divergent foreign policies and cultures; instability and possibly even civil war; or the emergence of truly independent democratic nations united by some form of a common market and collective security framework.

Second, when the region's size, its strategic location, the wealth of its natural and human resources and, finally, the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons are taken into account, events there will inevitably have a profound effect on the outside world. The United States, as the only remaining global superpower, has great stakes in the outcome. It is useless to think of a benign new world order if America has to preoccupy itself with a post-Soviet civil war or a resurgent Russian empire. Conversely the integration of the bulk of the former Soviet land mass into Western civilization would greatly change the global correlation of forces—to use an old

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Marxist-Leninist cliché—in a way favorable to U.S. interests and values.

Finally, Western and particularly American action or inaction will be a crucial factor during the transition to new political, economic and security arrangements in this area reaching from the Baltic to the Pacific. During ordinary times the politics of nations—particularly such great nations as Russia—can be only marginally affected from the outside. During periods of great transformation, however, with all their concomitant volatility and turmoil, input from abroad can make an enormous difference.

The contrast between Germany's evolution following its defeat in the two world wars demonstrates how considerable the impact of foreign influence can be. That argument is even more valid for the former Soviet Union, where the collapse of empire has almost overnight turned what used to be domestic politics and economics into international relations. The manner in which the newly independent states interact, whether they are at each other's throats or find new formulas for working together, will determine the success of their experiments with democracy, market-oriented reforms and, indeed, their own existence. This international dimension of post-Soviet change gives the West a much wider opening for a constructive role than if it were only a matter of strictly domestic political processes in preestablished nations.

II

In developing American approaches to the former Soviet republics, it is important to understand that these states, rather than their umbrella organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, will be the principal interlocutors with Washington in coming years. Regardless of whether one shares Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's pessimism about the CIS's chances for survival or Russian President Boris Yeltsin's optimistic hope that the CIS will prove to be more than a formula for a "civilized divorce," it is already apparent that this body is not and never will be a successor state to the U.S.S.R. The Commonwealth does not have a government, a parliament, a constitution, a central bank or any enforcement mechanism to implement its decisions. Its armed forces are in disarray, and the commander in chief, Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, operates under the auspices of the CIS Council of Heads of State, which is, at best, an ad hoc coordinating

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committee. Some of the states, including Russia, are moving in the direction of creating their own military units. Furthermore, with Ukraine and some of the other post-Soviet states advancing plans to introduce their own currencies, the CIS will no longer have a common monetary system.

When the CIS was originally created last December it was likened to a blend of the European Community and NATO. This comparison has proven to be a mistake. In fact the CIS is almost the exact opposite of these two Western organizations. Unlike the EC its members are not looking for greater integration but rather for devolution with minimal losses. And, in contrast to NATO, instead of having a common external enemy, the Commonwealth's member states are concerned almost exclusively with internal threats—threats from one another.

Nor is there much likelihood that the CIS will move in the direction of closer cooperation any time soon. With Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan determined to achieve complete independence, the lowest common denominator in the consensus-run CIS is very low indeed. Other states—Belarus, for instance—would prefer a tighter alliance. However, as the political dynamics clearly favor the disintegration of the old union, these republics seem to be opting to go along with the tide. Ukraine is uniquely positioned to be a counterweight to Russia in the CIS because of its large population (54 million) and, more importantly, because of Russia's willingness to pay the high price necessary to avoid a break with its sister nation. Without the Ukrainian partnership, moreover, Russian domination of the CIS becomes almost inevitable, and that is more than the other members are prepared to tolerate.

Chances are that eventually new transnational structures will emerge on the territory of the former Soviet Union. But that will happen only after the new states have tasted freedom and voluntarily concluded that some form of integration is in their mutual interest. These structures will be designed to advance new forms of cooperation rather than preserve the old discredited ties that the assertive nationalist movements view as holdovers from the imperial, totalitarian past.

Although American policy should be oriented toward the individual post-Soviet states, differentiation among them is a necessity. The fact that all of them once belonged to the same now defunct communist superpower is surely not reason enough to pretend that they are of equal importance to the United States, or that they have similar commitments to

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political and economic reforms, identically agreeable foreign policies or comparable human rights standards.

There is no escape from acknowledging the centrality of Russia to American interests. Russia will be the only major nuclear power in the region. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev has stated that, although he is willing to transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction, strategic missiles should be eliminated only in the context of a comprehensive disarmament package involving Russia and the other nuclear states. Yet it is likely that his primary motive is to use nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to draw more attention to his country and to obtain political and economic concessions from Moscow and Washington alike. In the end his record of pragmatism suggests that he will find some face-saving formula and give up nuclear weapons deployed in Kazakhstan rather than risk alienating both Russia and the West.

The Ukrainian situation is more complex. Unlike Nazarbaev, who is exposed to relatively few internal pressures to take an uncompromising stand against Moscow, President Kravchuk has to cope with the radical, nationalist Rukh movement. Because of the Ukrainian leader's background as a Communist Party functionary and his current lack of economic accomplishments, standing tall against Russia is his main claim to legitimacy. That, coupled with the hope that nuclear status can bring Ukraine additional prestige and benefits from the West, explains Kravchuk's zigzagging on the issue of delivering Ukrainian tactical nuclear weapons for destruction in Russia. Still Kiev is eager to build bridges to the West and does not want its interests to be neglected in favor of Russia's. This desire for a Western connection puts pressure on the Ukrainian leadership not to overplay its nuclear card.

Neither Ukraine nor Kazakhstan is known to have operational control over the nuclear weapons on its territory—this control apparently remains in Moscow's hands. Moreover, without Russian know-how, technicians and spare parts, neither Ukraine nor Kazakhstan is in a position to maintain a major nuclear capability. Of course if North Korea or Iraq can develop nuclear weapons, so can Ukraine. Yet the United States and the West in general have considerable leverage to prevent this from happening. Any possible Ukrainian or Kazakh nuclear arsenal, however, would pale dramatically in comparison with Russian nuclear forces.

Moreover, among all 15 former Soviet republics, Russia is

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the only state capable of being more than a regional power. Its territory is twice as large as that of all the other republics combined. More than half the former Soviet population, about 150 million people, lives there. There are also 25 million Russians living outside Russia's borders, many of whom maintain strong ties, if not outright loyalty, to Russia. A large number of them are likely to move back if the CIS disintegrates or if they are subjected to discrimination in their states of present residence. Even more important, Russia is far ahead in terms of the two factors that give the post-Soviet states the best chance for rapid development: abundant natural resources and a cheap but highly skilled labor force. Russia controls 90 percent of the oil, nearly 80 percent of the natural gas, 70 percent of gold production and 62 percent of electricity output of the former Soviet Union.

The highly centralized nature of the Soviet Union assured that the best universities, research centers and think tanks were located disproportionately in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk and a few other major Russian cities. It was common practice for the most able and dynamic representatives of the other republics to come to Russia for their education and settle there for life. Due to Russia's multiethnic composition and the imperial tradition of welcoming minorities into the elite, they are less likely to encounter discrimination there than in the other republics. Chances are that the majority of these people will not go back to their native lands, where they would encounter housing shortages, difficulties in finding new professional jobs and in many cases a more primitive and parochial way of life than that to which they have grown accustomed.

The last and most crucial point is that if democracy fails in Russia the chances are slim that it will survive in the other post-Soviet states. Success of the Russian experiment with political pluralism and a market economy does not guarantee that all other republics will automatically follow suit. But if a nationalist, revanchist and authoritarian regime comes to power in Moscow—one that starts to destabilize and bully its neighbors—it is hard to imagine how, with the possible exception of the Baltic states, the fragile democracies in the region could survive. Even if they managed to maintain their independence with Western security assistance, neo-imperialist Russian pressures would trigger strong nationalist backlash

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and demands for emergency rule incompatible with the patient introduction of freedom and tolerance.

After all, if it had not been for actions taken by Russia the Soviet communist empire would still be in place. Its collapse was not the result of a military defeat, as was the case with the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Nor did Russia reluctantly abandon a costly struggle against pro-independence resistance movements, unlike the colonial empires of Britain, France, Portugal and Spain. Mikhail Gorbachev's government would have had little difficulty keeping the Baltic republics under control if Yeltsin, then chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, had not come to their defense: first through expressions of solidarity, then in January 1991 by appealing to Russian soldiers and officers not to take part in a military crackdown and ultimately in February 1991 by calling for Gorbachev's resignation because of his embrace of reactionary policies.

Similarly, during the fateful days of the failed August putsch, it was the Russian government and parliament that organized the defeat of the conspiracy. With the notable exception of the Baltic states and Armenia, which despite their courage were hardly in a position to influence the coup's outcome, the leaders of the other republics either endorsed the junta or failed to resist it.

In sum Russia was the central force in the destruction of the Soviet totalitarian state, and Russia's continuing commitment to democracy and to a non-imperial foreign policy is a precondition for the freedom and prosperity of the other Commonwealth members.

III

Russia has paid an enormous price, not just in terms of loss of its superpower status and its essential economic ties with the other republics, but also in its sense of identity and purpose. Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has had no experience of living as anything other than an empire. The need to maintain and strengthen the empire, the pride of being a great power, the multiethnic composition of the ruling elite united by devotion to the vast and mighty state became key components of Russian political culture.

Moreover Yeltsin and his associates hardly anticipated the consequences of the Soviet state's demise. In this sense they were similar to Gorbachev, who, while systematically under-

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mining the foundations of the Soviet regime, honestly believed that he was laboring to improve it. In contrast to Gorbachev, however, Yeltsin has operated under no illusion that the empire could be successfully reformed without fundamental change.

By early 1990 Yeltsin had come to the conclusion that the old communist central government was too discredited and that nationalist tendencies in the republics were too strong for the Kremlin to maintain its control over the empire just by placing the republics on a longer leash. It was the notion of the leash itself, not just its length, that the increasingly assertive nationalist movements were resolutely rejecting. The fact that Yeltsin, as chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, had a vested interest in wresting power from the central government could only add to his sympathy for the separatist movements in the other republics.

But did Yeltsin and his supporters realize on June 12, 1990, when the Russian parliament adopted a declaration of sovereignty, that they were leading the union toward a complete and perhaps irreversible dissolution? The abundance of evidence suggests that this was not the Russian leader's intention at all. True, on several occasions, Yeltsin had talked as if he wanted to put an end to the Soviet Union altogether. His speeches included references to Russia becoming "an independent republic," joining the United Nations and dealing "as an equal with Britain, France, Germany and America." But a careful reading of Yeltsin's statements suggests that, for him, independence did not mean a complete break with the Soviet Union, but rather a drastic redistribution of power between the Kremlin and the republics, which would "no longer be automatically associated with the central authorities."[1]

In the struggle with the Gorbachev government many of Yeltsin's decisions were ad hoc. Yet there was a central theme: to replace a union based on diktat from the center—even if a relatively benign diktat—with a confederation based on voluntary cooperation among the republics. Like most people in the Soviet Union, excepting the Baltic states, Yeltsin operated on the assumption that the links among the republics were too deep to allow the death of the union. Also there was the belief that, as Yeltsin and Russia were in the driver's seat in destroy-

[1]*Literaturnaya gazeta*, Jan. 24, 1990.

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ing the old union, they would have a determining influence in shaping and running the new confederation of independent republics.

Little thought was given to why the republics would submit on their own to an arrangement in which Russia would again have a dominant voice. The whole Russian democratic opposition—preoccupied by the struggle with the Gorbachev government (which in the fall of 1990 had taken a reactionary turn) and sympathetic to nationalist movements—had failed to anticipate that its triumph against the communist imperial center would shift power to the republics (quite often to their turncoat neo-communist leaders) and eventually fracture the country along the often artificially established republican borders.

Probably the only way such a turn of events could have been avoided would have been the survival of the Gorbachev regime in weakened form. Then Yeltsin would have been needed by leaders of the other republics as a counterweight to the central government. He could have relied on whatever remained of the government's armed forces, security services, Communist Party apparatus and central planning mechanisms to prevent secessionist trends from going completely out of control.

The union treaty, which had been negotiated by Gorbachev with republican leaders and was ready for signature in late August 1991, was perhaps the last chance to stop the secessionist bandwagon. By totally destroying what was left of the central government's credibility, the putsch badly derailed the treaty. In the process it also delivered a heavy blow to Yeltsin's vision of a new Russian-centered confederation built from the bottom up. Almost overnight the Yeltsin government's role changed radically in the eyes of other republican leaders, from that of an indispensable ally against the imperial center to a principal threat to their drives for independence.

In the aftermath of the putsch Yeltsin and his associates aggravated the situation by taking over many central ministries and unilaterally positioning Russia as heir to the Soviet Union. These actions were explained partly by the need to block the remnants of the conspiracy from running the U.S.S.R.'s government and partly by an insensitivity to the new status and aspirations of the other republics. The Yeltsin team erroneously thought that since it (and the Russian republic in general) had been instrumental in defeating the junta, collecting the spoils of victory would be the natural thing to do.

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Instead its grandstanding generated anger and envy on the part of the ruling groups in the other republics. Moreover the less these groups had moved to stand up to the junta, the more they were eager to reestablish their legitimacy by appealing to anti-Russian, nationalist sentiments.

Ironically by prevailing against both the junta and the Gorbachev regime, the Russian leadership lost support in the rest of the country. That caught Yeltsin—and most of his allies among pro-democracy politicians and the majority of the Russian public—almost completely by surprise.

Yeltsin's December 1991 attempt to use the newly created Commonwealth of Independent States to generate a modicum of cooperation among the republics and to buy time for a cooling-off period failed to arrest centrifugal trends. Russia then had to confront the implications of the Soviet Union's demise. It was left with borders that were established by the communist regime reflecting neither the historical legacy nor the current demographic realities. The most serious problem was with Ukraine.

In addition to being home to more than 11 million Russians, under communist rule Ukraine had acquired territory on the Black Sea that had been part of Russia for centuries and, prior to the revolution, had never been identified either administratively or culturally as a part of Ukraine. The Crimean peninsula has become a particularly contentious issue. Its population is about two-thirds Russian, it was conquered by Russia from the Ottoman empire in the eighteenth century, and it has served as a base for the Black Sea fleet and remains a popular resort area. Ukrainian President Kravchuk broke his earlier promises to seek negotiated solutions to the division of the Soviet armed forces. He demanded a pledge of allegiance from all units on Ukrainian territory—including the Black Sea fleet, which Russia, on the basis of Commonwealth agreements, wanted included as a component of the strategic forces under joint command. These actions only contributed to the Russian sense of humiliation.

To put the matter into perspective, consider the agony caused by France's disengagement from Algeria, home to less than half a million Frenchmen. Algeria was much less central to French history than Ukraine is to Russia's. France has a much richer democratic tradition and was not suffering, as Russia is, from a terrible economic crisis magnified by the collapse of the union. Nor was France exposed to the danger

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Russia faces today of coping with further disintegration if the so-called autonomies (the 31 republics, regions and provinces inside the Russian federation itself) insist on going their own way.

Finally one should not forget that Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, was the birthplace of the Russian nation. It was there a thousand years ago that the Russians adopted Christianity. And anyone familiar with Russian literature and culture knows what an integral role Ukraine has played in the entire Russian experience. Probably the greatest Ukrainian writer is Nikolai Gogol, who wrote about his land with great affection, but did so in the Russian language and is as much a part of Russian literary tradition as the southern writer William Faulkner is of the American.

Under the circumstances it is not surprising that a great many Russians feel nostalgic for their past as a unified and mighty state. But statesmen should be judged by their actions rather than their feelings. By this criterion Yeltsin's response to the collapse of the Soviet Union was probably as restrained as was politically feasible. He accepted the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the other republics within their current borders as long as they remained in the Commonwealth. Although the Russian president and his ministers and advisers have made it clear that some territorial issues may be raised if Ukraine or any other newly independent states decide to withdraw, they have pointedly excluded reliance on force. There is no evidence of any attempt by the Yeltsin government to destabilize its new neighbors by exploiting the resident Russian population. The Russian president and his moderate minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, have raised questions regarding the discrimination that Russian-speaking minorities are being subjected to in some CIS nations, but they have been careful to do so in a restrained way, primarily at forums such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, without surrendering to the temptation to engage in what Kozyrev calls "megaphone diplomacy."

Yeltsin's record on relations with the other Commonwealth members is not entirely consistent. In addition to unilaterally taking over the U.S.S.R.'s assets abroad and sometimes acting as if he has the authority to speak for the whole Commonwealth, Yeltsin has failed to restrain some members of his government—most notably Russian Vice President Aleksandr

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Rutskoy—from making statements that appear provocative or even threatening to other CIS members.

Still Yeltsin's overall approach to the end of the empire has been fairly flexible, benign and pragmatic. Russian politicians such as Andrei Sakharov's widow Yelena Bonner and radical historian Yuri Afanasiev, who would go even further in accommodating the new states, have been increasingly marginalized. It is not surprising that as Russia gradually accepts its non-union, non-imperial status, even its democratic reform leaders are beginning to acknowledge that their state also has legitimate national interests. Those who, as a matter of principle, oppose the assertive defense of these interests on the grounds that this signifies a return to communist/imperial practices are on the sidelines of the Russian search for identity.

This does not necessarily mean that Russia is bound to surrender once again to the old imperial impulse. German and Japanese conduct after World War II demonstrates that while history influences the present it does not always determine the outcome. Years of costly and unproductive global expansion abroad and repression at home have turned Russian public opinion against the empire, and most people now consider it the relic of an unhappy and unsavory past. The Yeltsin government seems firmly convinced that the imperial burden was too much for Russia to bear. Furthermore it understands that a Serbian-type mistreatment of neighbors would, at a minimum, destroy chances for receiving much-needed foreign assistance and could also block Russia's entry into Western civilization.

IV

With Western aid the Russian democratic experiment has a reasonable chance to succeed. Working in its favor is the Russian public's disgust with the old regime and everything it represented. This disgust significantly reduces the opportunities for a coalition of neo-Stalinists and xenophobic nationalists to win public support. The Red and the Brown—as Yeltsin calls them—have neither a serious program going beyond nostalgic sloganeering nor charismatic leaders of national stature. According to recent public opinion polls, a considerable majority of Russians, while unhappy with the way economic reforms are being implemented, see no alternative to them and endorse Yeltsin's commitment to change.

But there are three conditions necessary for the success of

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Russian democracy. First, there must be substantial foreign assistance to provide shock absorbers along the rocky road from a centrally planned to a market economy. Second, Russia must avoid any military confrontation or trade war with other CIS members. Third, it must control centrifugal trends to prevent the disintegration of the Russian federation itself into separate regions that would pursue their own agendas and act with hostility toward one another. This will not be easy.

One pressing challenge to the survival of Russian democracy is the defiant stand of some autonomies, like Tatarstan, which are demanding almost total authority over their political and economic affairs without any meaningful federal control, or others, like the Chechen Republic, which are demanding outright independence. The 31 autonomies (most have already proclaimed their sovereignty) include less than 20 percent of the Russian federation's population, but occupy more than 40 percent of its territory. To date, with the exception of Tatarstan and the Chechen Republic, all the autonomies have initialed Yeltsin's proposed new federal treaty. Yet during the ratification hearings in their legislatures, many want to introduce amendments that would drastically reduce the federal government's prerogatives. There is a striking similarity between the current travails of the Russian federal treaty and the demise of the union treaty promoted by Gorbachev last fall.

There are serious differences as well. Most, but not all, of the autonomies, in contrast to the union republics, do not have borders with outside nations, and many, such as Tatarstan, are completely surrounded by Russian territory. If Russians represent only 20 percent of the population of union republics, the percentage in the autonomies amounts to almost 50 percent. In some autonomies they are a plurality or even a majority of all residents. Also, both the administrative structures and the level of national consciousness are weaker in most autonomies than they were in the union republics.

Still the Russian federal government, like Gorbachev's central government before it, has little to offer in terms of economic inducements and little to threaten in terms of law enforcement mechanisms. Assuming full control of one's own fiefdom, proclaiming sovereignty and taking a defiant stand against a big though pitiful Russian bear seems to be the political trend of the moment. The Yeltsin government is trying to counter this trend through a mix of patience, gentle persuasion, economic reforms—which should both improve

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general welfare and give the autonomies more control over their affairs—and by building more reliable police and armed forces. But it takes time for these measures to bear fruit. Confrontations with Ukraine over Crimea or further economic failures could accelerate secessionist tendencies among the autonomies. For example in Tatarstan there is considerable support for President Kravchuk's policy favoring the Tatars over the Russian majority, particularly as it relates to their return to the peninsula after decades of exile.

Since some of the autonomies—including the most defiant, like Tatarstan—are located in the center of Russia and have critical natural resources on their territory, their separation from the Russian federation simply could not work as smoothly as the secession of union republics from the Soviet Union. Russia might allow autonomies located on its periphery, like the Chechen and Tuva republics, to secede. However, any de jure or de facto secession of autonomies that are more centrally located or more crucial economically would threaten the complete dismemberment of Russia. In that case even ethnic Russian regions, such as Siberia and the Don basin, would be likely to proclaim their independence.

Such a total disintegration of Russia is likely to be only a temporary phenomenon. It would probably lead to chaos, bloodshed, a new civil war and the emergence of a new regime coming to power at gunpoint, as happened during the Time of Troubles in the seventeenth century and the Russian civil war in 1917–1920. Even if one were to disregard the possible use of nuclear weapons and the ecological disasters associated with such a calamity, the prospect of a strong, militaristic and, probably, authoritarian government in Russia cannot be in the interest of its newly independent neighbors or the world at large.

V

The success of the emerging—if still imperfect and fragile—Russian democracy is in the vital national interest of the United States. The pressures of democratic politics should encourage any Russian government to give priority to domestic reconstruction over foreign expansion, including any expansion against other CIS members. The federal structure (actually bordering on a confederation) of the state should provide additional safeguards against a rapid military buildup.

A difficult readjustment will be required for yesterday's

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superpower to become accustomed to a situation where its principal foreign partners are yesterday's dependents. Yeltsin and his foreign policy advisers, however, seem to be aware that the empire is over and that nostalgia is no substitute for policy. Not only has Yeltsin broken with the Soviet tradition of global struggle with the West much more decisively than Gorbachev, but the securing of "Russia's entry into the civilized world community" is a key goal of his foreign policy.[2]

The Russian leadership is actually changing its definition of greatness. There is growing appreciation that the greatness associated with imperial conduct is an obstacle to the greatness that Russia will gain by rejoining (or perhaps for the first time fully joining) Western civilization and becoming, initially, one of its beneficiaries and, eventually, one of its pillars. Surely it is in the American interest to encourage this kind of thinking in the second-largest nuclear power.

To be effective such support cannot be delivered piecemeal or sporadically: a little bit of economic assistance here to help Yeltsin with his parliament, a little bit of diplomatic action there to mediate the conflict with Ukraine over the Crimea. A comprehensive approach to the Russian problem is needed—a realistic one that incorporates clear priorities, rather than just a laundry list of U.S. officials' wishes.

The American focus on Russia, of course, should not mean neglect of the other newly independent states or license for Russia to get away with aggressive behavior in its policies toward them or any other country. Instead the American approach should reflect an appreciation that Russian developments are central to shaping the entire region's political character. Any sensible U.S. policy would use this as its point of departure.

This comprehensive approach should include security, economic and moral dimensions. It must be based on the realization that the newly independent states are unusually receptive to the new geopolitical context in which they find themselves—a context with new opportunities and dangers generated by the collapse of their predecessor, the Soviet Union. Redefining their security relationships, while they simultaneously divide the Soviet inheritance and deal with explosive minority issues and border disputes, is an extremely important

[2]*Izvestia*, Feb. 14, 1992.

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and delicate task. The United States has an interest in making sure the newly independent states are stable and secure, if for no other reason than to eliminate any neo-imperial temptation on Russia's part to meddle in their affairs. At the same time America should be careful not to give the impression that it is siding with these states against Russia in order to create a new *cordon sanitaire* to exclude Russia from Europe. That approach would only provide ammunition to those in Russia who charge that the West is inherently hostile to their country.

The United States cannot create a new security framework for the former Soviet Union. But it can facilitate, in an anticipatory fashion, the creation of new international security mechanisms designed to prevent (if possible) and to control (if necessary) any Yugoslav-style disasters. During the Yugoslav crisis the United Nations, the European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe arrived on the scene too late, and their efforts were not properly coordinated, sometimes even working at cross purposes. These lessons should be kept in mind when dealing with the CIS.

Washington can also quietly discourage the formation of regional groupings, such as the one proposed by Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis for his country, Belarus and Ukraine, that have an almost overt anti-Russian bias and that could trigger a reaction from Moscow. Moreover, considering how much is at stake in maintaining peace and a good neighborly relationship between Russia and Ukraine, the United States could play a mediating role. To be effective American diplomacy should avoid taking sides publicly. However this should not be an obstacle to making U.S. policy preferences clear to both parties. More generally the United States in cooperation with its European allies should use its considerable clout to urge Commonwealth members to avoid an uncontrolled arms race and to seek both individual and collective security arrangements with one another. Yet it should avoid extending—either unilaterally or collectively—any security guarantees to Ukraine and the other newly independent states that would exclude Russia. Such guarantees would considerably increase U.S. military commitment and put America unnecessarily at odds with Russia.

Also taking into account the artificial nature of the borders between the post-Soviet states, the United States should avoid taking a position on their territorial disputes. In contrast to the fragmentation of postcolonial Africa, one state, Russia, domi-

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nates the area. Yet millions of Russians and other Russian-speakers (in excess of 50 million people, according to some estimates) have suddenly found themselves residents of foreign nations, and some of these new nations may gravitate toward different regional structures and different cultures. If the CIS collapses, some territorial adjustments—and not all of them would necessarily be to Russia's advantage—may become inevitable. However the United States can play a significant role in emphasizing the importance of orderly procedures and peaceful solutions. This may be particularly applicable to the growing disput over Crimea. Both Moscow and Kiev should be cautioned against unilateral and violent actions.

In the economic sphere the $24 billion aid package for the Russian federation by the Group of Seven leading industrial nations, which was announced by President Bush and Chancellor Kohl on April 1, represents a good beginning. But it would be a mistake for Washington to let the international monetary organizations and a variety of bureaucracies administer such a colossal effort without a proper coordinating mechanism. The campaign to help Russia and the other independent states should be treated as the functional equivalent of war. One person should have the responsibility, with broad coordinating powers.

Because the objectives of aid are not just economic but ultimately—and predominantly—political, policy considerations must be placed above narrowly defined economic requirements. In addition aid should be allotted on a conditional basis. It should not become another entitlement going equally to every member of CIS simply because they used to belong to the Soviet Union. Rather it should be carefully directed to help private enterprise, promote reforms, strengthen democratic institutions and reward the benign treatment of neighbors. And it should be contingent on the recipients' commitment to refrain from disruptive protectionist measures against one another.

Finally, there is no substitute for demonstrating an understanding of Russia's predicament and respect for Russian pride. When the International Monetary Fund and some Western economists pressure the Russian government to proceed with economic "shock therapy," they forget that the only good reform is reform that is politically sustainable. The Russian move toward a free-market system is taking place in the context of economic conditions that are much worse than

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those in eastern Europe and of tensions between the central government and many of the ethnic autonomies. With 50 million people (one-third of the population) already living below the poverty level, shock therapy could trigger unpredictable consequences. It is difficult to envision the West providing massive assistance to Russia if the Yeltsin government were to lose control of parts of the country or if Moscow must rely heavily on force to keep them under control.

Similarly the United States will have to accept that, even under optimum circumstances, the road to post-imperial, democratic capitalism is going to be rough with some detours, and possibly temporary set-backs, that may look disheartening indeed. While America, of course, should not give Russia blanket approval, it would be unwise to overreact every time there is some bad news from Moscow.

Of course the ultimate outcome of the historical drama unfolding in the former Soviet Union will not be determined by foreigners. There is the real possibility that, no matter what the West does, democracy in these lands will prove only a brief interlude. But there is the virtual certainty that without a major constructive engagement by the West—and, realistically, this can only be arranged by the United States—the Russian democratic experiment will go up in smoke, taking the rest of the region with it.

On the one hand is the prospect that Russia will reestablish itself as a great power. If it does so without abandoning its commitment to democracy—due to the fact that its economy is relatively underdeveloped and its exports are mainly commodities—then it would have less reason than Germany or Japan to be at odds with the United States. Russia's revival thus has the potential of making a positive contribution to the global economic and geopolitical equilibrium that is beginning to drift against U.S. interests.

On the other hand one does not need excessive imagination to conjure up disasters of an apocalyptic magnitude if the Russian empire is reborn and attempts to strike back. The stakes are high for the United States, and they require an immediate, purposeful and comprehensive effort.

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Adrian Karatnycky

THE UKRAINIAN FACTOR

After centuries of colonial anonymity Ukraine is finally making its mark on world affairs. Although relegated to secondary status by the West, Ukraine is rapidly emerging as a forceful and important actor in defining the contours of post-Soviet Europe. Russia and its President Boris Yeltsin may have taken the lead in defeating the August 1991 putsch and the Soviet Communist Party. But it was Ukraine, led by President Leonid Kravchuk, that ultimately provoked the unraveling of the Soviet empire: Ukraine's refusal to sign Mikhail Gorbachev's union treaty precipitated the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the creation of the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Ukraine emerged from the Soviet Union's dissolution as a strategically significant state. Its 700,000-strong armed forces are continental Europe's second largest—nearly 50 percent larger than Germany's Bundeswehr. That is even larger than British and French forces combined and two and a half times the size of the entire complement of U.S. forces in Europe. Moreover, although it has agreed to remove them, Ukraine still possesses tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

Ukraine's weight in post-Soviet geopolitics comes as a consequence of its large population (52 million). It is Europe's second-largest state in terms of territory, an expanse that strategically hugs the shores of the Black Sea and divides Russia from its former east European satrapies: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania. The state is not only a major agricultural producer but also an industrial center, in 1990 accounting for 16 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s economic output.

Since its December 1, 1991, referendum, in which 90 percent of the population voted for independence, Ukraine

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has acted quickly to demarcate its sovereignty.[1] It created its own army, moved to establish a currency, introduced the Ukrainian language into state offices and schools and secured diplomatic recognition from more than 100 countries. But the emergence of the new state has not been free of conflict—the most significant of which remains with Russia over disposition of nuclear weapons and control of the former Soviet Black Sea fleet. Remarkably, however, Ukrainian statehood was achieved without bloodshed or upheaval.

The loosely confederated CIS was cobbled together hastily on December 8, 1991, primarily to satisfy Ukrainian concerns. Yet Ukraine has turned out to be the Commonwealth's most reluctant partner; from the outset Kravchuk pursued a policy aimed at ensuring a weak confederation. Ukraine consistently opposed attempts to create permanent CIS coordinating structures and blocked efforts to build a central CIS bureaucracy. All coordination, Kiev insisted, should come through bilateral and multilateral discussions among independent states. Kravchuk declined to attend the group's May 15 summit.

The main theme of Ukrainian statecraft has thus been to define the contours of sovereignty and to assert and test that sovereignty at every turn. It has reminded the other new republics, as well as the rest of the world, that the CIS is no state or subject of international law. At the March 1992 CIS summit in Kiev, for instance, Kravchuk rejected all but four of 18 treaties and agreements proposed. The Ukrainian president was explicit in his intentions: "I would like history to record one day that Kravchuk was one of those that did much to break up the empire, that Ukraine played an enormous role in that."

II

Ukraine's policies have already led to the fragmentation of what was the world's second most powerful military establishment. Kravchuk triumphed in his stance that a unified CIS military endangered Ukrainian sovereignty. His position won the support of Moldova, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Uzbekistan,

[1]The December 1 referendum produced a voter turnout of 84 percent. Support for independence ranged from 96–98 percent in the western Ukrainian districts of Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Lviv to 95 percent in the central regions of Poltava and Kiev, 85 percent in Russophone Odessa, 76.8 percent in industrial Donbas and 54 percent in Crimea. At the same time Kravchuk received a 61 percent vote for the presidency in a field of seven candidates.

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all of which are now forming their own armies. Ukraine's persistence, too, forced Russia to create its own armed forces. The new Ukrainian state thus helped define the military structure of the post-Soviet world.[2]

Questions of the military's formation and loyalty are central to any assessment of the new Ukrainian state and its prospects for survival. Steps toward the creation of Ukrainian armed forces began even before the founding of the CIS; the Ukrainian parliament adopted laws on December 6, 1991, on formation of armed forces and national defense. Then on December 12, just four days after the historic meeting in Minsk that gave rise to the Commonwealth, Kravchuk decreed himself commander in chief of all nonstrategic military formations on Ukrainian territory. By January 3 Ukraine had begun establishing its own army.

As a result of the speed with which Ukraine established authority over its territorial forces, the military appears increasingly loyal. The main instrument for creating the Ukrainian military was an oath of allegiance to be taken by all servicemen stationed in Ukraine, including nonstrategic sections of that part of the Black Sea fleet based on Ukrainian territory.

The taking of the oath was initially impeded in Ukraine's Carpathian, Kiev and Odessa military districts, and those Russian commanding officers were dismissed and replaced by ethnic Russians born in Ukraine. More than 40,000 soldiers who refused to take the oath were transferred to other republics. Thereafter, with the exception of the Black Sea fleet, the oath encountered few significant obstacles and was widely administered. In the first two weeks of January 250,000 troops took the oath, and in mid-March Ukraine extended the pledge to components of the CIS strategic force. By early April 483,000 officers and soldiers had sworn their allegiance.

The military's loyalty also stems in part from the growing proportion of Ukraine's own citizens that form army ranks. At the beginning of 1992 more than 55 percent of soldiers on Ukrainian territory were native born. That percentage has since been enhanced by the exchange of indigenous military personnel with other republics. Ukraine's April-June military

[2]For a thorough account of the events leading to the creation of the Ukrainian military, see Kathleen Mihailisko, "Ukraine Asserts Control over Nonstrategic Forces," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, Jan. 24, 1992.

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call-up, which likely yielded another 100,000 conscripts, will increase that proportion even further. All soldiers pledging loyalty to Ukraine are eligible for citizenship as well.

Kravchuk declared in March that Ukrainian servicemen would no longer serve in "trouble spots" of the former U.S.S.R.; all Ukrainian citizens could return to conclude their military service in the homeland. According to *Izvestia*, tens of thousands of Ukrainian officers and recruits have applied to return. Kravchuk insists he is ready to absorb all 400,000 Ukrainian citizens serving in military units outside the republic.

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry has become perhaps the most revolutionary part of the new state. Unlike most other Ukrainian departments, the entire Defense Ministry is new. It thus did not inherit the stultifying array of long-standing nomenklatura and functionaries or the many time-serving apparatchiks that populate other state agencies.

The defense ministry began its work in October 1991, a time when many regarded the prospects for a Ukrainian military as hopeless folly. Konstantin Morozov, a 48-year-old colonel general in the Soviet Air Force, resigned his commission to become defense minister. Of Russian-Ukrainian heritage, Morozov moved rapidly to "Ukrainianize" the military. He assembled a staff of military professionals and advisers, many from the democratic nationalist Rukh party and the radical Union of Ukrainian Officers. Created in 1990, the officers union today boasts 70,000 active members and reserves. It was thus able to offer Morozov strong technical assistance and has become an important informal instrument in winning the military's loyalty to the new state.

Tasks of transforming troops into loyal forces, elaborating new missions and threat assessments, preparing for defense conversion and substantial demobilization would be daunting enough for any defense establishment. It is especially true for a military unsure of precisely how many troops are on its soil. The most reliable estimate of Ukrainian troop strength—the 700,000 figure—does not include border forces and the new national guard; the defense ministry has not yet completed its personnel census and inventory of matériel. CIS military officials, however, suspect that Ukraine wound up with much of

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the most advanced weaponry and technology of the Soviet arsenal.[3]

Kiev has declared its intention to scale back Ukrainian forces to 200,000–300,000 over the next five years. That projected level would be well within the level accepted by most European powers. Ukrainian officials note that those reductions will be compensated by technological improvements, which should yield a military whose firepower matches that of the current level of forces.

No aspect of Ukrainian policy has attracted greater attention than its position on nuclear weapons. As of May 176 strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles with more than 1,600 nuclear warheads remained on Ukrainian soil. Presidents Kravchuk and Bush met in Washington in early May and agreed that Ukraine would rid itself of nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. That agreement, however, appeared to allow Ukraine to backtrack on earlier statements that the republic would remove all strategic nuclear weapons as early as the end of 1994. Kiev had also declared that all 4,000 tactical nuclear warheads would be removed by July 1992 and, with the exception of those with the Black Sea fleet, that has been accomplished.

In April 1992 parliament reconfirmed Ukraine's intention to be a neutral, nonnuclear state. The process of denuclearization has nonetheless had many starts and stalls. Exercising its new sovereignty, Ukraine has insisted on control over all nuclear weapons on its soil, strategic as well as tactical. Although nuclear warheads remain under the jurisdiction of CIS command, Ukraine's own control over some delivery systems ensures "nonuse."

Ukraine's emphasis on sovereignty extends to treaties as well. In their May meeting Kravchuk and Bush also agreed on Ukrainian participation in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks agreement. The apparent contradiction—that an intended nonnuclear state should be party to a nuclear treaty—has raised doubts in Russia, as well as abroad, about Ukraine's commitment to a denuclearized status.

In mid-March after more than half of its tactical nuclear warheads had already been removed from its territory, Ukraine stirred international alarm by announcing suspension

[3]See remarks by Colonel General Boris Pyankov in an interview in *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 7, 1992.

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of further weapons transfers to Russia. At issue, Ukrainian leaders asserted, were inadequate controls over the timely destruction of the warheads. The Ukrainian decision to suspend further transfers was also influenced by ominous rhetoric from Russian leaders concerning border revisions and by tension with Russia over possession of the Black Sea fleet.

Ukraine was reassured of sufficient Russian guarantees that the tactical warheads were indeed being destroyed, and Kiev resumed transferring warheads "for destruction under international supervision." Still, Ukrainian anxiety over Russia's intentions remains and may plague the process of denuclearization. President Kravchuk demonstrated the depth of Ukrainian concern in late April, when he announced the republic's intention to seek Western security guarantees in exchange for scrapping Ukrainian nuclear arms.

There is increasing sentiment on the fringes of the Ukrainian political establishment to keep the nuclear weapons. While the consensus within parliament and among major political groups is to proceed with missile destruction, any heightened Russo-Ukrainian tensions could reverse current attitudes.

III

The pace of Ukrainian economic reform has not nearly matched that of military reform; reform of Ukraine's economy has consistently lagged behind Russia's. But even reform-minded Ukrainian officials, such as Deputy Prime Minister Volodymyr Lanovoy, noted that Ukraine's slower pace was probably inevitable: "Ukraine . . . is unprepared for independent implementation of the reforms because its economy is not under full control of the state. . . . It is part of the economy of another state and is still regulated largely from Moscow."[4]

Ukraine was a vital agricultural and industrial center of the former Soviet Union. It produced a quarter of meat products, 21 percent of dairy products, 80 percent of pasta, 55 percent of vegetable oil, 46 percent of canned vegetables and 30 percent of flour traded among the former republics. Ukraine produced 23 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s coal, 35 percent of its ferrous metal, 41 percent of rolled steel, nearly half its iron ore, 22 percent of bricks, 33 percent of televisions, 25 percent

[4]"Ukrainian Radio First Program," March 27, 1992, quoted in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Central Eurasia*, March 31, 1992.

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of computation and automation equipment, 22 percent of tractors, 31 percent of harvesters and 56 percent of rail cargo cars.

Thus the unavoidable problem has been that Ukraine's economy is still largely intertwined with those of other former Soviet republics, most notably Russia. Ukrainian leaders argue that the new state cannot gain control of its economy and implement price reforms as long as Moscow controls the printing of rubles. Kiev has thus permitted circulation of "coupons" as a kind of unofficial currency that allowed Ukraine's economy some autonomy. Ukraine will likely introduce its own official currency, the hryvnia, in the second half of 1992, expecting to make it convertible by the beginning of 1993.

Parliament overwhelmingly endorsed a report issued March 24 by the Duma, a presidential advisory body, criticizing the fact that Ukraine's financial, monetary and pricing policies continued to be managed "from afar." Ukraine, the report argued, remained unable to take serious independent decisions on economic matters. To avoid Ukraine's being drawn into a single Russian-dominated economic complex, the report recommended gradually reducing imports from countries in the ruble zone, reorienting exports toward new markets, instituting taxes and charges "for all foreign facilities using Ukraine's transport infrastructure," and controlling "customs tariffs and foreign economic activity along the length of the Ukrainian state border."

The pace of Ukraine's economic change is likely to gather momentum, as President Kravchuk and most Ukrainian leaders favor fundamental economic reform. They are divided, however, over the specifics. Some leaders are deeply critical of Russia's approach. Volodymyr Chernyak, an economist of the Rukh coalition, put it this way: "Neither in Russia nor in Ukraine is it possible to follow the classic IMF scheme. You cannot free prices as the cornerstone of reform." President Kravchuk, too, has emphasized that Ukraine could not survive the radical shock therapy tried in Poland. "We have to learn from the experience of other east European states," he said. "Ukraine will take its own path."

Although critical of Russia's course, Ukrainian leaders are nonetheless committed to their own far-reaching economic restructuring. They believe that privatization must accompany any price reform, and parliament has passed sweeping laws

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that set the stage for such initiatives, proposing to privatize the commercial sector and small enterprises. Existing joint ventures have the right to repatriate their share of profits tax-free for five years; foreign stakes in new joint ventures will be exempt from taxes for the first three years of profitability. New laws also allow local governments to privatize housing and land. Still, many democrats believe that implementation of these reforms could be impeded by Prime Minister Vitold Fokin, Ukraine's former planning chief.

Agricultural reform may also be in the offing. Kravchuk had relied on strong support from collective and state farm managers in his bid for the presidency. He now appears to have declared war against those entrenched interests. "We can no longer tolerate a situation where a vast [agro-industrial] administrative apparatus, having exhausted its usefulness, is preserved in its primitive form," he declared. Kravchuk also appointed a new minister of agriculture with close ties to parliament's democratic bloc.

Progress has been made as well on the question of the U.S.S.R.'s hard currency debt. Until March 1992 Ukraine resisted attempts at collective responsibility for Soviet obligations. Ukrainian officials viewed the debt problem as linked to sovereignty: assuming partial responsibility for Soviet foreign debt was an infringement. Ukraine, it was argued, should be responsible for only Ukraine's share of the debt. In the end Ukrainian objections were put aside, however, and the republic agreed to guarantee 21.13 percent of the former U.S.S.R. debt of $82 billion. Russia will take responsibility for the balance owed by it and other republics.

Another major economic issue—energy—promises to vex Ukrainian leaders in years ahead and to complicate issues of Ukrainian sovereignty. Ukraine imports 42 percent of its energy needs, mostly from Russia. Ukraine requires 60 million tons of oil and 115 billion cubic meters of natural gas. It satisfies, respectively, only 8 and 20 percent of those needs for itself. To reduce this dependency and prepare for Russia's introduction of higher energy prices, Ukraine plans to economize on its generation of electricity by nearly 20 percent, to 220 billion kilowatt hours in 1992 from 270 billion in 1990.

Despite such economies Ukraine will remain extremely dependent on Russia for most of its oil and natural gas needs. Ukrainian leaders are thus seeking to diversify their sources of supply. One such source is the Middle East. Ukraine has

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already reached agreement with Iran and Azerbaijan to construct new pipelines to supply oil and natural gas to Europe. Iran, in turn, will supply nearly one-fifth of Ukraine's natural gas and 10 percent of its oil requirements.

IV

At the heart of Ukrainian statehood and the center of the formation of the Ukrainian state stands its president, Leonid Kravchuk. Yet he largely remains a mystery and anomaly.

Unlike Russian President Yeltsin, who immediately led strong resistance to the August putsch, Kravchuk vacillated in the first hours of the coup, urging Ukraine's workers not to disrupt the normal rhythm of work. Only when the coup began unraveling did Kravchuk voice opposition to what he labeled an "unconstitutional act." In the coup's aftermath Kravchuk portrayed his equivocations and caution as evidence of guile. By keeping Ukraine calm, he argued, he had succeeded in shielding the republic from a Moscow-based conflict.

Once director of ideology of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the party's ideology secretary in 1989–90, Kravchuk became a fierce advocate of Ukrainian statehood. In the months before the December referendum and presidential election, Kravchuk was accused of playing to growing nationalist sentiments in his bid to gain high office. But once in power, observers believed, he would move quickly to shape some sort of union with the other republics. Nothing could have been further from the truth. In the aftermath of the failed August coup Kravchuk pursued a consistent policy aimed at securing Ukrainian independence.

Many trace Kravchuk's political transformation to opportunism. Others point out that he was born to an Orthodox peasant family in the Volyn region of western Ukraine, a traditionally nationalist seat. Still others suggest Kravchuk has learned to appreciate the trappings of statehood, the ceremony of high office and the power that comes from legitimate popular support.[5] Whatever his motives, however, he has been unwavering in the march toward Ukrainian statehood.

In the sphere of political reform the new Ukrainian president has been a study in contradictions. While opening the Ukrainian media and ending the intrusive surveillance of the

[5]A poll taken in January 1992 rated Kravchuk the most influential politician in the CIS; see *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, Feb. 12, 1992.

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old security apparatus, Kravchuk has been predisposed to trust those who formerly worked in Communist Party ranks. Virtually all his appointed ministers and advisers, even those from the democratic camp, are former communists. After parliament granted Kravchuk sweeping powers in March to reform local governments, three-quarters of his appointments as local presidential representatives were once apparatchiks, including numerous former regional and local party secretaries.

Democratic activists charge that such practices have slowed the pace of change and stymied many local legislatures and governments now in the hands of elected democrats.

V

Ukrainian politics has been characterized by a proliferation of small parties. Democratic forces, however, have coalesced around two major camps: Rukh and New Ukraine.

Rukh, or "movement," was created in 1989 and draws strongest support in western Ukraine and urban centers such as Kiev and Kharkiv. It claims 700,000 members and points to millions of others who took part in its mass actions on behalf of statehood. Led by former political prisoner Vyacheslav Chornovil—Kravchuk's runner-up in the presidential race—Rukh is divided into two wings: a Chornovil-led majority that emphasizes the role of democratic opposition and a minority that believes Rukh should actively support Kravchuk as he works to consolidate Ukrainian statehood.

Chornovil has managed to maintain unity between those two poles by defining Rukh as a "constructive opposition"—backing the president when he advances statehood, criticizing him when he resists basic democratic and economic reforms. "We live in what at the grass-roots level is still a communist society," Chornovil has said. He notes that local authorities, especially in the collectivized countryside and many cities and towns, are still the same apparatchiks who tacitly backed the reactionary August coup. Now that statehood has been won, Chornovil argues, the major task is to build a civil society and to shape a democratic Ukraine.

The leaders of New Ukraine largely echo Chornovil's approach. But while Rukh is led primarily by longstanding anticommunists, New Ukraine was created by activists who emerged from Democratic Platform, a reform faction that split from the Communist Party in mid-1990. New Ukraine offers

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strong support for Ukrainian statehood, but because many of its members are ethnic Russians or Ukrainians from Russophone regions, it downplays the kind of patriotic sloganeering and symbolism characteristic of Rukh. Instead New Ukraine prefers to highlight economic reform and the strengthening of civil society.

New Ukraine's ranks include representatives of the reform wing of industry, the emerging business community, segments of academia and the scientific intelligentsia. This party also has two wings: liberal proponents of a free market and social democrats. Its leader, Volodymyr Filenko, believes such a dichotomy does not threaten the movement's unity. "As in eastern Europe," he explained, "differences between the liberals and the social democrats will not emerge until a considerable amount of privatization has occurred."

Neither New Ukraine nor Rukh is likely to capture a majority in new parliamentary elections. Rukh would enjoy strongest support in western and central Ukraine; New Ukraine, with its many Russophone leaders, would draw significant support in the east and south. The dividing lines between Rukh and New Ukraine indicate Ukraine's many regional differences—especially those cultural and political differences between the Uniate Catholic west, where passionate nationalist sentiments run high, and the Orthodox east, with its high proportion of Russians and Russian speakers.

The evolution of the Ukrainian independence movement, however, has thus far successfully traversed those breaches. By forging an inclusive, nonethnic conception of Ukrainian patriotism (defined as support for a Ukrainian state) and by wooing Ukraine's Russian, Jewish, Polish and Hungarian national minorities, Rukh and other anticommunist movements have avoided the divisive ethnic politics that plagued many other non-Russian republics. Western Ukraine's democrats largely tempered their nationalism and argued for Ukrainian statehood in pragmatic, economic terms. They thus avoided dividing the country into hostile camps. That approach, too, set the stage for cooperation between these two democratic movements.

VI

While Ukrainian-Russian ethnic relations remain calm, state relations between Russia and Ukraine have been tense. Certain high-ranking Russian leaders have made statements question-

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ing the current border with Ukraine. President Yeltsin's press secretary, Pavel Voshchanov, suggested in December that the frontier between the two republics was yet to be resolved. These tensions were diffused after a quickly arranged high-ranking Russian mission visited Kiev.

But the issue was raised again in late January by Vladimir Lukin, then chairman of the Russian parliament's foreign affairs committee. In a widely publicized memorandum Lukin, now Russian ambassador to the United States, wrote that in order to secure the Black Sea fleet Russia should question Ukrainian patrimony over Crimea, a region ceded to Ukraine in 1954. Such a policy, argued Lukin, would help quell growing clamor from the Russian nationalist right, while pressuring Ukraine to abandon its claim on the fleet.

The publication of the Lukin memo and a subsequent resolution by the Russian Supreme Soviet to investigate the circumstances of Crimea's transfer outraged Ukrainians. Kiev's response was the March 12 announcement that it was suspending transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia.

Relations worsened further in April after an unauthorized trip to Ukraine by Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy and State Counselor Sergei Stankevich, both of whom traveled to Sevastopol for a highly publicized visit to the Black Sea fleet. There Rutskoy, who has regularly criticized Yeltsin and attacked the putative surrender of "historical Russia," laid claim to Crimea and the Black Sea fleet. President Kravchuk in turn decreed on April 6 that the fleet was under Ukrainian jurisdiction. A day later Yeltsin issued his own decree authorizing Russia's takeover of the fleet. Finally on April 8 cooler heads prevailed: each leader rescinded his decree, and they established a joint parliamentary commission to resolve the dispute.

The two sides, however, are far from agreement. Ukraine's claim to the bulk of the Black Sea fleet issues largely from nonstrategic considerations. Ukraine has neither the inclination nor the capability to maintain anything approximating a 300-ship navy. The dispute over the Black Sea fleet is viewed by Kiev as a matter of protecting Ukraine's sovereignty and affirming its hold on Crimea. Securing a navy, which could in part be sold off, is also seen as a source of desperately needed hard currency.

The CIS and Russia have offered Ukraine 20 percent of the fleet; Kiev insists on control of 91 percent of all ships and submarines within Ukrainian territory. Yet Ukrainian leaders

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are likely to prove flexible and may agree to split the difference, provided Russia reaffirms its respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity. Russia in turn will probably seek some sort of base agreement to secure use of Sevastopol or some other Ukrainian port for the CIS strategic component.

Most of the tension surrounding Crimea is fanned by the dispute over the Black Sea fleet, but the Crimean dispute as such could well survive any Russo-Ukrainian agreement on the fate of the navy. A popular Crimean republican movement has agitated for independent statehood for the peninsula. The movement has gathered more than 200,000 signatures in support of a referendum on Crimean independence, scheduled for August 2. A reliable poll conducted in early February shows public sentiment in the Crimea to be fragmented: 42 percent support remaining an autonomous republic linked to Ukraine; 15 percent favor its return to Russia; 22 percent support a sovereign Crimean republic within the CIS; 8 percent favor complete independence.

The Crimean parliament heightened tensions on May 5, 1992, by adopting an ambiguous declaration of independence, an action the Ukrainian parliament subsequently annulled. The Crimean parliament appeared to back away from its earlier decision, but on May 21 the Russian parliament, while reaffirming current borders, threw the dispute into greater turmoil by voiding the 1954 transfer of the Crimea and calling for negotiations over the peninsula's future.

VII

Ukrainian leaders view ill-considered or provocative remarks by Russian officials as part of a pattern of Russian conduct that has plagued Ukraine for centuries. State relations are seen in terms of Russia's historical domination of Ukraine, and today's Ukrainian leaders are determined that history should not repeat.

Kravchuk and other Ukrainian officials understand that Russian President Yeltsin himself has never questioned Ukraine's current borders. Yeltsin aides say that the Russian president is committed to honoring a 1990 treaty with Ukraine that confirms existing frontiers. Ukrainian officials, however, aware of increasingly shrill opposition to Yeltsin in Russia, question his durability in office.

Yeltsin has made clear that a major component of Russia's democratic and Western-oriented foreign policy is a turn away

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from empire and from the use of force. Yeltsin told the Congress of People's Deputies on April 7 that Russia "was parting with the remnants of ideologized thought and messianic ideas." He added that "work to strengthen Russia's international position . . . by no means amounts to an attempt to usurp the role of a superpower." Russia, Yeltsin assured them, would pursue "radical change" that sees a "relative decline in the role played by military power."

Yeltsin's tenure holds out the promise of stability and peace, but there are powerful political forces in Russia aligned against his democratic course. Vice President Rutskoy, Yeltsin's constitutional successor, has emerged as a strong voice of a "Great Russia" that is "single and indivisible." According to one Yeltsin aide, Rutskoy's ghostwriters include Aleksandr Prokhanov—editor of the reactionary weekly *Den*—and the neofascist writer Yuri Bondarev. One of Rutskoy's main policy advisers is Iona Andronov, a former journalist known for his anti-dissident and anti-Western essays.

A coalition of "patriotic forces" in Russia has been forged between neocommunists like Sergei Baburin and anticommunists like Christian Democrat Viktor Aksyuchits and Constitutional Democrat Mikhail Astafiev. That coalition dominated much of the voting in April at the Russian Congress of People's Deputies and nearly jeopardized economic reform. Other democratic leaders, including Nikolai Travkin of the Democratic Party of Russia and St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, also oppose Yeltsin's policy of building a state based on a Russian federation and instead support restoration of a federated union based on the CIS.

Much of the current Russian political establishment thus favors resurgent anti-Western sentiments and revival of "great power" Russian nationalism. Certainly the economic transformation of Russia—a nation of vast territorial expanse with an unwieldy military-industrial complex and a potentially explosive mix of Slavs and Asians—is likely to prove far more vexing than that of Ukraine. Other factors work against Russian stability as well. Tens of millions of Russians live beyond Russia's own borders, many in the Muslim Central Asian states. Potential pressures on ethnic Russians may produce a flow of emigrants from those regions, further taxing a Russian economy already undergoing a difficult transition to the market.

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VIII

While its central preoccupation has been Russia, Ukraine nevertheless has moved quickly to signal the contours of a broader foreign policy. The focal point of that policy is Ukraine's desire to secure full-fledged membership in democratic Europe. Ukraine has made clear that it seeks eventual entry into the structures of the European Community. Toward that end it seeks membership as the fourth partner in the Vysegrad process, through which Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are seeking to coordinate their own passage into "Europe."

A cornerstone of Ukrainian policy has been its insistence on the permanence of existing borders. The new state is an important presence in central and eastern Europe, sharing borders with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Russia, Belarus and Moldova as well as the Black Sea coastline with Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Georgia.

Relations with Poland and Hungary are strongest. Poland was first to recognize Ukraine's independence, and activists from the Solidarity movement had offered technical and material assistance to Rukh. Hungarian President Arpád Göncz has visited Kiev, and the two states have signed a military cooperation agreement. Relations with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic are cordial, if complicated by unfounded Czech worries that Ukraine might support Slovakia's bid for independence.

With the exception of Russia, Romania looms as the greatest potential danger to Ukrainian borders. The Romanian parliament has made territorial claims on Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, which were awarded to Ukraine by Stalin.[6] Ukraine has tried to defuse the issue by staying out of Romania's conflict with Moldova over the Slavic Trans-Dnestr region, noting that the dispute is a matter for Moldova to resolve. In this way Ukraine hopes to win Moldova's and Romania's goodwill. By respecting Romanian and Moldovan borders, Kiev apparently hopes for eventual reciprocity.

Another focal point of Ukrainian foreign policy will be relations with countries with substantial Ukrainian diaspora.

[6]These territories were ceded to the U.S.S.R. by Romania under the threat of force in 1940 and reoccupied by Stalin's armies in 1944. The transfer of these lands, which include areas in which Ukrainians have long formed the majority, was confirmed by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.

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Those nations include the United States, where there are 750,000 Americans of Ukrainian ancestry; Canada, with 700,000 ethnic Ukrainians; and Brazil, with more than 200,000. There are also a quarter million Ukrainians in Poland and substantial Ukrainian communities in Britain and Australia. Relations with Israel, which was quick to recognize the new Ukrainian state, warmed in the last year, helped by a solemn week-long commemoration in October 1991 of the massacre of Jews in Kiev's Babi Yar.

IX

Regrettably the West has relegated Ukraine to the back burner. Yet growing opposition in Russia to Yeltsin's three-pronged policy of democratic change, economic reform and withdrawal from empire argues against making Russia the focal point of the West's post-Soviet policies. While everything should be done to shore up Yeltsin and Russia's democratic forces, Ukraine deserves a closer look as a potential anchor of stability in eastern Europe.

When they met in May 1992 Presidents Kravchuk and Bush signed accords extending most-favored-nation trading status to Ukraine and providing insurance for U.S. businesses that invest in the new republic. Kravchuk's trip to Washington raised U.S.-Ukrainian relations to a higher profile, but its status was merely a "working visit" rather than a "state visit" like that scheduled for President Yeltsin in June.

Ukraine is eager to win the approval of the industrialized democracies, as its renewal of shipments of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia and its commitment to nonproliferation suggest. Yet President Bush has set out an aid program with specific assistance to Russia for currency stabilization and none for Ukraine's own monetary unit. Likewise, the IMF's capital quota for Russia is nearly sixty percent greater per capita than Ukraine's. Even the emphasis on providing food assistance to Russia works to Ukraine's disadvantage: it makes Russia less dependent on Ukrainian imports while making no efforts to reduce Ukraine's own dependence on those exports. A more balanced Western aid package would provide assistance to make Ukraine more energy efficient and less dependent on imported fuel. Such an aid package should be crafted to ensure equity in levels of aid and loan assistance.

Ukraine has few of the ethnic, political and cultural divisions that will likely plague Russia in years ahead. It has nothing like

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Russia's simmering separatist movements, as in Chechnia and Tatarstan. While Ukrainians and Russians (73 and 21 percent, respectively, of Ukraine's population) represent different nations, their common Slavic roots argue for a stable ethnic mix. Moreover, with the exception of Crimea, all of Ukraine's oblasts have Ukrainian majorities. Ukrainian politics is dominated by pro-Western movements and leaders. Ukraine's most skilled communist officials were frequently taken for service in Moscow; its remaining communist elite was thus less skilled and has proven less durable than Russia's.

Civil society is emerging in both Russia and Ukraine. In Russia, however, it is increasingly divided into irreconcilable camps reflecting the traditional fault lines of Russian intellectual life—between democratic Westernizers and imperialist Slavophiles. In Ukraine most emerging structures of civil society share a democratic orientation. Many of the new and numerous language, ecological, cultural, trade union and political movements were born in the struggle for statehood and against totalitarianism. Extremist and irredentist Ukrainian nationalist groups are weak, even in the more nationalist west. Public-opinion sampling suggests far lower support in Ukraine for the return of an authoritarian iron hand and far more durable support for democratic rule.

A pro-Western Russian democracy may well triumph, but democracy and a pro-Western orientation are significantly more likely to endure in Ukraine. In time a stable and democratic Ukraine, linked to democratic Europe, could act as a conduit for democratic ideas to the east; a Western-oriented Ukraine, with its large Russian population, could engage Russia in the west. If Russia were to fall prey to a revival of obscurantism and imperialism, Ukraine would also become a welcome buffer for the new democracies of east-central Europe. Above all a free and pro-Western Ukraine would deprive a newly aggressive Russia of its capacity to reassert superpower control over its former satellites. Bolstering a strong pro-Western Ukrainian democracy and assisting a stable Ukrainian state, materially and technically, would not only benefit Ukrainians but the entire democratic West.

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Martha Brill Olcott

CENTRAL ASIA'S CATAPULT TO INDEPENDENCE

Few peoples of the world have ever been forced to become independent nations. Yet that is precisely what happened to the five Central Asian republics after Russia, Belarus and Ukraine—the three original signatories of the U.S.S.R.'s founding 1922 constitution—met in Minsk on December 8, 1991, and created a new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

That action by the three Slavic presidents left Central Asian leaders with an unpleasant choice: they could go it alone—either singly or as a group—or they could shrug off the intended snub by their Slavic counterparts and agree to join the Commonwealth. After a hurried meeting in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan's capital, they chose the latter course. If independence had to occur, it was best achieved gradually; the new Commonwealth structures, they conceded, would make it easier to regulate their interdependent economies.

To salve the smart of their initial exclusion the first meeting of the expanded Commonwealth was held in the Kazakh capital of Alma-Ata; the original Slavs-only club was thus recast in a Eurasian mold. That December 21 meeting declared the former Soviet republics sovereign and independent, as well as part of an extragovernmental union. Each republic, for the first time, had full control of its own natural resources and local economic enterprises.

Newly independent nations face extraordinary challenges, even under the best circumstances, and they usually hold the leaders who "won" that independence in high regard. The Central Asian leaders, however, were inadvertent founding fathers. Most were once part of the old Soviet Union's nomenklatura, which was in turn largely drawn from the region's traditional ruling elites. These leaders were neither democrats nor dictators, nor nationalist heroes. Some were opportunists; most were sincere in the desire to secure their countries'

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economic survival. All were aware of the highly vulnerable nature of their nations' premature births, and each leader recognized the risk of his own ouster.[1]

Each president headed a country whose economy was still fully intertwined with those of its neighbors. Only the U.S.S.R. had collapsed. Its interregional economic links, though damaged, still remained: southern Kazakhstan still got its electricity from Kyrgyzstan, while northern Kazakhstan helped service Siberia's energy grid; Turkmenistan still sent part of its oil to Russia to be made into jet fuel, but it processed Siberian oil in its own refineries. While each new nation continued to depend on its neighbors' basic inputs—fuel, energy and raw materials—the coordinating structures that regulated such commerce shrank or entirely disappeared.

As Soviet central structures withered, so too did subsidies from Moscow that had long helped feed Central Asia's ever increasing population. The region's leaders were left with sole responsibility for keeping their economies afloat. Yet technological and diplomatic expertise was sorely lacking in these new states. Each nation has tried to varying degrees to diversify its economy and exploit the interest of regional powers—most often, Iran and Turkey. But those efforts are hindered by transportation and communications links that still follow old colonial routes through Russia. Finally, large fragments of the former Red Army's conventional and nuclear arsenals were left behind. The presence of former Soviet troops and, in Kazakhstan's case, nuclear weapons and facilities complicates the task of securing the five states' physical safety and economic viability.

The first-order challenge now facing the states of Central Asia, therefore, is to emerge from political obscurity and economic isolation. Nationhood was reluctantly accepted. It has carried with it enormous burdens—mostly economic—for which none of the region's leaders could have been prepared and which even the most able consistently tried to avoid.

[1]Central Asia consists of five republics. The largest, geographically, is Kazakhstan, just over a million square miles, with a population of 16.5 million people—40 percent Kazakh, 38 percent Russian and 6 percent German. The most populous republic is Uzbekistan, with 19.8 million people—71 percent Uzbek, 8 percent Russian and 5 percent Tajik. Kirghiz account for 52 percent of Kyrgyzstan's 4.2 million people, Russians 22 percent and Uzbeks 13 percent. Turkmenistan, with 3.5 million people, is 72 percent Turkmen, 9 percent Russian and 9 percent Ukrainian. Tajikistan has 5.1 million people and is 62 percent Tajik, 24 percent Uzbek and 8 percent Russian. The Central Asians are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, and all but the Persian-speaking Tajiks are of Turkic stock.

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II

With hindsight it seems obvious that the developments of December 1991 were preordained by the failed August coup. Yet no one was more outspoken in defense of a revitalized U.S.S.R. than Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev. Shortly after the coup it was Nazarbaev who appeared before an agitated Supreme Soviet to deliver Mikhail Gorbachev's appeal to save a looser union. In October it was also Nazarbaev who hosted a meeting of republican leaders to reach an economic agreement among the 12 remaining Soviet republics.

As head of a republic with several thousand miles of common border with Russia and whose population is almost evenly divided between Kazakhs and Slavs, Nazarbaev was anxious to minimize a potential split between Kazakhstan and Russia. Then as now his position was that Kazakhstan was unique—"a link between Central Asia and Russia"—and its strategic role would be enhanced if the union were preserved.

Despite the declarations of independence by other Central Asian republics—beginning with Kyrgyzstan on August 31, 1991—Nazarbaev lobbied his fellow republican presidents to sign a new union treaty, which was completed in October. In the end all but Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov agreed to sign. Angered by Russia's refusal to pay higher prices for cotton and fueled by his own personal ambition, Karimov decided that both Uzbekistan's fate and bargaining position would improve through a more independent stance.

Even after the Minsk accord Nazarbaev made one last and unsuccessful plea for reorganization of the Soviet republics as a loose confederation. Finally on December 16, 1991, when the state's political emancipation was already an accomplished fact, Kazakhstan joined the other republics in declaring independence.

While Nazarbaev was obviously the most reluctant Central Asian leader, none was genuinely enthusiastic about the idea of national independence. All—save Askar Akaev, Kyrgyzstan's physicist turned president—had spent most of their careers closely tied to the management of their economies. Each was well aware of the economic vulnerability of any republic that might try to go it alone.

Reports of freight backups at local rail yards and flights canceled for lack of jet fuel—regular features on the local news

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throughout autumn 1991—were obvious reminders of the fragility of Central Asia's existing transportation and communication links to the outside world. Yet these leaders knew that alternative foreign access routes—through Iran, across China's Xinjiang mountains or by way of war-ravaged Afghanistan—were more tenuous still.

Central Asia's leaders were also aware that, although each republic was named for a local nationality, none was a "national homeland." The Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Tajiks all have border claims on one another—and large irredentist populations on which to base them—as do Uzbeks, Turkmen and Kazakhs. Stalin's map-making skills were sufficient to ensure that no Soviet republic would have an easy transition to nation-statehood. There is no historically recognized border between Russia and Ukraine, certainly none between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Russian "migrants" make up a far greater percentage of the population in the three Baltic republics than they do anywhere in Central Asia, other than Kazakhstan.

There is, however, one striking difference between those cases and the republics of Central Asia. The popular movements for independence that paralyzed the communist-led governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in the late 1980s, then Moldavia, Armenia, Georgia and finally Azerbaijan and Ukraine in the early 1990s, did not exist in Central Asia prior to the August coup.

Gorbachev's reforms prompted the same cultural and religious revival in Central Asia as occurred elsewhere. But Communist Party elites in these five republics were better able to insulate themselves from the fallout. They became patrons of their national arts, benefactors who helped transform state-owned buildings, mosques and religious institutions, and champions of the shift from Russian to their own national languages in public life.

For now at least, most have been successful and, with the exception of Tajikistan's Rahmon Nabiev, those that failed went quietly. Unlike in much of the rest of the Soviet Union, the roots of Central Asia's Communist Party elites reached down into traditional society. In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan their power was perpetuated through regionally based economic "clans." In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan these ties were linked to tribal origin and reinforced through economic patronage. As one fundamentalist Islamic cleric from Uzbekistan put it, "Our communist leaders may have

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been nonbelievers, but no Uzbek was really a communist—a liar yes, but not a communist."[2] That insight applies throughout the region.

Given the intertwined nature of the party, local economy and traditional society, these republics' communist elites can fall only when attacked from within. That was precisely what happened in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

In October 1990 Kyrgyzstan's Supreme Soviet chose the head of the Academy of Science, Askar Akaev, to be the republic's president, instead of party First Secretary Absamat Masaliev. Masaliev's defeat occurred only because many of Kyrgyzstan's leading communist politicians had lost faith in his ability to rule. They thus preferred to join forces with Kyrgyzstan's small democratic movement to bring in a political dark horse with which both groups could live.

Similarly Tajikistan's President Kakhar Makhkamov was brought down in September 1991 when Nabiev, the Communist Party leader Gorbachev ousted in 1985, temporarily joined forces with the Islamic revivalist and democratic opposition groups.

In those two republics proclamations of independence had an important political component: they were part of an effort to distance the new state from its communist past. After winning election as president, however, Nabiev again legalized Tajikistan's Communist Party and returned its property, shattering the political alliance that had briefly brought peace to the republic. After a month of peaceful demonstrations paralyzed public life, Nabiev used pro-government militia in May 1992 to try to squelch the protests. Pro-opposition forces overwhelmed Nabiev's own defenders, however, leaving the government in disarray under an uneasy coalition comprised of representatives of the communist elite as well as their democratic and Islamic opponents.

In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the communists—now renamed socialists, democrats and national democrats—pressed for independence, with only minimal public support. It was rumored that support for Uzbekistan's independence bill was so lukewarm, in fact, that President Karimov had to make a formal motion to mark its passage with applause. Although the Communist Party technically no

[2]Information on Islam is taken from my own interviews and travels throughout the region from March 24 to April 4, 1992.

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longer existed, most Uzbekistani legislators voted for independence simply to toe the party line. For some the vote was an expression of support for the goal of eventual independence. But few if any who gathered in that Tashkent hall believed that Uzbekistan had seceded from the U.S.S.R by virtue of its own legislation.

Uzbekistan's leaders were using "independence" as a synonym for full economic autonomy.[3] With substantial shortfalls in Russian deliveries of grain, wood, construction materials and oil, President Karimov was looking for new legal grounds to deny Russia the cotton and gold that Uzbekistan was required to supply U.S.S.R. enterprises. The logic behind the independence decree of Turkmenistan—rich in oil and natural gas—was similar.

III

Central Asia's leaders knew that the mere act of declaring independence would resolve few of their economic or political problems. They saw these decrees as a logical step in the battle for economic control waged between Moscow and the republics, a battle begun in 1987. Republics first requested financial accountability, then economic autonomy, and only then pressed for sovereignty and finally independence. The Baltic republics led the way; the Central Asian republics invariably pulled up the rear.

Thus even before the collapse of U.S.S.R. central structures, republics had received a degree of economic autonomy. They had been given the right to negotiate directly with foreign governments and companies, provided that plans were coordinated with appropriate central ministries and profits were deposited with central banking institutions. Republics could also invite in foreign banks—as Kazakhstan did with Saudi lenders in 1990. But they could not use those banks as repositories for foreign earnings. Moscow still owned the natural resources and finished goods that republics produced, and so the earnings went to the center.

Greater republican autonomy was intended to strengthen the Soviet economy as a whole as well as those of individual republics. For example, at a time when Sino-Soviet relations remained somewhat strained, direct ties between Kazakhstan

[3]From interviews conducted in Uzbekistan, Sept. 19–24, 1991.

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and China's Xinjiang province led to completion of a rail link between Alma-Ata and Urumchi in July 1991, to the benefit of all concerned. Generally Gorbachev hoped that by ceding some authority to republics he could placate their demands for greater financial autonomy and, at the same time, increase the scope of foreign investment. Soviet laws were modified to encourage development of joint ventures that would introduce new forms of technology into various republics; but the strategies for investment were originally worked out in Moscow.

The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers thus invited Chevron to develop the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan. Kazakh President Nazarbaev, however, did not join these discussions until 1990, a year after the initial agreements were signed. Even then his involvement is said to have come only because Chevron pressured Moscow for his inclusion. The Kazakhs did not become principals in the deal for another year. Public pressure and the findings of an independent foreign expert commission retained by the Kazakh government then prompted Nazarbaev to give Chevron a choice: completely reopen negotiations or withdraw from the deal. Even today Kazakhstan is not an entirely free actor in the project; it retains financial obligations to Moscow due to earlier investments by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Oil and Gas.

IV

None of the Central Asian republics yet have complete control of their economies. To some degree this is the product of confusion over the purpose of the Commonwealth itself—whether it is designed to be a coordinating body between republics or a device for preserving an integrated economic zone on the territory of the former U.S.S.R. Adding to that confusion from the onset was the nature of Russia's relationship to the CIS—whether it was an equal partner in the union, first among equals or the inheritor of the U.S.S.R.

Russia's leadership has variously played each of those roles. Russian President Boris Yeltsin was quick to take control of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign holdings and ministries and to use economic blackmail to press republics to accept Russia as the center of a single financial system and currency zone. When CIS republican presidents gather, Yeltsin makes symbolic gestures to reinforce the image that all are on an equal footing. Yet everyone knows that Yeltsin does not treat them as equals.

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When Yeltsin felt pressed to free prices in Russia, for example, all were pushed to adjust their price structures in accordance with Russia's own timetable.

Though each president must now defend the "national" interests of his republic, all are expected to allow Russia's interests to take precedence over their own. This has been a particular problem in a number of Central Asian republics, where the leadership's limited foreign policy experience may have made them appear pliable to economic pressure from Moscow. Central Asia's leaders, however, have proven less malleable than expected. Rather than ceding power back to Russia, Central Asian presidents have increasingly sought foreign partners to help them develop their economies in ways that are beneficial to their own republics but of little advantage to Russia.

Turkmenistan, for example, which produces just over ten percent of all natural gas exported by the former U.S.S.R., temporarily shut down foreign gas shipments in early 1992; the Russian successor to the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Oil and Gas was not passing on hard-currency earnings to a now independent and sovereign Turkmenistan, which still shipped all its oil and gas through Russia. Turkmenistan is obviously still sensitive to Russian pressure. In April 1992 Moscow got Turkmenistan to cut off gas shipments to Azerbaijan, and some see the Turkmen decision to increase by more than tenfold the price for natural gas shipments to Ukraine as a concession to Russia as well.

At the same time Turkmen President Saparmurad Niazov is pursuing a strategy independent of Russia, depositing his 1992 oil profits in a New York bank that has no ties with Russia or the former U.S.S.R. Moreover he has listened with great interest to the propositions of neighboring Iran. Since 1990 the two states have signed nine bilateral agreements containing plans for joint development of some of Turkmenistan's oil and gas reserves, including construction of a pipeline across Iran to ship gas to Turkey, Pakistan and parts of Iran.

Iran has also taken a stake in supporting the economic independence of other republics. Iranian interests have agreed to support construction of new oil pipelines across Azerbaijan to supply Ukraine with Iranian oil. Nazarbaev led the Iranians to believe that he favored expanding Kazakhstan's Caspian Sea ports so that Tengiz oil could be shipped through Iran; Russian authorities, meanwhile, as-

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sumed Tengiz oil would be exported by improving pipelines already running through their republic.[4] A provisional deal signed between Chevron and Kazakhstan in May 1992 is said to provide for possible construction of a new pipeline to ship the oil through a Black Sea port.

Of all the region's republics Kazakhstan has found it most difficult to distinguish its economic interests from those of Russia. The industrial economy of northern Kazakhstan is more closely linked to southern Siberia than to Kazakhstan's own agricultural south. Nazarbaev has thus been careful to make sure that the pace of Kazakhstan's economic reform proceeded in step with Russia's, often sending to his legislature for minor modification bills previously passed by the Russian parliament.

Moscow has also held Kazakhstan to a tighter definition of "shared mutual self-interest" than the region's other republics. When Kazakhstan carved out a degree of financial autonomy for itself in December 1991, Russia began to boycott the republic. A month later, with many of Kazakhstan's key industries standing idle, Nazarbaev caved in. The two neighboring republics signed an agreement calling for full coordination of their financial and trade policies. Goods priced in rubles were guaranteed free movement between the two republics, but each would pay in hard currency for transit shipments. While seemingly equitable, the agreement worked to Russia's advantage; Kazakhstan sends a much larger percentage of its transit goods across Russia than vice versa. The financial agreement also puts Kazakhstan under enormous pressure to join Russia in a convertible ruble. Given Kazakhstan's greater isolation and generally low standard of living, the agreement could lead to disproportionate hardship.

At the same time Kazakhstan has tried to delineate an economic policy that is, at least in part, independent of Russia and the CIS. Like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan is more eager to sell rights to new oil fields than to those already explored; earnings from newly negotiated agreements will go directly to the republics' own treasuries. Hence in addition to Tengiz, rights to new oil fields in Akmolinsk have been sold to the French concern Elf. British Petroleum, British Gas and AGIP

[4]Interview with Ali Reza Sheikhattar, adviser to the foreign minister, Islamic Republic of Iran, March 3, 1992.

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have bid against one another for rights to oil and gas fields in Uralsk as well.

These arrangements, however, will take several years to reach maturity. For the moment Kazakhstan, like other republics, still does not control the hard-currency reserves necessary to pay its shipping bills. With nine percent of the U.S.S.R.'s gold reserves, Kazakhstan has begun smelting its own gold bars. In February 1992 it also offered to sell $500 million worth of chromium in multiyear, third-party transactions with Western bankers in an effort to pay off its foreign purchases.

V

The need to pay the bills and, more important, to fill the stores with food and basic consumer goods is propelling the former Soviet republics to pursue independent foreign policy strategies. The emergence of the Central Asian states as independent or quasi-independent international actors is already beginning to change the geopolitics of the region.

Iran, Turkey and Pakistan—all of which more or less border the region—are interested in expanding their influence both individually and as a group formed around the Economic Coordination Council. Certainly the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. sparked the council's revitalization; in February 1992 the group expanded to include all Central Asian republics save Kazakhstan, which accepted only observer status. More distant Muslim neighbors—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Libya and Egypt—are also keenly interested in the region. Central Asia not only offers the chance to develop new economic links and to advance religiously based geopolitical interests but it could also be a source of nuclear technology, nuclear materials and advanced weapon systems.

Only Kazakhstan currently has a nuclear arsenal. Nazarbaev has regularly repeated his commitment to turn that arsenal over to Russia and to honor all international nonproliferation conventions. But there is reason to doubt his sincerity on both counts. Prior to the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. Nazarbaev publicly supported the idea of a "nuclear-free" Kazakhstan; he now seems in no hurry to get the strategic weapon systems out of the republic. Nazarbaev's vacillation on the nuclear issue has dampened the enthusiasm of some U.S. policymakers who had earlier viewed him as a possible future statesman of some distinction.

There is also reason for concern about the security of the

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nuclear weapon systems in Kazakhstan. Assurances that Russia controls and supervises the strategic missiles are not themselves guarantees that those weapons are properly maintained and safely stored. All of Kazakhstan's shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons are said to have been shipped to Russia. Yet rumors of the sale of tactical weapons to Iran continue to surface, despite repeated official denials. Moscow and Alma-Ata also abound with rumors of Kazakhstan-based military commanders who are willing to sell—or who have sold—operational codes to tactical weapon systems.

Kazakhstan, along with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, is a source for uranium. In fact a former Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy factory that produces uranium–238 still operates in Tajikistan. Nabiev, in an effort to attract Western aid and assistance, announced a ban on uranium sales. But he also agreed to expand trade with Libya, and it is safe to assume that the Libyans may seek to circumvent any such ban.

Conventional weapon systems are themselves a potentially rich source of hard currency for Central Asian governments. Kazakhstan has the most sophisticated weapon systems in the region and has announced plans to sell off part of that former U.S.S.R. arsenal. The Nazarbaev government has bought the acquiescence of some of the republic's military commanders by permitting military factories and installations to reorganize themselves as private concerns and to sell their wares through local commodities exchanges.[5] Profits are shared by Kazakhstan's government and its new military entrepreneurial class. Uzbekistan is offering its local forces similar opportunities.

The future role of the former Soviet military in Central Asia is critical. Though the officer corps of those armies is predominantly Russian, more than half the enlisted men are not. Moreover it is no longer certain that Russians, even officers, will prove loyal to Russia. The local republics are now feeding and housing these men, as well as creating opportunities for their financial enrichment.

Russia's plan to create its own army will only compound these problems. It will increase pressure on Central Asian republics to build their own armies—initially around those in

[5]For an account of the sale of SU–24 MK bombers, see *Izvestia*, Feb. 28, 1992.

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the former Red Army who choose to stay and eventually staffed by officers trained in neighboring Islamic countries.

Though an unwanted expense, forming armies would be consistent with the current national aims of republics like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Such a task, however, creates potential difficulties for the more pro-Russian Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Those republics had hoped to have CIS forces guarantee their security. Now, defense by Russia's army would compromise national sovereignty, and creation of national armies would possibly be a grave affront to Russia.

VI

Notwithstanding the ambiguous status of former Soviet forces in the region, Russia's presence in Central Asia is constant. Even with the formation of national armies, Russia will remain an overshadowing military and economic power. And for at least the immediate future Russia will also remain Central Asia's main link to the outside world.

Central Asians still travel abroad on U.S.S.R. passports; plans for republic passports have yet to be announced. Central Asian states lack the resources to open their own foreign missions and are represented abroad by Russia, having rejected Turkey's offer to represent them instead. Neither do these new states have immediate plans for opening their own embassies, not even in neighboring Iran or Turkey, nations that have already opened several fully staffed embassies in the region.

There are only a handful of trained senior diplomats from Central Asia, and the number of junior diplomats is limited as well. Even Kazakhstan, which has paid more attention to its international representation than any other Central Asian republic, has a foreign ministry that employs only thirty people. Most professional diplomats that are available previously worked in the foreign ministry of the U.S.S.R. Uzbekistan, for example, has recalled senior Soviet diplomats to work in the republic.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have sought to add to their diplomatic numbers by sending young people to train at the Russian foreign ministry's academy. But the use of former Soviet diplomats or others newly trained by Russia raises questions of how competent Central Asia's new diplomats will be to advance the national interests of their own republics.

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Fearful of mixing Russian interests with its own, Turkmenistan in certain cases is using foreign-born children of former political exiles to represent it abroad. Uzbekistan is debating whether to do the same.

The problem of physical, rather than diplomatic, isolation is even more serious. These new states are still fully dependent on the old Moscow-based U.S.S.R. transportation and communication grids, which control international mail, telephone and telegraph links and most international travel. Those nearby states that help Central Asian republics emerge from that physical isolation will eventually enjoy a foreign policy advantage. A number of neighboring states realize this fact and are seeking to capitalize on new opportunities.

Iran has promised to aid neighboring Turkmenistan and Persian-speaking Tajikistan with new satellite-based communications systems. Turkey is negotiating with Kyrgyzstan, and Japan, Australia and even Israel have proposed similar systems for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Turkey has also announced plans to provide satellite television transmission to the entire region. Most of those contracts are yet to be signed; it is impossible to predict when independent and direct communication systems will exist with any of the new Central Asian states.

There is also competition—especially between Turkey and Iran—to help the Central Asian republics develop new air links. Both nations would like to serve as Central Asia's hub to the outside world. International air service between the five capitals and Tehran and Ankara will begin within the year, and sporadic direct service between Tehran and Dushanbe, and Tashkent and Istanbul, already exists. Full development of those air routes as well as that projected between Tashkent and Islamabad still depends on major investment by foreign partners, which has not yet been forthcoming.

Aeroflot, the former Soviet carrier, has been broken up into a number of competing national airlines. Even the largest of these, the new Ozbekistoni Hovo Iollari (Uzbekistan Airlines), is having trouble maintaining regular service because of the need to pay hard currency for Russian jet fuel and spare parts. The Uzbek airline is surviving for the moment through multirepublic trade agreements involving middlemen from Turkmenistan's oil industry. Smaller ventures, like Chimkent

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Airways, which has promised direct service between Kazakhstan and Italy, face nearly insuperable challenges.

There is also the promise of new international rail connections through Iran, once the Turkmenistan-Iran rail spur is completed in late 1993. That project has the full support of all five Central Asian republics; it will create a direct rail link that stretches from Urumchi to Ankara. Ultimately the accessibility of an expanded Central Asian market depends on a resolution with Russia of questions of railway ownership and maintenance. The nationalization of rail and rolling stock has begun throughout the region and progressed furthest in Turkmenistan, in large part to avoid any ownership ambiguity of the planned railroad to Iran.

Pakistan would also like to play an important role in the area and has promised Central Asian republics full funding to complete a highway spur from Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan to the Karakorum highway in China. But, as part of this roadway runs through Afghanistan, that link between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean is far from assured.

VII

Central Asia's physical isolation and continued access mainly through Russia highlights an even greater problem. The international community has formally accepted the independence of Central Asian republics—granting them membership in the United Nations and even honorary status in Europe through participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the NATO advisory council. Yet there is no interest in championing the cause of Central Asia, should Russia be offended. This is true of Muslim and Western states alike. Despite its crippled economy Russia is still regarded as a great power. For many states it is a potential arms broker of considerable importance. For others Russia is a vast market ripe for development—potentially far larger than the whole of Central Asia.

Even Iran and Turkey, which have made expanded ties to Central Asia a foreign policy priority, are reluctant to risk sacrificing good relations with Russia to advance their regional goals. Though their politicians are frequent visitors to Central Asia, Iran and Turkey maintain close and cordial relations with Russia as well. Moreover Iran's mediation efforts in the

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disputed Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, were begun and sustained with Russian cooperation.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which each sent high-level missions to Central Asia in early 1992, are also concerned about Russian opinion. For the moment at least, their economic involvement in Central Asia is less extensive than that of Turkey or Iran. Their financial capacity for future investment is much greater, of course, but these Arab states will not risk Russia's goodwill to improve ties to new Muslim states with uncertain political futures.

For now there is no conflict of interest. The emergence of independent states in Central Asia does not necessarily threaten Russia's position in the Middle East. Russia itself has a large Muslim population; it retains strong interest in friendly ties with many of the U.S.S.R.'s former Middle Eastern allies. That Russian interest, argue prominent Russian foreign policy advisers, should prevent potential dissonance between Russia's Middle East policy and those of its Central Asian neighbors. It might also make life easier for the millions of Russians who live in Central Asia and bring investment from the Middle East to Russia.

VIII

The situation in Central Asia is only one of many factors that Russia's new leaders consider in formulating their foreign policy goals. Central Asia's presidents, on the other hand, clearly formulate their foreign policies with an eye firmly fixed on Russia. This has made the region's leaders proceed cautiously in establishing ties with the Muslim world.

Russia is not only a powerful neighbor, it is the self-appointed guardian of the approximately ten million Russians who still live in Central Asia. Concern for Russian sensibilities is especially keen in Kazakhstan. President Nazarbaev is determined to remain the link between Russia and Central Asia rather than risk becoming identified as head of an "Islamic state."

Nazarbaev nevertheless has made clear that he feels a strong affinity toward Turkey. In early 1992 he angered local Russians by admitting he would contemplate joining some sort of Turkic multinational organization, should one be created. Nazarbaev is held in high regard by most of Kazakhstan's Russian community. He is concerned, however, over territorial claims made by Russian nationalists. Kazakhstan's own small

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but armed Cossack population is also cause for worry. The Cossack defense of Russian rights in Moldova's Trans-Dnestr region was a frightening portent of what could someday occur in Nazarbaev's own republic.

Kyrgyzstan is also sensitive to the "Islamic state" issue, especially since President Akaev enjoys strong support from a large Russian minority. Kyrgyzstan joined the Economic Coordination Council, but Akaev would not permit the republic to enter the Islamic Conference Organization, precisely because its membership was explicitly restricted to Muslim states.

The other three Central Asian republics are more willing to pursue explicitly pro-Islamic foreign policies. Such policies, however, are not designed to drive out their Russian populations; an exodus of Russians would mean a critical shortage of trained personnel. The region's leaders recognize that even with foreign technical assistance it will be a generation before Central Asians themselves can replace Russians in upper levels of the work force. If official statistics are to be believed, however, Russian emigration from the region has dropped off in the last year. Undoubtedly this is due in large part to the difficulties of resettlement in Russia.

Jews in Central Asia are particularly concerned. If these republics become Muslim states, Jews fear, they will also turn anti-Israel and, by extension, anti-Jewish. Contrary to such fears, however, new Central Asian states seem eager to pursue close ties with Israel. Israel will open its second CIS embassy, in Tashkent, and plans full diplomatic representation throughout the region. Uzbekistan is interested in Israel's drip-irrigation technology and hopes to encourage investment by those Jews who have left the republic to live in Israel. Returning Jews, however, have complained that they are sometimes roughed up by nationalist Uzbek youths.

While pleasing Israel is certainly an interest, concern for U.S. opinion and the desire to secure U.S. aid have been much more compelling reasons for Central Asian leaders to protect the rights of local Russian and European populations. The issue of Russian rights is complex, however. Many Russians living in these newly independent Central Asian states consider themselves entitled to the same privileges they formerly enjoyed as Soviet citizens. Many consider it a violation of their human rights that they now have to learn Uzbek to keep their state jobs, that their children are denied an exclusively Rus-

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sian-language education or that Islamic holy days, rather than Christian, are becoming official holidays.

Central Asian leaders who make too many concessions to local Russian populations are also at risk. Today in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan respect for Islam is closely interwoven with the public national consciousness. Even the Kirghiz and Kazakh populations expect some public recognition of their Islamic heritage. Political leaders are thus groping for ways to distance themselves from the atheistic Communist Party they had served earlier. They have sometimes even felt driven to make grandiose public gestures in the name of Islam.

But gestures alone have not been enough. Kakhar Makhkamov attended a well-publicized service in Dushanbe's main mosque to see off Tajikistan's pilgrims to Mecca; he was nonetheless deposed. Ignoring Islamic leaders, however, is an even surer route to failure. Karimov thus went to great efforts to save Uzbekistan's head mufti from two separate "palace coups" in the clerical establishment, hoping that the indebted mufti would help him gain favor among Uzbekistan's increasingly numerous Muslim believers. Karimov has spoken publicly of his own acceptance of Islam, permitted some religious education in public schools and in April 1992 appointed a leading Uzbek cleric to serve in his cabinet as adviser for religious affairs.

The Uzbek leader hopes for a foreign policy dividend from these public endorsements of Islam. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have traditions of investing in Muslim causes, as does Pakistan and to a lesser degree Egypt. Even quasi-secular Turkey has an interest in Central Asian Islam. That interest was manifest when Turkish President Turgut Özal told the visiting head of Central Asia's Naqshabandi (Sufi) order that he, too, was a Naqshabandi. One assumes that Karimov had some presentiment of this exchange; when the Uzbek president visited Turkey, the Naqshabandi leader was brought in tow.

The relationship between religion and politics is equally complicated for Central Asia's other neighbors. That is certainly true in the case of Iran, whose officials forcefully maintain that they are spreading commerce, not revolution, in Central Asia. Nonetheless it is easier for Iran's foreign ministry "moderates" to sell such a strategy to Iran's clerical establishment when recipient states publicly embrace Islam as well.

There is in fact little evidence to support rumors that Iran is

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engaging in a massive clandestine effort to support Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Leaders of Central Asia's Islamic revivalist movement appear far more interested in the teachings of their Sunni Muslim brethren than those of fundamentalist Iranian Shiites.

For their part Iranian leaders appear happy to do business with a secularly oriented Kazakhstan. They take no public notice of the fact that Nazarbaev is an avowed atheist who has banned Islamic parties and groups from registering in his republic. Though accepted by the Iranians, Nazarbaev's policies are nonetheless encouraging a small but growing Islamic opposition movement in Kazakhstan.

Public linkages between Islam and foreign aid have nevertheless been made. Saudi Arabia announced plans to distribute to Kazakhstan some 400,000 Korans in the Kazakh language and to provide free passage to Mecca for thousands of pilgrims from Central Asia. Similarly Kuwait signed an oil deal with the Kazakh government that includes the construction of a large mosque in Gurev (now Akterau) as well as building oil extraction and refining facilities.

IX

Central Asia's leaders realize that in order to rebuild their economies they must attract aid from a wide variety of foreign sources. In recent months they have thus engaged in a frenzy of diplomatic activity, traveling to the capitals of neighboring and European states and receiving senior foreign delegations on an almost daily basis. None has a fully formulated foreign policy strategy. Rather, schooled in the Soviet state-planning tradition, each has been tempted to look for an intellectual "quick fix" in the form of a development package that would address political, economic and social problems all at the same time.

Regional cooperation in Central Asia was always more ideal than real. But the post-Soviet diplomatic strategies of the Central Asian leaders have pushed their republics even farther apart. When Central Asian leaders meet among themselves, as they did in April 1992 in Bishkek, they find little of substance on which to agree. Under Soviet rule the leaders competed for Moscow's favor. Now they are competing for investment from a far greater pool, and each is striving to define the uniqueness of his republic.

Development planning has been marked by a degree of

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fickleness. Uzbekistan's President Karimov, for example, has most often embraced an Islamic variant of the "Turkish model." After a trip to an economic forum in Davos, Switzerland, however, he was sufficiently enamored with Western development planning to hire a group of American lawyers to help with Uzbek constitutional reforms. That was only four months after he had endorsed a "Chinese model"—without specifying whether he meant Taiwan or the mainland. Karimov has proven so impressionable, in fact, that some in Tashkent predicted he would return from Riyadh dressed like a Saudi prince.

Several close aides are understandably nervous that Karimov is not fully aware of the risks of his "Turko-Islamic" development strategy. Karimov, they warn, is setting himself up to be attacked as both a bad Muslim and a holdover from the republic's communist past. Meanwhile the Uzbek president is also trying to appease "Westernizers" in his midst. A longtime opponent of private property, he is now an advocate of radical economic reforms and supports development of a national currency to coexist with a convertible ruble. Karimov's critics fear that such reforms are both too little and too late to attract substantial foreign investment.

Nabiev decided to emphasize a "Persian model" in Tajikistan. As head of a republic whose main export is electricity—and which sometimes lacks even that—Nabiev could only play the cards in hand. Iran has provided Tajikistan with financial infrastructure, air links and satellite communications, as well as textbooks written in Persian script. Iran says it has no interest in missionary work among Tajikistan's overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim population. As proof, Iran is exporting Persian soap operas for local consumption rather than the religious broadcasting that dominates its own television. But the presence of religious activists in the Tajik government could make Iran a more attractive ideological model, especially if the new regime in neighboring Afghanistan proves to be pro-Iranian as well.

Turkmenistan is also adopting a variant of an "Iranian model," although one more reminiscent of the former shah than the current religious leadership. Turkmenistan's parliament has approved appointment of a special commission to evaluate the quality of the large number of new presidential portraits being printed and announced President Niazov's

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selection as the first Makhtum Kuli laureate.[6] Niazov's lust for personal power seems of little interest to his new Iranian partners. It remains to be seen whether they can build the infrastructure necessary to export Turkmenistan's oil and gas quickly enough to forestall a mass economic crisis.

Only marginally more self-sufficient than Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan has been harder hit by the shift to free prices than its more affluent neighbors. As the Turks seem willing to donate assistance, President Akaev has also embraced their development model. Without substantial foreign assistance there is real risk that Kyrgyzstan will feel compelled to resort to narcotics trade to pay its mounting debts. Kyrgyzstan was the last Central Asian republic to agree to international drug trade restrictions, but all the republics are potential drug-producing regions. Turkish aid to Kyrgyzstan will not come entirely without strings. Kyrgyzstan decided to shift the Kirghiz language from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet, a move that will increase Turkey's intellectual influence in the republic.[7] For now Kyrgyzstan's religious elite is resigned to the balance between secular values and respect for religious freedom that the Turkish variant should provide.

Of all the region's leaders Kazakh President Nazarbaev has been most reluctant to embrace a particular development model. He too passed through a stage in which he searched for foreign experiences directly applicable to Kazakhstan's circumstances—South Korea's, then Turkey's and finally a market economy styled after America's. Nazarbaev now seems to have grasped that the answers to Kazakhstan's development lie somewhere in Kazakhstan.

Those close to Nazarbaev report that he is a strong Kazakh nationalist. His public statements contradict this. Kazakhstan, he persistently repeats, is striving to become a multinational, politically pluralistic republic with a market-oriented economy. His goal is to attract foreign investment from all quarters: Western democracies, Asian Tigers, Islamic neighbors as well as those who—like India and China—fear them.

Kazakhstan has no tradition of political participation. Few in the republic understand what is meant by a civil society, let

[6]Makhtum Kuli was an eighteenth-century Turkmen poet, and his name was given to Turkmenistan's new and highest national award.

[7]Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have made similar decisions; Uzbekistan's officials have not yet decided among Latin, Arabic or Cyrillic alphabets.

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alone support the ideals of national and religious tolerance upon which stable multinational democracies are based. The economy of the republic is strained; prices are rising quickly and goods are in short supply. There have already been ugly reminders of what can happen when nerves are frayed. In January Kazakhs and Chechens clashed in the western part of the republic. A small group of Chechens was then forcibly "resettled" back to the north Caucasus. A few weeks later a Kazakh military construction crew went on a rampage near the space center at Baikonur, leaving three Russians dead.

x

With the possible exception of Kazakhstan, Central Asian republics are having trouble defining their "national" interests. All, including Kazakhstan, have had trouble designing and implementing those policy choices already made. The situation is a nightmare for U.S. policymakers. How does America define policies in defense of its national interests in a region where local leaders have trouble defining their own?

Central Asia's presidents are not skilled international actors, but they are shrewd politicians. Each understands that their region is not a priority for the United States. U.S. recognition notwithstanding, they know that America cannot be relied upon as a major source of foreign investment nor as the primary conduit of technological expertise. Such help is more likely to come from their neighbors and from states that have traditional interests in Central Asia. Uzbekistan, for example, has received 500 scholarships from Saudi Arabia but funding for fewer than fifty students next year to study in the United States.

For the moment there is certainly no threat to U.S. interests from developments in Central Asia. No single state is willing to make the investment necessary to "conquer" the area. That is true of China, India, Pakistan and the Arab states. It is also true of Turkey and Iran, the two powers most interested in the region. In the long run the sum of this international activity will make Central Asia more interested in strengthening its Muslim and Turko-Persian heritage than salvaging residual Russo-European traditions. Such a development need not be detrimental to U.S. interests, particularly if America does not rely on surrogates to represent it in the region.

The United States will strengthen its position if it helps Central Asia gain a place in the international community that

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is independent of intermediaries. Having just been freed from one form of political and economic dependency, Central Asians have had enough of "big brothers." Hence, though assistance from Turkey and Iran is eagerly accepted, the so-called humanitarian motives of both nations are regarded with considerable suspicion.

Russia's motives are likewise definitely distrusted by Central Asians. America should not rely on Russian judgments in defining its own interests in the region. Central Asia's presidents accept the inevitability for the immediate future of continued economic integration with Russia. But no Central Asian leader expects altruism from Russia, a nation that has repeatedly defined its historic destiny in terms of their region's subjugation.

Central Asians still fear that Russia will find new ways to reassert its will—if no longer by force, then through economic coercion. The United States must strive to reinforce Russia's newfound democratic instincts. America cannot do this if it aids Russia at the expense of the other republics. Central Asia deserves its proportional share of the technical assistance and educational training earmarked for the CIS. The colonizer and the colonized must separate on terms beneficial to both. Only then can they be expected to live alongside one another in peace.

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Robin Wright

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY AND THE WEST

Thirteen years after the Iranian Revolution wrought the world's first modern theocracy, Islam is once again emerging as a powerful political idiom. Not only in the Middle East, but from north and west Africa to the former Asian republics of the Soviet Union, from India to western China, Islam is increasingly a defining force in evolving political agendas. The new burst of activism has reached such proportions that, with the demise of communism, Islam is increasingly—and erroneously—being perceived as one of the future ideological rivals to the West.

The latest phase began in the late 1980s. It varies distinctly from the Islamic experience in Iran in 1979, in Lebanon after 1982 and among a host of smaller cells in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria and elsewhere during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The two most conspicuous differences are the constituency and tactics of the new Islamists.[1]

II

The first phase was more often associated with Shiite Muslims, Islam's so-called second sect.[2] Besides the Iranian Revolution, groups such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and Iraq's Dawa, which also operated on the Shiite-populated eastern shores of the Arabian peninsula, accounted for the most visible and

[1]The various Islamic movements are often called "fundamentalists" in the West, but most are in fact not fundamentalist in their agendas. Fundamentalism generally urges passive adherence to literal reading of scriptures and does not advocate change of the social order, instead focusing on reforming the lives of the individual and family. Most of today's Islamic movements resemble Catholic Liberation theologians who urge active use of original religious doctrine to better the temporal and political lives in a modern world. Islamist or Islamism more accurately describes their forward-looking, interpretive and often even innovative attempts to reconstruct the social order.

[2]Shiite activism can be traced in part to the tenets and history of the faith. Shiite clerics are invested with the power to interpret God's word to the faithful, while Sunni Muslim clerics are considered guides or advisers—a difference analogous to the Catholic and Protestant sects. The Shia are also more easily mobilized because the seventh-century schism that led them to break from the Sunni was based on fighting injustice.

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enduring activism.[3] The recent resurgence of Islam, however, is more prevalent among the mainstream Sunni, who account for at least 85 percent of the world's one billion Muslims. The Sunni are also spread more widely through the 75 nations that constitute *Dar al Islam*, or House of Islam. With the exceptions of Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and Yemen, the Sunni dominate countries stretching from Africa to the Levant, the Arabian peninsula, across the southern tier of the new Commonwealth of Independent States, into western China, south Asia and as far east as Indonesia, the most populous Muslim state.

Unlike the extremism that typified the first resurgence—in political upheavals as well as suicide bombings, hijackings and hostage seizures—the new Islamic activism is now characterized by attempts to work within the system rather than outside it. Since 1989, for example, Islamists from diverse groups have run for parliament in Jordan and Algeria. Indonesia's largest Muslim movement, which has support from up to 40 million people, has held peaceful rallies this year to urge democratic reforms in the authoritarian state. Since the dismemberment of the Soviet Union in 1991, Islamists in the former Central Asian republics have petitioned for legal recognition, to end years as underground movements, so they can run for public office.

Reasons for the new preference for ballots over bullets vary within each country and movement, but they generally reflect an acknowledgement that the costs of extremism in the 1980s proved too high. Iran's isolation, for example, forced it backward economically, not forward. Also the demise of communism starkly illustrated the joint dangers of totalitarian rule and confrontation with the West. Islamists have not failed to recognize that pluralism and interdependence are the catchwords of the 1990s.

Cooperation has by no means fully replaced confrontation. But in key regions Islamists are no longer simply striking out angrily at what they do not like. After centuries marked mainly by dormancy, colonialism and failed experiments with Western ideologies, many Islamists feel they have a mandate to create constructive alternatives. Further pressed by the same factors that have led to political and economic transformations globally, a growing number of Islamists are now trying to

[3]The two-week seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 and the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat by Sunni Muslim fanatics were two major exceptions.

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reconcile moral and religious tenets with modern life, political competition and free markets. Few Islamists, as yet, have suitable or complete answers. The common campaign slogan, "Islam is the solution," remains simplistically inadequate.

Politicized Islam is not alone. At the end of the twentieth century, religion has become an energetic and dynamic force for change worldwide. Among the struggling societies attempting both to rid themselves of bankrupt or inefficient systems and to find viable alternatives, religion provides ideals, identity, legitimacy and an infrastructure during the search. In varying degrees, Buddhists in east Asia, Catholics in eastern Europe, Latin America and the Philippines, Sikhs and Hindus in India and even Jews in Israel have turned to their faith to define their goals and to mobilize.

The various attempts within Islam, however, also reflect a deeper quest—one that could make the Islamists' impact broader or more lasting, because Islam is the only major monotheistic religion that offers not only a set of spiritual beliefs but a set of rules by which to govern society. Besides the challenge of finding a place in the new global order, Islam is now at a pivotal and profound moment of evolution, a juncture increasingly equated with the Protestant Reformation. The traditional role of the faith, its leadership, organization, priorities and interpretation, are also under scrutiny.

The changing focus is reflected even in the names. The first phase of the Islamic resurgence was often symbolized by a host of groups—in Lebanon, Egypt and Israel's occupied territories—named Islamic Jihad, or Holy War, while the latest activism is most noted for groups—from Tunisia to Tajikistan—called the Islamic Renaissance Party. The challenge is as much within Islam as in the countries and systems in which Muslims live. In many ways Islamic societies now find themselves in the opening rounds of what the West went through in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in redefining both the relationship between God and man and between man and man.

The challenge for Islamists is all the greater because the political climate—at home and in the international arena—is hardly conducive to reforms or experimentation, much less full expression. The specter of Iran's revolutionary excesses and Lebanon's terrorist zealotry continues to color local and Western attitudes toward Islam. Despite the growing body of evidence to the contrary, Islam is still widely—and again

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wrongly—perceived as inherently extremist. Despite the many shades and shapes of Islamic activism, it is also still wrongly treated as a single or monolithic force.

III

The spectrum of new Islamist activism is reflected strikingly in two geographic extremes of the Muslim world: north Africa and Central Asia. In both areas since 1990 Islam has become one of the principal challenges to socialist rule. Both regions present a challenge as the West tries to define its relationship with Islam after years of tension.

Algeria has become the primary test case for the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Islamic activism emerged in Algeria when President Chandli Bendjedid ended socialist one-party rule after growing public discontent was capped in 1988 by riots in which at least 400 people were killed. In the first phase of a three-part transition the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won a stunning upset in the 1990 local elections, capturing more than 60 percent of regional assemblies and 55 percent of municipal councils. The National Liberation Front (FLN), which had ruled since leading Algeria's eight-year war against French colonialism, came in an embarrassingly poor second.

The election, the first free multiparty poll since independence in 1962, was as much a rejection of the FLN as a vote of support for the Islamists. Almost three decades of inefficient and increasingly corrupt rule had finally caught up with the FLN. By 1992 at least 14 million of Algeria's 25 million population were estimated to live below the poverty line. With a $25 billion foreign debt that consumed almost 70 percent of its oil revenues, the government had little left to address mass grievances over chronic housing shortages, unemployment, substandard education and social services and limited development. And with 65 percent of the population under the age of 30, the majority had no memory of, much less nostalgia for, the Algerian revolution.

In contrast the energetic Islamists offered a legitimate and familiar alternative, if not a very detailed program. Their appeal was also reflected in their response to a strike called during the election by gas stations, newspapers and even trash collectors. After mounds of garbage accumulated on the streets of the Mediterranean capital, Islamists mobilized supporters to clean up the refuse with their hands. The Islamists'

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commitment was in stark contrast to the malaise within the FLN.

Because of the large rejectionist vote in local elections, the second phase of the transition, elections for parliament, was expected to be a more accurate reading of the public's political will. In the first round in December 1991, which fielded more than fifty parties, FIS captured 188 of the 231 seats decided, only 28 short of a majority. This time the FLN came in third, with only 15 seats, trailing after the Berber-dominated party, the Socialist Forces Front, which won 25. Hamas, another Islamic party, came in fourth. Although the FIS total was a million less than during the local elections, it appeared set to win a decisive parliamentary majority in the second round for 199 undecided seats scheduled for January 16, 1992.

The two elections represented a political milestone. No Islamic party since the Iranian Revolution had won such an overwhelming victory, and no Islamic party had ever definitively defeated a long-dominant power through democratic means.

But the world's first Islamic democracy never had a chance to prove itself. Five days before the second round of elections, a "white coup" led by Defense Minister Khaled Nezzar forced Bendjedid to resign. He was replaced with a five-man High State Council, and elections were then suspended. Over the following weeks, the FIS leadership was detained and the party banned. At least 8,800 sympathizers or supporters of both FIS and Hamas—some claimed the figure was as high as 30,000—were also rounded up by late March and dispatched to detention camps in the southern Sahara desert. In an attempt to revoke the results of the 1990 local elections, dozens of mayors and many regional assembly leaders who had won power on the FIS ticket were also arrested; the assemblies were dissolved.

Islamists were the target, but democracy was the ultimate victim. The Algerian junta has hinted that it might follow through with the final phase of the transition, presidential elections, due in late 1993; but FIS is unlikely to be included. Indeed the new government's strategy is to use the interim—with the help of foreign aid and loans and by selling off oil and gas rights—to address the grievances that led the electorate to vote for FIS. The council also reportedly favors rewriting the constitution to prevent future attempts by Islamists to enter

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politics. On April 29, Algeria's Supreme Court ordered the FIS dissolved.

The junta, however, is unlikely to survive. The Algerian coup was in many ways like the abortive Moscow putsch in 1991; although the process may take longer, it will fail for similar reasons. Bendjedid's phased transition to pluralism produced more than just multiple parties. From a handful of newspapers under state control, Algeria's press soared to dozens of diverse and increasingly outspoken publications. Once-cloistered debate moved into open forums, while public interest groups, including a human rights movement, began to flourish. Most of all, Algerians, particularly the disaffected, tasted empowerment and liked it; its indefinite suppression will eventually produce a backlash.

The junta's tactics have also been crass. To lead the new ruling council, the military brought back Mohammed Boudiaf, an aging revolutionary hero who fell out with his cohorts in 1963 and has lived in exile ever since. The detentions were ruthless. When security forces were unable to find a wanted Islamist, they merely picked up another family member. Many detainees have undergone summary trials and have been sentenced to two to twenty years in prison. The government also banned all public gatherings around mosques and even moved to replace 40 percent of the leaders of Algeria's 9,000 mosques; scores of *imams* (Islamic religious leaders) were among those detained. Algerians have not experienced such repression since the war for independence.

But the junta is most likely to fail because it has given new legitimacy to the very force it sought to suppress—Islam. After the coup, the FLN fragmented into factions for and against the putsch, while opposition parties were unable to mobilize effectively against the junta. In the disarray, FIS was left as the force pushing hardest for democracy.

The movement's remarkable discipline after the coup helped. Despite the riot police and army cordons around key mosques, FIS leaders repeatedly urged restraint. "The army has a scenario for us, but it is a role we will not play. We will not respond to provocation," acting FIS leader Abdelkader Hachani told thousands of the faithful at Friday prayers.[4] Although FIS is a multifaceted movement with factions that

[4]From a speech given at the Bab el-Qoed mosque during the week of the coup.

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favor different levels of activism, as well as differing versions of Islamic democracy, it was visibly united in trying to prevent bloodshed.

Even after the mass arrests, FIS demands two months after the coup were limited to release of political detainees, an end to persecution of Islamists, a dialogue with all political parties and resumption of elections. Notably it did not call for jihad. Most of the sporadic hit-and-run attacks, particularly against Algerian security forces, were linked to a host of small and loosely organized Islamic extremist cells not under FIS control. Among them were Hijra wa Takfir, or Sin and Atonement, and the Afghans, so-named for their participation in the Afghan war against Soviet occupation in the 1980s; many were reportedly trained by the CIA in Pakistan. Despite the temptation, FIS did not abandon democracy to achieve its goals.

IV

For the Arab and Muslim worlds, Algeria is not simply a test case of the affinity of Islam and democracy. It is also a test of whether the West can reconcile with Islam. On that count the West's record is only marginally better than the junta's.

After the Algerian coup, Western reaction was notable largely for its passivity. The U.S. State Department officially "regretted" the suspension of the democratic process in Algeria and then fell silent. Several Western governments allowed the junta's representatives to pay official visits to explain their plans and goals. Some even considered aid. A consortium of European and American banks provided $1.45 billion to help Algeria spread out the servicing of its debt.

Before the U.N. General Assembly last fall, President Bush said: "People everywhere seek government of and by the people. And they want to enjoy their inalienable rights to freedom and property and person." The United States, he added, supported those rights globally. If Algeria is any example, however, there is an implicit exception: any country where Islam is the winner of a democratic election.[5]

The lack of U.S. response, at a time when the Bush administration is active and outspoken in advocating political pluralism, makes it appear that the White House prefers a police state to an Islamic democracy. Indeed the absence of an

[5]Ironically then Vice President Bush helped upgrade relations during a visit to Algeria in 1983, a visit that symbolized the new importance of relations.

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international outcry or Western condemnation—as there was, for example, after Peru's president suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament in April—has encouraged the junta to pursue its course, a fact FIS has publicly noted. The FIS platform remains uncomfortably vague. Its achievements in Algeria's municipalities during 18 months in power were mixed, in no small part because of disputes with FLN governors over budget allocations and priorities. Despite FIS reassurances, other Algerian parties feared the Islamists would eventually ban them and declare a theocracy, as happened in Iran.

Yet Algeria was arguably one of the best places to experiment with Islamic democracy. First, as a Mediterranean country, it is still strongly influenced by the nearby West, unlike Iran where the West had a strong arm but was physically distant. Algerian Islamists have, so far, been unusually sensitive to the West's fears.

Second, the core issue in Islamicizing societies is implementation of *sharia*, Islamic law, as either a source or the source of law—a step not necessarily incompatible with Western interests. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both of which have close ties with the West, are but two of many Islamic countries where *sharia* holds sway.

Third, with presidential elections not scheduled until 1993, the transition had a built-in restraint. Whatever majority FIS won in parliament, Bendjedid still would have had veto power over any drastic changes to the constitution for the first two years.

Finally, it would have been preferable to have the Islamists accountable in public office rather than operating as clandestine cells outside the system. The coup has encouraged violence, ironically, much as French repression against Algerian demands for independence ignited one of the longest and bloodiest wars in the Third World.

Unfortunately too much time has now passed to go back. In Algeria the Islamists are virtually certain to prevail. The question is what will happen to FIS along the way. Over time the junta's draconian tactics may polarize, even divide, the dominant Islamist movement, giving the upper hand to fiery young preachers like Ali Benhaj rather than thoughtful and temperate FIS leaders like Hachani, a petrochemical engineer, and philosophy professor Abassi Madani. In late March a FIS statement said the government's refusal to engage in dialogue and its repressive tactics could lead supporters to respond with

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force to "return the right of the people to choose those who will govern them." The formal order to dissolve FIS virtually ensures a more militant response. And what happens in Algeria is certain to influence other parts of the Islamic world.

For the West the danger is that its reluctance to pressure the junta, or even to speak out against it, will be seen as an inherently anti-Islamic sentiment even when Islamists work through the democratic process. That perception could have long-term consequences beyond Algeria. The end result of the Algerian coup is likely to be costly for virtually everyone but the military junta.

V

Another vital new region of growing Islamist sentiment is in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Five predominately Muslim states have become independent since the August 1991 Moscow putsch: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Four of the five are the last bastions of strict communist rule. The exception is Kyrgyzstan although, like its neighbors, communists still control its parliament.

Islam is not new to Central Asian politics. It was one of the unifying forces in the region as far back as the eighth century. During the medieval reigns of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane in Turkestan, Islam reached its glory with contributions in science and the arts that still account for many of the region's greatest accomplishments and monuments. Although its influence varied widely among the largely nomadic tribes and clans of the mountains and steppes, Islam thrived until tsarist Russia absorbed Turkestan in the nineteenth century and began denigrating the religion.

After Bolshevik revolutionaries refused to grant the region autonomy, Islam was still sufficiently strong to be one of two mobilizing forces in the subsequent six-year civil war. In 1920 Basmachi rebels secretly declared a new state, the Turkestan Independent Islamic Republic. It never had a chance, however, against Russian troops. To prevent further pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic nationalist movements, Stalin then carved up old Turkestan, rather arbitrarily, into the five current states and flooded Central Asia with Russian settlers in the 1920s and 1930s.

Despite seven decades of religious repression, many of the 60 million Soviet Muslims managed to keep the faith alive by

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teaching and practicing it in homes and illegal mosques.[6] And since the Soviet "freedom of conscience" law was passed in 1990 Central Asia has undergone a stunning Islamic resurgence. Some estimates claim that up to ten new mosques open daily in the mineral-rich region, which shares strategic borders with Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan. The number of *madrasahs*, or seminaries, is also mushrooming, as is enrollment. More important to the region's political evolution are the various branches of the Islamic Renaissance Party. Although it finally managed to register in Moscow as a legal party in 1991, its activities were banned in four of the five Central Asian states because of communist fear of Islam as a political force.[7]

Over the next three years Central Asia—the most conservative region during Soviet rule—faces the challenge of major political change, particularly when it comes time to vote for the first post-Soviet parliaments. The contest will pit the stalwart communists, most now renamed, against the new democrats and emerging Islamists in all five states. Despite the precedents set in the European republics, the communists in Central Asia's parliaments show little sincere interest in opening up political systems. And despite more eager promises of economic liberalization, few have allowed the sale of valuable state properties that provide them with power, patronage and funds.

Unlike other Muslim societies, however, the Central Asians have never had direct or indirect exposure to democracy. Even in Kyrgyzstan, which has the only genuine communist-turned-democratic president, democracy remains an alien concept tied, in most people's minds, more to economic than political freedom. Leaders of Kyrgyzstan's Democratic Movement believe it will take at least another generation before democracy is fully understood and takes root. Elsewhere, prodemocracy groups, such as Uzbekistan's Birlik and Tajikistan's Democratic Party, have so far attracted mainly the small intelligentsia.

In contrast, Central Asians are quite naturally returning to their cultural roots after more than 150 years of Russian

[6]The Soviet Union had the fifth-largest Muslim population in the world.

[7]Before the Soviet demise the Islamic Renaissance Party was a loosely knit group of cells based in diverse republics and autonomous provinces with large Muslim populations. With the Soviet breakup, they have become separate parties.

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colonialism. They are reverting to their Turkic and Persian languages and abandoning the cyrillic alphabets imposed on both tongues by Moscow. The life-cycle rituals are being restored. In this context, Islam is certain to be a major factor in shaping the future.

Islam, however, is undergoing its own upheaval, pitting "official" leaders against "unofficial" Islam. During communist rule the new *imams* and a handful of mosques allowed to operate in Central Asia were approved, and therefore controlled, by the state. Since the late 1970s, dissident Muslims have been operating underground, mobilizing opposition to atheistic communist rule and practicing the faith in clandestine mosques. Most of the new mosques have been privately built by local populations; most are also more closely aligned with unofficial Islam. The changes have also been reflected in attempts to remove the leadership at Tashkent's Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia, which was the Kremlin's mechanism of control.

At this stage the mainstream branches of the Islamic Renaissance Party have moderate goals. Most center around ending communist domination of the political, economic and religious hierarchies, restoring Islamic culture and outlawing alcohol, drugs and prostitution. Many have no objection to the relations Israel is now establishing with Central Asia.

While most favor adoption of *sharia* as a source of law, virtually none envision a theocracy run by the clergy or an Iranian-style Islamic republic in which other parties would be outlawed.[8] The Islamic leader in Tajikistan, the only Farsi-speaking state in Central Asia, made a point of rejecting the Iranian model, pointing out differences between the Shia and the Sunni as well as Western and Russian fears of radical Islamic states.

In a series of interviews over the past year, Islamists throughout Central Asia and in north Africa have talked convincingly about crafting their own models of an Islamic democracy. Their versions, even within a single group, vary widely. Some suggest borrowing democratic aspects from secular Turkey and Islamic government practices from Pakistan, although they say neither country provides an ideal model. Few want to borrow anything except financial support

[8]Interviews with representatives of the Islamic Republic Party and Alash throughout Central Asia.

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from Saudi Arabia, the "Guardian of Islam" and site of its holiest shrines. All claim their versions of Islamic democracy would allow other parties and free speech, but would impose strict penalties on unIslamic practices such as alcohol, prostitution and drugs.

Many Islamists, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for example, also now coordinate with the new democrats. The most visible challenge to communist rule in Central Asia took place in Tajikistan last September when the new democrats and Islamists mobilized thousands of supporters for a peaceful vigil in Dushanbe to demand democratic elections. They pledged not to take down their tent city across from the parliament until the acting president resigned. Facilitated by the Islamists, the rally was the largest and most effective protest against communist rule since the Basmachi uprising, and the communist government eventually agreed to hold democratic elections. This spring the Islamists and pro-democracy groups again cooperated in a prolonged but peaceful sit-in that forced the communist president to agree to form a national coalition government.

As in Algeria the test ahead plays out at both the local and international levels. The longer the Central Asian regimes delay real pluralism—allowing all parties to work within the system rather than outside it—the greater the danger of a more embittered, strident Islam emerging to challenge the *ancien regimes*.

Some are already tempting fate. The Uzbek leadership has restored religious holidays and returned religious property nationalized by the Soviets. Simultaneously, however, it has banned all religious parties from politics and the clergy from running for public office. In Kazakhstan, secular opposition parties have been legalized. In contrast, the first political detainees since independence were seven members of Alash, the local Islamic party named after the mythical leader of the Kazakhs. They were charged with "insulting the honor and dignity" of the president and holding unauthorized rallies. And throughout Central Asia, renamed communists are arguing that they should retain power to block politicized Islam.

The West has also taken a confrontational stand on Islam in Central Asia. Western officials, including Secretary of State James A. Baker, have recently toured the new Central Asian states to urge them to emulate secular Turkey rather than neighboring Islamic Iran during the transition to post-Soviet

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rule. Baker met with fledgling democrats in only one republic, Uzbekistan; in three visits he never met with a single Islamic leader. Although the United States stressed human rights and pluralism in its talks with Central Asian leaders, the real message appears to be as much anti-Islam as pro-democracy.

The Bush administration is making the same mistakes in Central Asia and Algeria that the Carter administration made in Iran by backing away from the unknown Islamists before even trying to deal with them. Generally the West is not applying the most important lesson of the Cold War: co-option is far more effective than confrontation in undermining a rival, in this case one perceived rather than real. As in Algeria, the West would also be far better served by encouraging real democratic openings that include Islamists rather than tolerating authoritarian systems that exclude them.

Western alarm over Islamic activism also appears to be premature. Iran and Pakistan were the first two countries to heighten their presence in Central Asia; both opened diplomatic missions and discussed new cooperation and cultural ties. And Iran's Ali Akbar Velayati was the first foreign minister to tour the entire region last fall.

Rather than compete for influence, however, Iran has so far preferred cooperation, even with the current Central Asian leadership. At a Tehran summit in February, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey revived the Economic Cooperation Organization and expanded it to include Central Asia and Azerbaijan.[9] Iran's economy is also now so deeply troubled that the post-Khomeini leadership is increasingly looking inward rather than to regional expansion. Its only direct intervention in the former Soviet republics has so far been limited to peace efforts in nearby Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Central Asian Islamists are not interested in imitating Iran. Iran, in turn, does not have the resources or even the will to meddle significantly in Central Asia. After two wars in the Persian Gulf and another in neighboring Afghanistan, its interests are very specifically focused on economic development to prevent the whole region from becoming a backwater.

Indeed Iran's elections for *majlis*, or parliament, in April 1992 revealed the depth of change in even the Islamist movement's most fanatic proponent. To end opposition

[9]Sensitive to its 40 percent Russian population, Kazakhstan has observer status.

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against opening up Iran's economy and foreign policy, the regime of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani introduced a screening process that disqualified one-third of the more than 3,000 candidates, including 40 incumbents. Most were revolutionary hard-liners blocking economic reforms, such as privatization, foreign investment and overtures to the West; several were associated with the revolution's early judicial excesses and the 1979–81 takeover of the American embassy. Not surprisingly, the new *majlis* is filled with supporters of market reforms and diplomatic initiatives.

Iran's revolution still has a long way to go in rectifying human rights abuses at home and extremist tactics abroad. But Tehran's assistance last year in helping win the release of American and British hostages in Lebanon and its neutrality during Operation Desert Storm are further indications that Iran is willing to compromise, even occasionally concede, in order to reenter the community of nations. Although Iran is far from being an Islamic democracy, the example it is setting today differs significantly from the revolution's early years.

VI

The West and Islam have reached a crossroad in their relationship. The clash of the past 13 years—epitomized by the antagonism between the United States and Iran—need no longer serve as the paradigm. Unfortunately, despite the strong evidence of Islam's political appeal and its future potential, the United States and its Western allies still have no more tangible strategy to contend with Islam than they did after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini forced the shah of Iran from the Peacock throne in 1979.

As Islamist sentiment grows, the West has two stark alternatives: one is to use this important juncture—when both democracy and Islam are growing—to press Muslim-dominated countries toward political pluralism and then to accept the results of free and fair democratic elections. By having sided with democracy from an early stage, the West will then be in a stronger position to hold new Islamic governments accountable if they abuse or abandon democratic principles—without being seen as anti-Islamic.

The incentive is to ease tensions between Western and Eastern cultures and countries. The next few years will be as important for democracy's evolution as for Islam's. For two millennia democracy has taken root only in Western cul-

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tures.[10] One of the next major global challenges will be determining whether democracy is adaptable to Eastern countries, including Islamic and Confucian societies, and vice versa. This is a moment to encourage, rather that obstruct, Islam's expression in pluralist forms.

The second alternative is to try to counter or contain Islamist movements by backing or aiding governments that repress them. Such a policy could become as costly and prolonged as fighting communism, and potentially more difficult. Challenging an ideology that is supported by a failed economic system is one thing; demonizing a centuries-old faith and culture is another. Moreover, as in the Cold War, the United States would have to cultivate some unsavory allies along the way. Many of the regimes most committed to blocking Islamist movements—ranging from Syria's Hafez al-Assad to Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi—are also opposed to democracy.

This alternative—an implicit or declared policy of stopping Islamist movements before they rise to power—could also realize the West's greatest fears: unity of the diverse and disparate Islamist groups into an anti-Western force and the use of extremist and terrorist tactics. Finally, the broader danger is that trying to obstruct Islamists will, in turn, lead to a new East-West divide with far deeper passions—and a bloody history—behind it.

The Islamic resurgence clearly presents a challenge to the West. But it also provides enormous opportunity.

[10]The exceptions are countries where it has been imposed, such as Japan after World War II.

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Angelo Codevilla

A SECOND ITALIAN REPUBLIC?

Politics in Italy has changed less in recent decades than in any other Western nation. Now, however, major changes, if not a brand new constitutional order, are under way. On June 10, 1991, Italian voters approved a referendum to make a marginal change in the country's electoral law. Approved by 95.6 percent, against the strenuous opposition of the country's political establishment, the referendum was the equivalent of a small hole in an earthen dam: it allowed the near unanimous outpouring of the Italian people's pent-up sentiments against the political parties that have ruled the country in a kind of oligopoly since 1944.

After that vote Italy's powerful parties tried to preempt serious institutional changes by proposing reforms to strengthen the system. But the issue of reform escaped the parties' control and dominated the campaign for the general elections of April 5, 1992. The election results weakened the parties' capacity to resist changes that would drastically reduce their influence. The system is not likely to survive the massive, open iconoclasm that has spread from the general population to the political class itself.

II

The central fact of contemporary Italian political life is that it is dominated by party organizations and that the people have never had a chance to say no.

The parties' oligopoly actually began in 1919 when parliament scrapped the traditional single-member-district electoral system (such as exists in the United States and France) and instituted proportional representation. Ever since 1892 the Italian Socialist Party had bound its parliamentary members to vote as directed by party leaders. The inchoate Liberal majority in the Italian parliament, struggling to build governing coalitions against the disciplined bloc-voting Socialists, hoped that proportional representation would bring discipline to its

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own ranks. In a contest that hinged on discipline, however, victory went to Benito Mussolini's Fascists, an even more disciplined offshoot of the Socialist Party. Beginning in 1922 the Fascists drove the other parties underground, abroad or into the Vatican. The Fascists also absorbed and expanded most of the socialist and Catholic mass organizations and patronage networks.

Mussolini fell on July 25, 1943, when King Victor Emmanuel deposed him from the prime ministership. Those who rushed onto the newly reopened political scene were largely unknown in Italy. The American and British governments, not the Italian people, forced the king to accept the self-appointed leaders of the Christian Democratic, Socialist, Communist and other parties as the authoritative representatives of the Italian people. After June 1944 Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi claimed to act in the name of "the political parties from which the government has emanated [and which] are the expression of the will and aspirations of the Italian people."

Whatever else divided them the party leaders were unanimous in their determination to shut out competition. They specified that only parties, not individuals, could take part in the election of deputies to the constituent assembly that would draw up the new constitution, and that only the national directors of each party could approve candidacies. As the election was by proportional representation, individuals were elected solely because party bosses had placed their names high on party lists. Hence self-appointed party leaders were able to pick both the assembly that drew up the constitution and the parliament that ratified it.

Proportional representation has shaped Italian politics. The voter casts his ballot for a party, and parties divide the seats in parliament in proportion to the votes they receive. If a party receives, say, 25 percent of the vote in a district, the top fourth of its list for that district is elected. Hence members of parliament are little more than employees of the party leaders who make up those lists. In the old days, Communist members of parliament would turn their salaries over to the party and receive a party paycheck. Members of parliament from other parties are under looser discipline, but all are subject to the list makers.

From the system's infancy the politicians insulated themselves from the voters. All Italian parties have tried to copy the Communists' organization—general secretaries, directorates,

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central committees. In practice those who are lower in the pyramid are creatures of those above. Unlike Americans, Italian voters could not affect struggles within parties because primaries do not exist in Italy. Italians cannot vote against individual politicians they do not like any more than they can vote a government out of office. The electoral law allows the voters to express their preference for individual candidates on party lists. In 1991 the Christian Democratic leadership, having won a plurality of the vote in Palermo, gave the mayoralty not to the candidate who received the overwhelming majority of "preference" votes but to the one who came in twenty-third.

Bosses from the several parties decide among themselves who will form the governing majority and what laws will pass. They are the final authority on everything from budgets to patronage. Italy has averaged more than one government per year since the fall of fascism, and those fifty governments have fallen and been reborn not by mandate of the electorate or by votes of parliament but by discord or agreement among a handful of party bosses.

The parties' relative strength at the polls and in parliament has shifted back and forth over the years. The Christian Democrats, with more than a third of the vote, have been the core of governing coalitions, while the Communists, with less than a third of the vote, have been formally in opposition since 1947. Until 1963 the Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals, each with about five percent of the vote, were the balance wheels of government. Since then the Socialists, with about a tenth of the vote, have filled that role. During the 1970s the Communists were the driving force, but have since declined. The parties' fortunes, however, have had less to do with the minuscule changes in the percentage of the vote than with their ability to make deals with one another. The chief purpose of those deals has been patronage.

Post-fascist governments dissolved only five of the hundreds of fascist mass organizations, and placed the fascist networks in everything from the oil industry to filmmaking to banking under central ministries or local authorities. The fascist state's industrial holding company, IRI, became the centerpiece of the first Italian republic's patronage apparatus and remains so to this day. Everywhere fascist appointees were purged and replaced by designees of the parties. Each party fought to increase its share of the spoils, and all the parties' internal factions also clamored for more. Hence, from the very begin-

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ning, each Italian government was doubly driven to create more posts under its control.

Every political event became an opportunity to expand the patronage base. After the Christian Democratic Party ousted the Communists and Socialists from the cabinet in 1947, it sought to expand its clientele in order to rival the Communists' and to counterbalance the weight of church organizations within its ranks. Hence in the 1950s Christian Democratic-dominated governments expanded the para-state sector and started monumental development projects in the south. While the effects on Italy's economy are debatable, the high costs and multiplication of the Christian Democratic network are not. When the Socialist Party reentered the cabinet in 1963 new places and emoluments had to be found for its supporters. Hence electric utilities were nationalized. Socialist leader Pietro Nenni described this move as "a stick thrown into the wheels of Italian capitalism." Be that as it may, the Socialists got the patronage, the owners got uneconomically high prices, and Italian consumers were stuck with the bill. And when the Communists all but entered the government during the late 1970s, a further expansion of patronage was necessary to accommodate them, including expansion of the state broadcast company and the IRI.

Anyone who opens an Italian newspaper can see that a substantial portion of the day's news concerns struggles between the parties over *le nomine*, who will fill what post on the "board" of the state broadcast organization, a bank or a company. Each official post gained at the top delivers a bounty of posts in lower layers. Moreover, since each post gained in the public sector radiates influence into the private sector, the parties' patronage has no logical end. Italian society pays an incalculable economic and moral toll.

Not surprisingly, antiparty grumbling has been a perennial feature of Italian political life. The response from party politicians, as well as from American intellectuals who take their lead, has been that such grumbling is illegitimate. While C.S.R. Harris' official British history of World War II described the first manifestation of antiparty feeling in 1946 as a reaction to greedy "self-constituted party leaders," Carlo Sforza characterized it as "neo-fascist fifth column activity." In 1972 one of the most widely circulated books on Italian government said that the pejorative term *partitocrazia* "often comes from the pen of a former fascist or fascist sympathizer

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with little insight into or sympathy with the democratic process."

Why did the Italian people—not known for their docility—bear with this party oligopoly in relative silence for so many years? Because Italian politics for some forty years beginning in October 1947 was overshadowed by one question: Will communists rule Italy or not? Since 1947 the Christian Democratic Party, secure in the knowledge that it was the indispensable alternative to communism (the self-described "anti-communist dike"), hardly had to campaign, much less worry that anyone could muster enough of the public's energies to try to reform the system.

Thus for nearly a half century cabinets have risen and fallen, policy has lurched left or right, careers and fortunes have been made and lost, strictly by deals made among factional potentates. The voters have been spectators.

III

This is not to say that Italian politics has been either tame or devoid of significance. On the contrary Italy's political parties dramatically fought their own cold war against a background of social revolution. The Italian elections of 1948 only threw the Communist Party off stride. In the late 1950s the Communist and Socialist parties led their united clienteles into a round of strikes and riots to pressure the Christian Democrats to open the cabinet to the Socialists. After that maneuver succeeded in 1963 the Socialists, a variety of violent and nonviolent leftists, plus many Christian Democrats tried to open the government to the Communists. In the mid-1970s there occurred a kind of civil war—anyone who dared express opposition to communism was liable to be beaten or shot, while the authorities feared antagonizing self-proclaimed progressives.

The judiciary, too, was radicalized. Thus communist magistrates temporarily jailed Edgardo Sogno, the former commander of the Liberal Party's antifascist partisans, for alleged fascist activities. The crisis came in 1978, when the terrorist Red Brigades broadened their list of enemies to include the Communists and their chief Christian Democratic ally, former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, whom they abducted and murdered. The public's and the parties' unanimous reaction to the murder of Moro doomed the terrorists and, more importantly, banned threats of violence from Italian public life. In 1979 the

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Socialists, under Bettino Craxi, reversed course and staked their future on anticommunism.

Once the Socialists stopped pushing for Communist inclusion in the government, and once the Communists could no longer rely on demonstrations and labor strikes to coerce other parties, communism began to fade as an issue in Italian politics. Italy's internal cold war ended. Thus in the 1980s other matters became politically significant; among these was the Italian people's distaste for their own political system.

The way in which the Communist Party lost power in the 1980s says much about the Italian political system. After the 1979 elections, while the party was near its peak electoral strength with nearly a third of the seats in parliament, the Communists had already ceased to be a credible threat to enter the government. When the Communists lost the capacity to coerce the ruling Christian Democrats, they lost nearly everything. By 1992 the principal successor to the Communists accounted for about half the votes the party had received a decade earlier. Outside a few bastions in central Italy, however, communist influence had virtually disappeared from the country.

The Socialist Party's rise in the 1980s also was shaped by the system. Throughout the decade the Socialist Party's leader, Craxi, was clearly Italy's predominant politician. Had there been a national election for chief executive, he probably would have won easily. His party's vote, however, depended on its clientele, and that grew more slowly. Having begun the decade with some 10 percent of the vote, the Socialists ended it with less than 15 percent.

Elsewhere in Europe Socialist and Christian Democratic parties alternate power. But in Italy, where the Socialists have been part and parcel of the government, the public cannot consider them as an alternative government. Indeed Craxi, who was prime minister longer than anyone else during the 1980s, could hardly call for "throwing the rascals out." So, although the Socialists outgained the other parties at the polls during the 1980s, both the electoral system and public opinion barred any quick advances.

The Christian Democratic Party remained steady in electoral strength throughout the 1980s. But the fall of communism made salient what had been undeniable since the party and the Catholic Church parted company in the 1950s: the Christian Democrats stood for nothing but the enrichment of

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their own clientele. When the communist flood receded, so did the need for an anticommunist dike. Hence the vestiges of the Christian Democrats' legitimacy faded away.

Through the 1980s a feeling spread through all layers of Italian society that the quarrels of the postwar period among fascists, communists and others were a closed chapter of history. The different parties offered only different brands of parasites; the country needed to shape up in order to keep company with the world. The chief obstacle to its doing so was the political system.[1]

IV

Over the decades, talk of institutional reform has vanished in the turbulence of party politics. Prior to the 1953 election the Christian Democratic Party proposed a change in the electoral law to award a bonus of seats to any party that gained a simple majority—that is, to itself. After 1958, a few Italian politicians expressed admiration for minor constitutional features of France's Fifth Republic, like the automatic passage of bills to which the government attaches the "question of confidence," as well as for the German practice of deposing chancellors only by electing their successors. But none proposed adopting the Fifth Republic's major pillars: the direct election of a powerful president and a legislative branch elected in single-member districts. To talk about the relationship between the voter and the government would have cast doubt on the Italian parties' claim that they alone embody "democracy."

In the mid-1970s "years of lead," about a hundred Christian Democratic members of parliament objected that the party leadership's opening to the Communists was a breach of faith with the electorate. One of these "hundred," Massimo de Carolis, a Milan city councilman, got himself elected to parliament by asking the electorate to give him their "preference vote." In exchange, promised de Carolis, he would follow the voters' wishes rather than those of the party leadership. De

[1]No incident shows more clearly the low regard in which Italians hold their political system than the election to parliament of a Hungarian porn star, Ilona Staller, nicknamed Cicciolina (cute little fleshy one). In 1987 the leader of the tiny Radical Party, Marco Pannella, put Cicciolina high on his party's list for parliament to make the point that even a porn star would automatically benefit from the votes given to the party and to underline the fact that party bosses, not voters, get to control who sits in parliament and what they do there. The Emperor Caligula, after all, had once held the Roman senate up to ridicule by securing the election of his horse.

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Carolis and the "hundred" also talked of the need to do away with proportional representation. The Red Brigades shot de Carolis, as well as the newspaper editor who backed him. The "hundred" were finally neutralized by the realization that they could not capture the Christian Democratic party organization, only wreck it to the Communists' benefit.

In the early 1980s Italy's most promising politician took up the cause of reform. Chastising the lack of connection between Italian elections and Italian government, Craxi championed the direct election of the president. That proposal, had it been adopted, would probably have resulted in his becoming head of state. It was very popular in the country, but anathema to the party directorates. The principle of direct, contested election of government officials, whom the voters can turn out of office, was the very negation of Italian political oligopoly.

Craxi's talk of reform further strengthened the popular feeling that something must be done to the country's political institutions. Craxi himself, however, underestimated that feeling. Indeed in 1989 he threatened a government crisis to force the Christian Democratic leaders to renege on a commitment to support the direct election of mayors and other minor reforms. By thus closing the parliamentary door, Craxi left the reformers no choice but to attack the system through referendums.

In 1990 Mario Segni, a young Christian Democrat in parliament, started a committee to gather signatures to propose three referenda. Although the son of a former president and a lifelong Christian Democrat, Segni had never been a party careerist. In the 1970s he had been among the leaders of the Christian Democratic "hundred." In 1990 his committee was ostentatiously nonpartisan and attacked "the regime of the parties."

The first of the proposed referenda would have caused nearly four-fifths of the Italian Senate to be directly elected in single-member districts. The second would have allowed the direct election of mayors in all Italian cities (currently it is allowed only in towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants). The third would have restricted the voter to expressing one rather than five preferences for individual candidates on the parliamentary list of the party of choice.

Gathering the signatures for the petitions was no problem. But Italy's constitutional court—which like every other branch of the judiciary is anything but independent of the parties—

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declared the first two proposals unconstitutional and would not let them be submitted to the voters. The third proposal, approved by the court, differed from the others chiefly in that it was almost completely without practical significance and not the sort of thing that might have been expected to engage popular sentiment. It is most unlikely that anyone in Italy's political establishment anticipated the battle that followed, much less its results.

The referendum's practical significance was straightforward: the electoral law allowed the voter, after choosing a party list, to write in up to five numbers, each corresponding to one of the candidates on the list. Thus, once in a while, the electorate managed (as Milanese voters did in the case of de Carolis in the 1970s) to send to parliament someone whom the party bosses would have preferred to keep out. Most of the time, however, the preference system was used to keep a detailed account of who votes for whom, thus negating the secrecy of the ballot.

Here is how the accounting worked. Most Italian precincts are small—often with fewer than one thousand voters. Hence even the largest parties seldom receive more than a few hundred votes per precinct. In small southern towns any given party's votes per precinct seldom exceeds one hundred. If, then, the local sub-boss instructs someone whose vote is being exchanged for a favor to write in five numbers in a prearranged sequence, each party can be mathematically certain whether each and every one of its voters followed orders. This practice, which dates back to 1919, is of obvious importance for managing the lower end of a patronage system.

In 1991, except in the south, the importance of eliminating preference-checking by reducing the number of permitted preferences from five to one was more symbolic than practical. The same is true of the proposal's other effect—to end the pooling of preference votes that allowed party factions to boost one of their candidates.

The symbolic stakes, however, turned out to be huge. Those who urged a "no" vote or counseled voters to boycott the polls, pictured themselves as defenders of the "democratic" constitution against chaos or worse. Those who urged a "yes" vote portrayed themselves as the advocates of people power and morality against an immoral *partitocrazia*. Effectively, the referendum was on the question: Do you want the political system

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to continue as is, or do you want to change it to reduce the influence of the party bosses?

The most vocal opposition came from Craxi's Socialist Party. Having argued that the proposal was unconstitutional and that the court should not have allowed it to go to the voters, the Socialists added that the referendum was worthless and counseled Italian voters to spend a weekend at the beach rather than at the polls. If, as seemed likely, fewer than 50 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots, the referendum would fail for lack of a quorum. This, in Craxi's words, would be a "reinforced no." Ironically, by showing that he cared very much how the referendum came out, Craxi probably convinced many Italians that they too should care.

The Christian Democratic leadership did not want to make that mistake. Its strategy was to treat the referendum as "small stuff," which in Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti's words, should interest only "four cats." Hence the leadership did not formally tell voters to stay home, although the former party secretary, Ciriaco De Mita, announced that he would not vote, and the current secretary, Arnaldo Forlani, announced that the party was working on a "serious" reform plan for "later." The Christian Democrats preferred a low-key approach also because a formal "no" position would probably have energized some other dissident party members to become even more active on the "yes" side than they actually became.

Craxi had argued against this strategy and, as the campaign drew to a close and more and more individuals from the Christian Democratic orbit announced that they would vote—and probably vote "yes"—Craxi charged the Christian Democratic leadership with duplicity. But the behavior of the Christian Democratic-controlled electoral bureaucracy indicates that the party leaders' intentions were the same as Craxi's. Up to a week before election day it seemed that about half the nation's polling places might not even open; roughly that many precinct "presidents" had either called in sick or not answered the prefects' formal call to take up their duties. This could hardly have happened without a strong message from the top of both the Christian Democratic and Socialist patronage networks.

The Communists, who had recently renamed themselves the Democratic Party of the Left, wielded their much-reduced influence in favor of a "yes" vote. The tactical advantage of appearing more democratic than the Christian Democrats,

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especially than their nemesis, Craxi, outweighed whatever losses the Communists would suffer in capacity to check up on their shrunken patronage network. The small "lay" parties were split and counted for nothing.

The "yes" campaign led by Segni's nonparty committee was augmented by rebels against the parties (but primarily against the Christian Democrats) and consisted exclusively of party-bashing. The leading rebel and chief source of free publicity for the referendum was the president of the republic himself, Francesco Cossiga.

Like Segni, Cossiga is both a Christian Democrat and a Sardinian. As president he was supposed to be above party politics. But, he argued, nothing in his job description obliged him to be silent on basic civic duties, like voting, or on the tone of public life. Thus on May 9, 1991, the Italian president told the television cameras that the government had become a "*cosa nostra*" of the parties. He thereby legitimized the harshest criticism of the regime—that the government serves as a conduit of organized crime and that its activities are often indistinguishable from the crime syndicates'. Earlier, from his august position, he had legitimized the argument that a constitutional revolution was needed: "Don't be afraid of the term 'second republic'."

But above all Cossiga picked fight after public fight with those who counseled abstention. De Mita spoke for perhaps a majority of the nation's party leaders when he said that Cossiga's words "belong in a county fair." Others used even ruder language. But polls showed that some two-thirds of Italians approved of what Cossiga was saying and wanted him to say more. The furor around the head of state surely drew public attention to the referendum.

A few other prominent Christian Democrats—such as former Economics Minister Beniamino Andreatta and Tina Anselmi, a former minister of labor active in Catholic women's circles—joined the "yes" camp. But it appeared that in so doing they were following, not leading, some of the party's largest social constituencies. The financial community, represented by the national employers' federation, the *Confindustria*, weighed in just before the vote by declaring that the regime of the parties is the greatest obstacle to greater prosperity.

Perhaps the heaviest blow of all came from the Catholic Church. While the Italian bishops' conference remained officially neutral, individual bishops paraded before the cameras

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with statements like "the referendum is a democratic instrument not to be ignored," and "this referendum can lead to more substantive, urgently needed reforms." Not until a month after the referendum did Pope John Paul II speak to the press against "the excessive weight of political mediation" and link the parties to "the widespread illegality which has placed the institutions in a crisis." But the pope's feelings on this matter had evidently long since filtered down to most parish priests, because they had sounded this theme consistently, throughout the country, throughout the campaign. Catholic lay organizations too, including the left-of-center Communion and Liberation, urged a "yes" vote with none-too-subtle reproaches to the parties, above all their own Christian Democrats.

The results were unprecedented. Italians are known for their divisions, not their cohesion. But it seems that northerners and southerners, rich and poor, Catholics and secularists agreed to strike a blow at the political system. Over 62 percent went to the polls, about average for a referendum. No one can know how many would have gone had all the precincts been open and in the absence of official discouragement. But once in the booth, 22 out of 23 electors voted "yes." Even if everyone who did not vote were counted as a "no," the "yes" still would have won by 26 million to 18 million votes. Nothing in Italian politics has ever been plainer. Nor can such unanimity be attributed to the endorsement of authoritative figures. The only explanation for this grass-roots phenomenon is that the regime of the parties has very few defenders. The party leaders' total surprise at the result showed how much they had taken for granted an electorate that had never had the chance to say no to them.

V

The other organized force that is driving Italy toward reform, the regional "leagues," offers an even more radical way of saying "no." The Italian constitution criminalizes anyone who proposes undoing the republic. Yet that is precisely what millions of northern Italians loudly say they would like to do. Anyone driving through the vital business centers of northern Italy notices countless graffiti reading "Away from Rome!" and "Rome = mafia" and "We work, Rome robs." Even casual conversation confirms the northerners' resentment that the government draws revenue disproportionately

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from the north while spending to support the south's clientelistic ways, as well as disgust with a state bureaucracy that is forcing northerners, more and more, to adopt southern habits of corruption.

During the mid-1980s the political establishment did not take the leagues seriously, in part because their leaders were young, penniless and without connections, and because, to make their point of regional identity, they spoke publicly in local dialects—a sure mark of low socioeconomic status. But the leagues captured ever bigger slices of the vote in local elections. On November 25, 1991, the Lombardy League gained 24.4 percent of the vote in the municipal election of Brescia, Lombardy's second-largest city, barely beating out the Christian Democrats to become the city's largest party.

The leagues of course have no interest in getting bogged down in government; they are a protest movement. As such they are feared above all by the Christian Democrats. The leagues may be on the fringe, but their voters are not. Unlike those who vote for the neo-Fascist or Communist parties, the leagues' voters have no history of sociopolitical activism. They are not chronic malcontents, nor do they look to the past. Rather they look to a European future. For the most part the leagues' voters are the quiet, productive people who had voted Christian Democrat primarily because it was the "anticommunist dike." Now that the communist flood no longer menaces, they tend to see the Christian Democrats as the mainstay of something noxious. The leagues cause chaos not only within the Christian Democratic Party, as local candidates scramble to distance themselves from the national party, but also among the parties, when the weakened Christian Democrats find it increasingly difficult to form governing coalitions.

Thus in 1992 more and more politicians had become convinced that to avoid being squeezed between the referendum committee and the leagues, they had at least to appear to do the last thing in the world they wanted: diminish their own prerogatives.

VI

Even before the referendum the Christian Democratic Party formulated its solution for two of the chronic complaints against the regime—lack of connection between the voting booth and the government, and lack of governments sufficiently coherent and long-lived to be held responsible. The

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Christian Democrats proposed that about 80 percent of the Chamber of Deputies be elected as before, by proportional representation in multi-member districts. The remaining 20 percent of the deputies would come from a nationwide pool. Of these 120 seats, 75 would be awarded as a bonus to any party or group of parties that had presented itself as a coalition and had gained a plurality of the total vote (at least 40 percent). The remaining 45 would be distributed among the parties according to the percentage of the vote they received. The nationwide pool is intended to give a governing edge to any party (read, the Christian Democrats) or coalition of parties that receives the most votes but not enough to govern. Other parties, especially the Socialists, tend to see this proposal as the Christian Democrats' power grab.

To make governments long-lived and responsible, the Christian Democrats propose instituting a "chancellorship"—cabinets that, unlike nearly all of Italy's postwar governments, could not resign simply because of party squabbles outside of parliament but that would have to stay in office until they were replaced by a vote of parliament. Members of parliament would remain mere creatures of the party bosses, and the only change would be a somewhat more efficient and transparent process for making and unmaking governments. This proposal does not alienate any of the parties. Hence it might well be adopted. But it is difficult to imagine that either proposal would satisfy the voters.

The Socialist Party's predicament is difficult. Any modification of proportional representation emphasizes the party's twin liabilities—its small size and its public image as a government party as corrupt as the Christian Democrats. To fully exploit its biggest asset—Craxi—the party would have to obtain the Christian Democrats' agreement to the direct election of the president. But the Christian Democrats are certain to block such a proposal, even if the Socialists agreed to severe restrictions on presidential powers. That is because, regardless of any written constitution, anyone directly elected by the voters could control the political agenda just by speaking out.

The Communists have even less choice. They know that a single-member-district electoral system would instantly reduce them to a token number of members of parliament from central Italy and that, as in France, a presidential system would seal their exclusion from national influence. They have thus proposed a hybrid of the French and German systems, in

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which 300 deputies would be elected by single-member districts, 270 by proportional representation out of the unsuccessful candidates and 60 by proportional representation out of national lists. But the Communists' main focus is on the short run. They have a clear interest in being the Christian Democrats' staunchest allies in maintaining the current system, or in joining with the Socialists as a leftist alternative to the Christian Democrats, or in joining with almost any other party in almost any enterprise, just to escape from the crippling isolation they have suffered since 1978.

The minor parties—the Liberals, the Social Democrats, the Republicans—know that any change in proportional representation would wipe them out. Yet they are already so small—drawing two to five percent of the vote—that they are little more than vehicles for a small handful of individuals. These individuals, however, may well believe that they would lose nothing, and perhaps gain, by changing the system.

Again and again since the birth of modern Italy in 1870 its politicians have exhibited a quality they call *trasformismo*—the tendency not to die on old barricades, but to transmogrify political identities to fit changing conditions. In the 1890s there was a rush to be a liberal. In the 1920s and 1930s fascism was de rigueur. In the 1970s a shift was underway toward "antifascism" as defined by the Communist Party. In the 1990s politicians may race to champion direct election to office.

VII

Party leaders carried their positions into the campaign for the election of April 5, 1992. Christian Democrats, Socialists and even Communists too would have preferred a boring debate on their proposals after which the public would vote as usual, giving the party bosses another lease on power. The Christian Democrats and Socialists would split the posts of president and prime minister and would compromise on changes to the electoral law. Members of parliament would be held in check by the threat of dissolution of the government and yet another round of elections. It quickly became clear, however, that the party directorates had lost their grip on their own subordinates, as well as on the country.

The Christian Democrats' troubles may best be seen in the desperate attempt of Paolo Lazzati, secretary of the Milan branch, to entice Segni to head the Christian Democratic list in the Milan area. Lazzati realized that the party's traditional

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leaders had no credibility as reformers and hoped that the only man in the country with such credibility would come to his rescue. Segni politely refused, citing his obligation to represent his native Sardinia. Nevertheless the Milanese Christian Democrats and those of the Veneto region campaigned as Segni supporters and pledged to work with him to gather signatures for his referenda, regardless of what party headquarters in Rome might say.

Moreover, as leaders of the various parties bargained about what to do after the elections, Segni was working to invalidate their deals. He registered a new party, called the "Referendum List," and asked people who were already candidates on other lists to join. Candidates would be accepted if they pledged to vote for legislation effecting the proposed electoral reforms, regardless of the wishes of party leaders and of whether their vote would cause any government to fall.

The point was not to gain votes for this list, but to publicly pledge as many members of the new parliament as possible to a set of reforms, rather than to the party bosses. Within a week some 200 Christian Democratic, Socialist, Communist and minor party candidates asked to appear on Segni's list. In the end some 600 candidates joined, to the dismay of party leaders who for the first time since 1919 realized that they would not be able to control a significant portion of the members of parliament elected with their label. In response Christian Democratic leaders managed a weak threat against Segni in the party newspaper, *Il Popolo*. But by March 1992 they needed him more than he needed them.

Throughout the electoral campaign President Cossiga continued his attacks on the party system. The Catholic church went out of its way not to be seen as supporting the government. In the north the leagues launched insult after insult at the system. The business community, for its part, seemed to second them; for the first time the national employers' federation held its convention only with members from the northern regions. On the other side the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties' campaign boiled down to this: We are the constitutional system and to attack us in a way that undermines this system is criminally irresponsible, indeed subversive.

The least revolutionary result of the April elections was that in the Chamber of Deputies the governing coalition lost 28 seats and fell to 48.8 percent of the vote. Nevertheless the old four-party coalition retained a bare majority. In the Senate the

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coalition also managed a bare majority of seats, despite receiving only 43.3 percent of the vote. Nationwide the leagues got 9.9 percent of the vote. But there are deeper reasons why Christian Democratic and Socialist leaders appeared on television with shell-shocked looks and mutters reminiscent of Soviet officials in August 1991.

The Christian Democrats received 29.7 percent of the vote in the Chamber and 27 percent in the Senate—down by five and seven points. That understates the debacle. Only in poor, Mafia-riddled Sicily did the Christian Democrats hold their own. Even there a movement of dissident anti-Mafia Christian Democrats captured 12 seats. In Lombardy, the nation's vital center, with an economy bigger than Austria's, the Christian Democrats slipped to 23.2 percent, well behind the leagues' combined total, 26.7 percent. In the north as a whole, the Christian Democrats barely beat the leagues' 20 percent. Hence the Christian Democrats are sure to find their northern members of parliament unmanageable. The elections made the Christian Democrats' traditional alliance with the Socialists politically untenable because the new parliament contains 144 members who are publicly pledged (on Segni's Referendum List) to desert their own parties, if need be, on the crucial issue of reform. The Vatican newspaper's cheers for the Christian Democrats' defeat added insult to injury.

The Socialists, with 13.6 percent of the vote, lost only about one point numerically. But they failed to overtake the Communists. Worse, because the Christian Democratic Party is now so weak, the Socialists can no longer count on using it to ride to power. So the Socialists are hemmed in on both the right and the left, and their bargaining power with both sides has dropped. Most disheartening is the fact that Craxi, once the great innovator of Italian politics, found himself in the role of its last defender.

The Communists received 16.1 percent of the vote—a huge ten-point loss.[2] Nevertheless, all things considered, their short-term prospects are not bad. If the Christian Democrats and Socialists want to stay in office and do business more or less as they have for the previous forty years, there is little alternative

[2]The traditionalist wing of Italian communism drew 5.6 percent of the vote. Hence the combined total of the successors to the Italian Communist Party was 21.7 percent, a five-point loss.

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to dealing with the Communists. The minor parties, despite their gains, count for less than ever.

It may well be impossible for the parliament that convened on April 23, 1992, to form a government for any purpose other than to reform the constitution and the electoral law. President Cossiga's term was due to expire on July 3, 1992. His desire to preside over a constitutional reform was well known. Had the major party directorates agreed to the appointment of a prime minister, such as Segni, whose cabinet would perform caretaker functions while elaborating reforms to be submitted to the electorate's choice, the process of reform might have been short and relatively smooth.

But the Christian Democrats and Socialist directorates made clear their intention to thwart the appointment of a reformist government, to wait out Cossiga's term and to elect a new president less committed to reform. They regard the parliament elected on April 5 as "constituent"—empowered to draft and approve constitutional changes. They want to form a government along with the Communists in the name of achieving "governability." Such a government would then try to pass a "reform" tailored to the parties' interests.

On April 28 President Cossiga resigned, forcing parliament (augmented by regional delegates) to elect a successor. This preempted the formation of a Christian Democratic-Socialist-Communist government, and made sure that in the first post-election test of strength reform would be the only public issue. The three big parties cannot count on winning. The 107 deputies and 37 senators pledged to support Segni's reforms could defect from their parties and prevent the election of an antireform president. Moreover the sight of the Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists uniting in ballot after ballot to throttle reform threatens to inflame the country.

VIII

In 1992 the great divide in Italian politics is between those who want to maintain something like the first republic and those who want drastically to reduce the role of the parties. To the extent that members of parliament put party interests ahead of true reform, they lump themselves together for the voters' retribution at the polls. The next election will surely see a multiplication of protest voting. Those northern voters who refrained from supporting the leagues during the 1992 elections, in the hope that reform might come some other way,

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would be driven to support outright secession. Moreover Segni's reform referenda are gathering signatures and riding a wave of public opinion. A grand-coalition cabinet put together for the sake of governability would lack the moral and political authority to defeat them. Would the government try to outlaw the referenda or annul the results? This would amount to a coup. There is no reason to believe that the Italian nomenklatura would succeed where the Soviets failed.

In the wake of the 1992 elections little is clear other than that the first Italian republic is all but dead. Contrary to the views of eminent academics, anticommunism was the only reason why the Italian people tolerated it. As soon as they were able to junk the system safely, they set about the task with gusto.

What will follow the first Italian republic is less clear. No doubt the Italian people want to hire and fire their representatives directly. No doubt, too, millions of Italians want to get rid of the vast patronage system and to break the connection between government, business and crime. The political and legal processes by which reform will occur are cloudy enough. Much more difficult to foresee is the process by which Italians will tackle the vested interests and habits that the first republic will leave behind. The short history of reform in formerly communist lands of eastern Europe is long enough to teach that new laws and economic policies are only the public manifestations of a phenomenon that must essentially occur at the moral level.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

HITLER AND STALIN: PARALLEL LIVES. By Alan Bullock. New York: Knopf, 1992, 1081 pp. $35.00.
DE GAULLE. VOL. II: THE RULER, 1945–1970. By Jean Lacouture. New York: Norton, 1992, 640 pp. $29.95.
CHURCHILL: A LIFE. By Martin Gilbert. New York: Henry Holt, 1991, 1066 pp. $35.00.

By some special cunning of history these three weighty tomes have appeared simultaneously in the United States—and furnish excellent accounts of the European leaders who dominated the political scene of so much of our century. These biographies, with their expert summaries of historical contexts, once more document what most people once knew—that in some historical circumstances individuals do matter and matter decisively.

The best of these works deals with the worst of men: the master historian and brilliant biographer Alan Bullock has written a gripping study of the two tyrants who transformed their countries and much of the world. Bullock details the public careers of Hitler and Stalin, while shrewdly analyzing the inner dynamism that made triumph and unparalleled terror possible. In reconstructing their lives, he reminds the general reader (for whom the book is felicitously written) just how important was the German-Russian axis in the first half of the century and how the interaction between these hostile yet similar regimes shaped world politics. A synthesis of vast scholarship, the book is also riveting reading.

Lacouture's second volume of his biography of DeGaulle is a thorough, splendid account of the great political dramatist, the very conscious creator of his own legend. Lacouture, France's best known political biographer, continues in this volume to set DeGaulle in the context of mostly adversarial conditions, beginning with his conflicts with the Anglo-Americans during the Liberation. As ever, DeGaulle merged his ego with the demands of France's honor, damaged by defeat and collaboration. Lacouture depicts the complexities of French politics and corrects the general's own version of his "withdrawal" after 1946; he sought his return to power and understood that Algeria offered both the means and the test of that return. A balanced, indispensable work about a man whose personal power was so much greater than his country's. As Abba Eban noted when he visited DeGaulle on the eve of the Six Day War: "Authority flowed from him like a steady tide." There was also a dark and disagreeable side; in June 1940 Churchill, referring to the newly arrived self-proclaimed savior of France, described it as "an aptitude for suffering." Lacouture's work, based on the rich literature and many interviews, depicts a shrewd and cleverly opportunistic man—as well as a realistic and courageous leader, as attested by his ending of the Algerian war.

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Churchill depicts the engrossing life of perhaps the most appealing European statesman of the century. Narrowly focused on the essentials of Churchill's public and private life, Gilbert (the authorized biographer who has completed a magisterial, multivolumed biography) nevertheless recreates a large slice of British history. A compelling story—from the earliest days of Churchill as radical reformer—much of it told in Churchill's own incomparable voice, including his letters to Clementine, recording triumph and failure in two wars and in the never peaceful years in between. Gilbert is understandably under the spell of Churchill's greatness—at which other historians and writers are trying to chip away. Churchill, the romantic realist, the rebellious traditionalist, had a horror of Bolshevism and yet grasped Soviet help in order to defeat the still greater horror of Hitler, against whom he had relentlessly warned. In material power weaker than either, Churchill was Hitler's most determined enemy and understood Stalin better than most.

For anyone who wants an authoritative account of our epoch, these three works would make a good beginning—and they suggest that serious biography can recapture the true drama of history.

THE LINCHPIN: FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1950–1990. By Julius W. Friend. New York: Praeger (with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1991, 160 pp. $37.95 (paper, $12.95).

A slight work on a central subject: the successful reconciliation of earlier enemies and their joint leadership of the European Community. France had to adjust to Germany's several miracles: the economic one and, in 1989–90, the miracle of peaceful reunification. The author, formerly with the CIA and author of a book on Mitterrand, analyzes the common and divergent interests that will shape the policies of the two countries in the EC and in the now much wider Europe.

AMERICA, GERMANY, AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. By Gregory F. Treverton. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1992, 240 pp. $19.95.

An expert on American-European relations, Treverton gives a splendidly compressed analysis of U.S. policy toward postwar Europe and especially toward Germany, the central problem and now the major power of Europe. Treverton writes authoritatively of U.S. policy and policymaking, and his view that even an America in long-range relative decline will remain a (diminished) presence in Europe seems highly plausible. A spirited summary of the past and a tour d'horizon of Europe's prospects concludes with the thought that "the international environment of the next decade or so will be *relatively* benign for the United States."

General: Political and Legal

Andrew J. Pierre

FLIGHT FROM THE TRUTH: THE REIGN OF DECEIT IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION. By Jean-François Revel. New York: Random House, 1992, 408 pp. $25.00.

One of France's leading intellectuals in a country that properly prides itself on its intellectual life, Jean-François Revel—the former angry young

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man—has become angrier as he has grown older. His audience benefits. Beginning with the sentence, "The foremost of all forces that drive the world is falsehood," he accuses his colleagues in the media, politicians, professors and almost anyone else who dares to voice an opinion, of bending the truth to fit their own preconceived ideology. Not that Revel has not often been accused of doing that himself. Yet he has an important and provocative point. In this age of information overdose the "truth" has become ever more difficult to discern. This he views as a threat to democracy, whose lifeblood is transparency.

REGULATING COVERT ACTION. By W. Michael Reisman and James E. Baker. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1992, 250 pp. $28.50.

The need for covert operations may decline in the post-Cold War world, the authors acknowledge, but such operations will continue to be occasionally necessary. What should be the international and national norms for regulating them? Two respected legal scholars carefully analyze the question. The most original section deals with international law and the U.N. Charter, where on first appearance there is little precedent and guidance, yet they identify norms of law on case-by-case examination far more than one might expect. As for American policy, Reisman and Baker recommend that "an act accomplished covertly should be overtly lawful." One reason is that it is likely to become public knowledge, sooner or later, and the government must be prepared to live with the consequences. This sophisticated book examines governmental actions toward which many will be opposed or ambivalent, but that are still likely to be undertaken even in the new world order.

GENOCIDE WATCH. Edited by Helen Fein. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1992, 204 pp. $25.00.

Genocide—the attempt to eliminate a national or ethnic group substantially if not completely—is still very much with us, this work reminds. Witness the Kurds in Iraq, the killing fields of the Khmer Rouge and the Hutus in Burundi. Indeed one can ask if the current rise of ethnic conflict will not increase genocidal massacres. This original book focuses, properly, less on the criteria in international law, where the issue has already been addressed, than on the question of what can be done. Interesting suggestions are made regarding constructive roles that can be played by nongovernmental organizations as watchdogs and by the press as a conduit to the world conscience.

DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE FALLACY OF POLITICAL REALISM. By Miroslav Nincic. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, 200 pp. $37.50.

In the post-Cold War era the desired yet implicit contract between democratic societies and their leaders on both the substance and style of foreign affairs may be more difficult to identify. Nincic, a political scientist at the University of California at Davis, sees the twin dangers of "disruption" from below and "derailment" from above in the conduct of foreign policy. Indeed some level of public deception is at times necessary. Accordingly, he argues, there may be a tradeoff between democratic ideals and the wisdom and effectiveness of American foreign policy. He ends this thoughtful analysis with a call for "principled pragmatism." But by remain-

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ing at the conceptual level, without much in the way of concrete examples, one is left without any significant policy guidance.

DECLINE AND DISCONTENT: COMMUNISM AND THE WEST TODAY. By Paul Hollander. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction, 1992, 314 pp. $32.95 (paper, $24.95).

Volumes that knit together sundry writings of one author do not always work as intended, as in this case. These pieces range from social problems in Hungary and the Soviet Union to a tribute to the late Sidney Hook to a strong critique of the "radical" Institute for Policy Studies (read Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnet) in Washington. The framework of juxtaposing the collapse of communism in the East and the malaise in the West is fragile and provides for few comparisons, chiefly because Hollander gives it insufficient attention. Yet there is a great deal of both insight and humanity in these pages, written by a sociologist who feels at home in both societies.

TERRITORIAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. By Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl. New York: Routledge, 1992, 180 pp. $52.50.

Over fifty years ago Nicholas Spykman, a preeminent political scientist, observed that geography is the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states. Few would argue that today. In this solid and meticulous work, two academics look back at 770 instances of territorial change in the international system over the period 1816–1980. A great deal of data is tabulated and interpreted. The most interesting point to emerge is that, with the virtual end of decolonization, territorial change will alter in substance and form. Secession of ethnic groups may become the most prevalent form of territorial change. And some Cold War artifacts still need to be resolved, such as the two Koreas and the two Chinas.

RIGHT v. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE. By Louis Henkin and others. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991, 200 pp. $14.95 (paper).

This timely second edition of the highly successful 1989 book has a new chapter by David Scheffer (which lengthens the volume by more than fifty percent) and a new afterword by John Temple Swing. Scheffer dissects in a masterful manner the unilateral U.S. invasion of Panama and the multilateral response to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. The first is seen as corrosive of international law, the second (albeit with reservations) as legitimate collective security. Most significant is the suggestion that in the aftermath of the Gulf War there may be broad support in the "new world order" for multilateral enforcement of international law through collective military actions. [This is a corrected version of the review published in the Spring 1992 issue.]

General: Military, Scientific and Technological

Gregory F. Treverton

MAKING WAR: THE 200-YEAR-OLD BATTLE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OVER THE WAY AMERICA GOES TO WAR. By John Lehman. New York: Scribner's, 1992, 320 pp. $22.95.

This engaging essay, part memoir, begins with Desert Storm and ends with Panama, with constitutional theory and history in between. Lehman

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has served the last three Republican presidents; he was Reagan's secretary of the navy. He is wise enough to recognize that the Constitution hardly settled the tussle over war powers—it was, in Edwin Corwin's phrase, "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." He is also honest enough to admit that while he favors a strong president in principle, he tends, like most of us, to look more favorably on Congress. Lehman emphasizes the leverage of congressional investigation ("inquisition," through his executive branch spectacles), and he concludes that Congress' power of the purse has been roughly the check on executive discretion that the Founding Fathers had in mind.

FORCEFUL PERSUASION: COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR. By Alexander L. George. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1992, 112 pp. $10.95 (paper).

Second thoughts about the Gulf War have propelled "what if?" questions about nonmilitary alternatives. In this slim, readable volume George revisits his 1971 classic, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. He niftily summarizes older cases and adds new ones (Nicaragua, Libya and the Gulf War), evaluates them through his method of "focused comparison" and sets out thoughtful guidelines.

CLOSING PANDORA'S BOX: ARMS RACES, ARMS CONTROL AND THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR. By Patrick Glynn. New York: Basic Books, 1992, 464 pp. $30.00.

Men invite war by fearing the weapons that deter it: so argues Glynn, an unabashed Reagan admirer who served that administration's arms control agency. The first chapter is his noted article on Sarajevo in *The National Interest*, which argued that war came in 1914 less because of mindless militarism than the opposite: British carelessness about the balance of power. Here he intends to provoke, and he does. During the Cold War "liberal pacifist" Americans bedazzled by the "arms control paradigm" nearly repeated Britain's mistake. Yet the premise that Western firmness would eventually cause the Soviet system to crumble underlay containment from the very beginning; later debates turned on how to balance firmness and risk. Most observers of all persuasions would concede that the Reagan defense buildup played some role in hastening the demise of communism (whether America could afford it without taxes to match is another question), but it will take Soviet archives, and better understanding of human personality, to know how much Soviet behavior responded to specific ups and downs in America's defense effort.

SMALL WARS, BIG DEFENSE: PAYING FOR THE MILITARY AFTER THE COLD WAR. By Murray Weidenbaum. New York: Oxford, 1992, 228 pp. $22.95.

Weidenbaum, Reagan's first chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, has a very different perspective on the defense buildup of the 1980s from Glynn (above). The case for a crash program was weak, he argues, and the program was chaotic going up as well as down. There is no one better placed to suggest how to do better next time around in limiting the harm of a rapid defense drawdown to both the economy and military. He is attentive to the uneven effects of defense cuts across the country, but his guidance is that of a thoughtful conservative. With annual cutbacks no

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larger than one percent of GNP, monetary adjustments should suffice to keep the economy from falling deeper into recession. Beyond that, the government should channel defense savings away from consumption and toward private sector research and development, then get out of the way.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING. By Kenneth R. Mayer. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1991, 272 pp. $28.50.

If politics ain't beanbag, as Mr. Dooley had it, defense politics, happily, ain't all pork barrel, as this young political scientist carefully argues. To be sure, contractors do spread subcontracts as widely as possible, and members of Congress do defend programs in their own districts. But these stratagems have little real impact either on how much is spent or which systems are bought. Then why all the fuss? In part because defense procurement is so visible (accounting for two-thirds of the government's discretionary spending), claiming credit is good for congressional winners and crying "pork" good for the losers. In the end decisions *are* political—that is, about values—not merely technical. Based on the parlous history of the A-10 aircraft, Mayer observes, "if the Pentagon is not always right when it wants to buy something, it is not always right when it wants *not* to buy something."

INADVERTENT ESCALATION: CONVENTIONAL WAR AND NUCLEAR RISKS. By Barry R. Posen. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1992, 280 pp. $36.00.

One of America's premier analysts of conventional warfare argues that "confusion about the relationship between conventional and nuclear war can lead to situations in which Western conventional and nuclear forces work at cross purposes." In particular NATO's accurate conventional weapons, like cruise missiles, might have damaged Soviet nuclear forces, thus hastening escalation to nuclear war; to be sure, Soviet forces implied the same risk. Posen's case materials derive from Europe during the 1980s, but his conclusions are suggestive beyond the Cold War to a "third image" of conflict driven less by calculated national purpose than fear in an anarchic world.

STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE PAST AND THE PROSPECTS. By David Fischer. New York: Routledge, 1992, 336 pp. $99.50.

Fischer was present at the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. His survey, centering on the role of the Nonproliferation Treaty, is detailed, full of source material, and optimistic. Cause for concern about the familiar nuclear suspects is balanced, for example, by South Africa's accession to the NPT and, more fundamentally, by the prospect that waning of great power reliance on nuclear deterrence will abet the psychological barriers to proliferation.

EMERGING DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY. Edited by Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber. Boulder (CO): Westview, 1991, 337 pp. $42.50 (paper).

THE INSECURITY DILEMMA: NATIONAL SECURITY OF THIRD WORLD STATES. Edited by Brian L. Job. Boulder (CO): Lynne Rienner, 1992, 257 pp. $35.00.

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Two good well-edited collections, primarily by younger scholars: Danspeckgruber's top-notch group from both sides of the Atlantic grapples with Europe's security future as the Cold War ends; Job's authors, organized by the University of British Columbia, take up a topic too little examined. K. J. Holsti's chapter is a particularly provocative reminder that most wars during the Cold War were in the Third World and that most of those wars were over domestic arrangements, either anticolonial struggles or attacks on governing regimes. Thus the familiar premises of realist theory—concentration on the nation-state and external threat—are not very helpful.

VERIFICATION: THE KEY TO ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1990s. Edited by John G. Tower, James Brown and William K. Cheek. McLean (VA): Brassey's, 243 pp, $32.00.

The contributors to this volume, a tribute to the late Senator Tower, walk around verification to view it from a variety of perspectives—historical, technical and political. Their chapters combine to produce a useful review, one that provokes the question of whether their subtitle might end with a question mark: will verification be the arms control issue of the 1990s or will it cede pride of place, at least between the United States and lands of the former Soviet Union, to the question of who acquires which arms control obligations?

RETHINKING AMERICA'S SECURITY. Edited by Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton. New York: Norton (for the American Assembly and the Council on Foreign Relations), 1992, 479 pp.

This ambitious volume addresses fundamental questions about America's future: What are the country's vital interests? What is America's place in the post-Cold War world? How is security to be defined and defended as old threats disappear and new ones materialize? Allison and Treverton offer a useful deductive paradigm for answering these questions. Starting with a reexamination of what national security means in the post-Cold War world, the volume moves to an assessment of national security's various dimensions, then presents several contending visions of the new international order and concludes with a topical look at the U.S. stake in various regional problems. The essays offer an illuminating array of views from Peter Peterson's advice to focus on domestic problems to Charles Krauthammer's exhortation to seize the "unipolar moment." The book brings structure and coherence to the debate about national security in a world transformed.

Joseph Kruzel

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

BEHIND THE NUMBERS: U.S. TRADE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. Edited by Anne Y. Kester. Washington: National Academy Press, 1992, 297 pp.

It is no harder than it ever was to count and weigh goods as they cross frontiers. But technological change, the increasing internationalization of national economies and the growing importance of activities that are hard to measure, such as services and financial transactions, limit the value of the

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old figures. Moreover out-of-date statistical methods, limited funds, the lack of international comparability and a variety of other defects noted in this revealing book often make familiar data poor guides to policy. The panel of the National Research Council that produced this book (which included some excellent economists) takes a broad view of the problems. It emphasizes the need for figures based on the national ownership of companies and not just their location. How long will it be before another panel will have to analyze the difficulties of assigning a nationality to a thoroughly internationalized business?

NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE. By Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992, 369 pp.

This very comprehensive study serves as an excellent handbook for the Mexican-Canadian-U.S. negotiations looking toward some kind of free trade area. It provides fairly detailed estimates of possible effects on jobs, trade and other matters. More important it describes all the major issues (with special attention to the Mexican aspects) and makes quite concrete recommendations for dealing with the difficulties they present. There is some discussion of the relations of the negotiations to the interests of other countries and world trading arrangements. The authors, who have done much work in related fields, conclude that a North American Free Trade Agreement "should produce an improved, trilateral version of the Canadian-U.S. agreement" and serve "as a model of future trade pacts both regionally and multilaterally."

DOWN IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS. Edited by Richard Boltuck and Robert E. Litan. Washington: Brookings, 1991, 368 pp. $34.95 (paper, $15.94).

A growing number of people are learning that "fair trade" laws are among the most troublesome American barriers to imports. This very valuable book provides a great deal of information about the multifaceted problems of coping with foreign dumping and subsidies. It clarifies many arcane subjects, including the choice of prices, the estimation of costs, the impact of exchange rates and the elaborate make-believe of "constructed value" and "surrogate countries." With one major exception the lawyers and economists who have written these papers are very critical of the way the Department of Commerce administers the fair-trade laws and believe that, while there is not much political interference in individual cases, the investigations are "tilted systematically against importers."

GLOBALIZING THE GATT: THE SOVIET UNION'S SUCCESSOR STATES, EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM. By Leah A. Haus. Washington: Brookings, 1992, 141 pp.

The main strength of this book is its narrative of the negotiations that brought Poland, Romania and Hungary into GATT and of the failed efforts by Bulgaria. Its weakness is that in correctly emphasizing the way political considerations dominated these matters it provides only a thin treatment of the problems created by the differences in national economic systems. There is excellent material drawn from interviews and unpublished documents, but little is said about what benefits east European countries could realistically expect from participation in GATT or what changes they (and Western countries) would have to make for the best results.

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EXPORT CONTROLS IN TRANSITION. Edited by Gary K. Bertsch and Steven Elliott-Gower. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1992, 355 pp. $57.50 (paper, $21.95).

These useful papers deal with many of the issues raised by export controls in a post-Cold War world, including such persistent difficulties as enforcement, the extraterritorial application of American law and disagreements about international understandings. There is less than one might expect about nonproliferation.

TRADE WITH JAPAN: HAS THE DOOR OPENED WIDER? Edited by Paul Krugman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, 340 pp. $50.00.

As the editor interprets these conference papers, the quietly positive answer to the title's question seems less important than three other conclusions: "Japan *is* different"; the differences "contribute to trade tension"; but "there are really efficiency advantages to the Japanese style of business." Though not entirely up to date the essays provide a much more sophisticated analysis of the issues than is common.

WESTERN DOCTRINES ON EAST-WEST TRADE. By Peter van Ham. New York: St. Martin's, 1992, 276 pp. $45.00.

This first-rate study rises well above the level of most books on East-West economic relations. In contrasting the assumptions, perceptions and practices of those who have advocated some kind of containment and those who have sought the political benefits of promoting interdependence, the Dutch author has used a rich variety of historical and contemporary material.

THE ECONOMY OF UNITED GERMANY: COLOSSUS AT THE CROSSROADS. By W. R. Smyser. New York: St. Martin's, 1992, 266 pp. $45.00.

Most of this book is a good, clear, comprehensive description of how the west German economy works. The problems arising from the addition of eastern Germany are taken up more tentatively and selectively, with the emphasis on a merger "between rich and poor" rather than "between a capitalist and a socialist economy."

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BASIC HUMAN NEEDS. By Bruce E. Moon. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1992, 316 pp. $45.00 (paper, $14.95).

At the core of this book lie ingenious and complex analyses and manipulation of a wide range of data bearing on a "physical quality of life index." Not surprisingly the effort to link approaches to economic growth, social organization and governmental policies with the satisfaction of basic human needs cannot go beyond a "first cut" at arriving at conclusions.

The United States

William G. Hyland

SEIZE THE MOMENT: AMERICA'S CHALLENGE IN A ONE-SUPERPOWER WORLD. By Richard Nixon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992, 322 pp. $23.00.

This is the former president's best book, because he deals with current, lively issues and is forthright in stating his position on each. He supports

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assistance to the former Soviet states and advocates an active role in eastern Europe and continuing engagement in western Europe. He also comes out for independence of the various states comprising the former Yugoslavia, but urges a broader European entity. On the Middle East he is critical of U.S. policymakers' inability to distinguish between true friends and potential enemies. While heavily criticizing woolly-headed isolationism, he wisely adds a last chapter prescribing some domestic remedies and, Nixon being Nixon, he finally comes down to the question: "Do we have the will to play a leading role?" Altogether worth reading during the current debate about post-Cold War foreign policy.

I'VE SEEN THE BEST OF IT. By Joseph W. Alsop with Adam Platt. New York: Norton, 1992, 480 pp. $29.95.

This is a delightful memoir completed by Adam Platt after Joe Alsop's death. Platt has successfully captured the condescending and acerbic flavor of Alsop's commentaries, and many of the stories and vignettes will be familiar to those who knew him as a powerful force and colorful fixture in Washington politics and journalism. For Alsop "the best of it" was the Kennedy administration. The period that followed was "bitter and bewildering." Unfortunately there is not enough on Alsop's strident and defiant defense of American intervention in Vietnam, which he championed in his columns. If one wants to evoke the ambience of Washington just before and after World War II, this memoir does it.

THE IMPERIAL TEMPTATION. By Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991, 228 pp. $22.50 (paper, $14.95).

Analyzing the post-Cold War era and the new world order is rapidly becoming a cottage industry. This volume will surely rank as one of the best; it has the virtue of dissecting not only the significance of American policy at the end of the Cold War but the meaning of the Gulf War as well. The authors suggest that the end of the Cold War and the opening of a new world order were characterized by decline in the utility of the use of force alongside the growth of economic power as a determinant of policy. The Gulf War, which the authors believe Bush sought from the beginning of the crisis, contradicted the concept of a new order; the result was to exalt the use of force as an essential element of world order. The authors fear that the swift success of the Gulf War will tempt America to a new imperialism: a sort of neo-Wilsonian order, but imposed by the very means Wilson wanted to disavow. The policy emerging from the Gulf War, they argue, amounts to the functional equivalent of "global containment" in the name of high principles, but at the expense of the American tradition: to use force with moderation and restraint, only if absolutely necessary.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE. By James Chace. New York: Oxford, 1992, 235 pp. $22.95. A Twentieth Century Fund Book.

Another analysis and prescription re the post-Cold War world and America's role in it. Borrowing a title from John Maynard Keynes' seminal work after the end of World War I, Chace argues that in the new internationalism economic power and social cohesion will count as much if not more than raw military power. The United States emerges as first among equals in this context, but its role is bound to be reduced. Economic

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solvency, the subject of a previous book by this writer, will become a key. While contracting its security commitments and revising its military role, Washington, the author believes, will have to seek new institutions to manage the critical global economy.

FRIENDLY TYRANTS. Edited by Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle. New York: St. Martin's, 1991, 542 pp. $39.95.

An interesting idea that produces mixed results. During the Cold War the United States found itself allied to some highly unsavory leaders and regimes. They were tyrants but, to paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt's remark about the elder Somoza, they were our tyrants. This collection of essays includes most of the obvious candidates but some dubious ones as well—such as the South Vietnamese leaders, the king of Jordan and Mexican presidents—who hardly qualify as tyrants. Some "tyrants" began as rather moderate alternatives (Suharto); others were even revolutionaries (Ferdinand Marcos). Paul Henze on the Turkish military leaders, Adam Garfinkle on the Greek colonels and Barry Rubin on the shah of Iran are among the better chapters. The coeditors set the stage effectively with an introductory essay that points out that even when such alliances were mandated by valid American geopolitical requirements, once a crisis developed, the media spotlight focused on the regressive character of these regimes, and American policy came under increasing pressure. In his concluding essay on policy Richard Haass argues that the overt use of force is rarely justified; but if a regime changes, American policy should be "flexible," inclined to support fledgling democracies, but broadly defined.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF DÉTENTE. By Michael B. Froman. New York: St. Martin's, 1992, 179 pp. $49.95.

This is an excellent compilation and analysis of the attitudes of American administrations since Eisenhower toward détente. The centerpiece is the Nixon-Kissinger period, when détente flourished. In the Carter years it ended in deep disappointment with the U.S.S.R. Most interesting, however, is a brief chapter that shows Reagan's transformation from a dedicated opponent of détente to a man who left office singing its praises, to the dismay of his conservative supporters. The author's net judgment is that détente was only a limited success, but probably necessary.

THE OLD BOYS: THE AMERICAN ELITE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CIA. By Burton Hersh. New York: Scribner's, 1992, 536 pp. $29.95.

This book traces the formation of central intelligence, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, from its growth out of the Office of Strategic Services through the resignation of Allen Dulles after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. Heavily anecdotal and breathlessly written, the narrative introduces a steady stream of colorful characters who became the founding fathers and staff of the CIA. The author documents the infighting and backbiting among a group of strong-willed officials, but fails to pause occasionally for much reflection or analysis on the course of American intelligence, its assumptions about policy and its own role in what came to be called the national security state. Well documented, based mainly on secondary sources as well as interviews.

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The Western Hemisphere

Abraham F. Lowenthal

DEBT, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMOCRACY: MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LATIN AMERICA, 1965–1985. By Jeffry A. Frieden. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1991, 296 pp. $26.95 (paper, $16.95).

In this jewel of a book Frieden systematically compares how and why Latin America's five largest debtors—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela—differed in their approaches to development policy choices, paths of political development and responses to the debt crisis of the 1980s. Frieden argues that variations in official borrowing policies and responses to the termination of foreign credit are best explained by the impact of powerful domestic lobby groups pursuing their own concrete interests. Clear and cogent.

THE RUSSIANS AREN'T COMING: NEW SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Wayne S. Smith. Boulder (CO): Lynne Rienner, 1992, 195 pp. $25.00.

These essays, presented at a November 1990 conference, were written when there still was a Soviet Union and when some analysts were still arguing that Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" was a tactical respite and Soviet formulations concerning the end of world revolution but a ruse. Although developments since then have made some of the volume anachronistic and its arguments somewhat moot, the essays remain important in showing that there was never as much of a Soviet presence, influence or "threat" in the Western hemisphere as Washington policymakers said and probably genuinely believed.

GUERRILLAS & REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSURGENTS AND REGIMES SINCE 1956. By Timothy Wickham-Crowley. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1991, 424 pp. $59.50.

In this macro-sociological study Wickham-Crowley analyzes the origins and outcomes of 11 Latin American rural insurgencies occurring in two waves: the first from 1956 to 1970, the other from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. Focusing on the personal backgrounds of the guerrillas themselves and on national social conditions, he seeks to explain when it is that guerrillas acquire military strength; why they succeed or fail at securing substantial peasant support; why guerrilla-led revolutions were able to take power only in Cuba and Nicaragua and failed to do so in Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador. The conclusion is that revolutionaries only came to power when they had strong peasant support, substantial military strength *and* secured a cross-class alliance against a patrimonial dictator; in these circumstances U.S. support was then withdrawn from the dictatorship.

THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN CHILE, 1982–1990. Edited by Paul Drake and Ivan Jaksic. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992, 321 pp. $45.00 (paper, $19.95).

Eleven qualified academic analysts, more than half of them Chilean nationals, analyze the gradual breakdown of Augusto Pinochet's authori-

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tarian regime from its peak at the beginning of the 1980s through the collapse of its economic model to the Chilean public's rejection of its political model in the historic plebiscite of 1988. Chile's protracted transition toward redemocratization took place amid profound transformations of the country's economy, society and politics, making the transition both possible and different from what it would have been a decade earlier. By the time of the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 presidential elections, Chileans had opted for the politics of compromise and moderate consensus. These essays, the first comprehensive volume on Chile's return to democracy, help explain why and how.

POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND DEMOCRACY IN URUGUAY. By Luis E. González. Notre Dame (IN): University of Notre Dame Press, 1992, 201 pp. $26.95.

One of Uruguay's foremost social scientists, a pioneer in survey research, analyzes the restoration of Uruguayan democracy against the background of the country's long democratic experience. His review is sobering: "The same risk-prone configuration of the years preceding the 1933 and 1973 coups remains the most likely forecast: serious substantive problems, fractionalization of the governing party, which has no legislative majority either, and presidentialism . . . which may lead very early to stalemates blocking the formulation of policies." The author proposes turning to parliamentary institutions as a way to reduce the risks of stalemate or confrontation in Uruguay; this argument is also being heard more frequently in Brazil, Chile and other Latin American nations.

LATIN AMERICA TO THE YEAR 2000: REACTIVATING GROWTH, IMPROVING EQUITY, SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY. Edited by Archibald R. M. Ritter, Maxwell A. Cameron and David H. Pollock. New York: Praeger, 1992, 280 pp. $47.95.

Although uneven and a bit unfocused this anthology is worthwhile because of its largely successful attempt to go beyond snapshots of the moment and to consider underlying trends for Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. Fundamental problems of inequitable income distribution, inefficient economies, unsustainable environmental practices and fragile democratic governance are stressed in this sober overview.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

Robert Legvold

BORIS YELTSIN: FROM BOLSHEVIK TO DEMOCRAT. By John Morrison. New York: Dutton, 1991, 303 pp. $20.00.

Morrison has written not so much a proper biography of Yeltsin—although parts of the life story are there, drawn largely from Yeltsin's own memoir—as a lucid, elaborate account of Yeltsin's part in the dramatic politics of the Soviet Union in its last three years. A journalist for Reuters, Morrison makes good use of speeches, the analyses of Western specialists and his own on-the-spot conversations to reconstruct the key stages in Yeltsin's mighty struggle with Gorbachev and the dying regime he led. More than anything else Morrison helps the reader see how little Gor-

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bachev understood the emergence of Russia, in contrast to Yeltsin, who did fully.

NATIONALISM AND EMPIRE: THE HABSBURG MONARCHY AND THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good. New York: St. Martin's, 1992, 313 pp. $49.95.

Originally prepared for a conference in April 1990, these are scholarly essays dedicated to a comparison of the historic Russian, Soviet and Austro-Hungarian empires, predicated on the notion that the comparison is rich and close, including the path to extinction. The heart of the matter is nationalism and, once it strikes within an empire of many ethnic formations, the end is in sight. The reader will come away with a broader and historically enriched sense of what happened to the Soviet Union, but the immensely complicated story of why it happened, particularly when and the way it happened, remains for others to tell.

REACHING OUT TO MOSCOW: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION. By Marshall Brement. New York: Praeger, 1991, 191 pp. $42.95.

It tells us just how dramatic change has been when a book offering a radically different prescription for U.S. policy toward the departed Soviet Union and published in December 1991 is only months later of merely historical interest. The historical interest is in Brement's sharp critique of U.S. policy in what turned out to be the last year of Soviet power. One might add, in fairness to the author, a senior American diplomat whose most serious shortcoming in this instance is one of timing, that not all of the faults to which he points have disappeared, although the Soviet Union has.

THE COMMUNISTS: THE STORY OF POWER AND LOST ILLUSIONS, 1948–1991. By Adam B. Ulam. New York: Scribner's, 1992, 528 pp. $27.50.

Having written the history of the Bolsheviks' rise to power, the history of Stalin's dramatic recasting of the Soviet order and the history of Tito's first major challenge to a monolithic Moscow-centered world, Ulam, appropriately, offers a history of the whole enterprise's demise. His thesis is that once the original force of the idea expired only physical and political expansionism could save the system and, in the end, expansionism could not be sustained. Yet that thesis is not as interesting as the well-told story that follows. Ulam has long been fascinated by the curious and sometimes dramatic twists that powerful personalities give to history, and he is back to recounting their role from Mao's first visit to Moscow two months after the October 1949 triumph of the Chinese revolution to Gorbachev's unwitting destruction of the system he meant to save.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNIST RULE IN POLAND, 1943–1948. By Krystyna Kersten. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, 535 pp. $49.95.

Kersten is a historian on the faculty of the University of Warsaw and a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences. In 1984 she finished this vast history, which tells how communism came to prevail in Poland and over the various forces that would have had it otherwise. This is a detailed account of what were the many levels of that process throughout the society from

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1943 forward; it is not merely another account of Soviet intrigues after the Red Army's liberation of Poland from German occupation. Apart from providing a comprehensive history of one of the postwar world's formative events, the book has great appeal in its stern avoidance of political labels and its strenuous analytical neutrality.

EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION. Edited by Ivo Banac. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1992, 255 pp. $33.50 (paper, $12.95).

Less than a year after the collapse of socialism in eastern Europe an unusually bright and creative group of specialists assembled at Yale to explain what had happened. This book is the result. All the countries are covered, including Albania and Yugoslavia. Those who come after and take on the historian's task of reconstructing the whole story, making full use of the distance of time, will find in these essays inspired early conjecture.

REINVENTING POLITICS: EASTERN EUROPE FROM STALIN TO HAVEL. By Vladimir Tismaneanu. New York: The Free Press, 1992, 303 pp. $22.95.

History always bears reencounter after great intervening events. Tismaneanu revisits the complex fate of eastern Europe in the postwar period with the special insights of someone who views the scene from this side of the 1989 revolution. In his case the insights are the greater because he is a sensitive and sophisticated observer who grew up in the system. Although from Romania, he draws his illustrations from many countries, perhaps mostly from Poland.

THE PATRIOTS' REVOLUTION: HOW EASTERN EUROPE TOPPLED COMMUNISM AND WON ITS FREEDOM. By Mark Frankland. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992, 356 pp. $26.50.

Not every reader will want elaborate theoretical explanations of the grand historical reversal in eastern Europe in 1989; many will prefer a straightforward, textually rich report on what it looked like and how it felt. Oddly, in the flood of literature now appearing on the east European revolutions, not much is of this sort. Frankland, a seasoned British journalist, fills the gap very well. This is a book that informs while giving pleasure, in no small part because it is so well written.

THE RADIANT PAST: IDEOLOGY AND REALITY IN HUNGARY'S ROAD TO CAPITALISM. By Michael Burawoy and János Lukács. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, 215 pp.

Not many American social scientists who write about the evolution of east European society in the last phases of socialism have gained their insights by catching a bus at 5:32 in the morning and heading off to a job as a lathe operator in a Hungarian machine shop. Burawoy, a Berkeley industrial sociologist, did that for four months in 1984, and then returned the next year to work five months in the Lenin Steel Works. He and his Hungarian colleague meld these reality-testing experiences into a lean, straightforward and large-spirited analytical framework that knocks the dazzle from much of the popular expectation in East and West.

The argument starts with the proposition that it will not do to compare the "*ideology* of capitalism—the efficiency of market competition based on private property and the freedoms of liberal democracy—with the *realities*

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of state socialism—the waste and inefficiency of planning and the repression of the one-party state." It concludes, for well-argued reasons, that in eastern Europe "the radiant future that is to be capitalism is no less utopian than the radiant future that was to be communism."

MILITARY OCCUPATION AND DIPLOMACY: SOVIET TROOPS IN ROMANIA, 1944–1958. By Sergiu Verona. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1992, 211 pp. $34.95.

Verona examines the question of the stationing of Soviet troops in Romania from their arrival in the course of World War II until their withdrawal in 1958. He uses the broad context of Romania's place in Soviet strategy, Stalin's and Khrushchev's policies in eastern Europe, the role of Yugoslavia and East-West relations. Drawing from recently accessible American and British documents, he throws new light on hitherto obscure or unexplored aspects of his subject. But on many points judgment must still be reserved. Knowing what Western diplomats thought was going on in Moscow, Bucharest and Belgrade is no full substitute for primary evidence, which presumably exists (and may soon come to light) in the archives of those former communist capitals. John C. Campbell

The Middle East

William B. Quandt

BATTLE LINES: THE AMERICAN MEDIA AND THE INTIFADA. By Jim Lederman. New York: Henry Holt, 1992, 342 pp. $29.95.

An experienced foreign correspondent takes a hard look at media coverage of the Palestinian intifada (with an epilogue on the Gulf War). He has strong criticisms of how both Israelis and Palestinians (and the American and Iraqi governments in the gulf conflict) tried to manipulate the media, but reserves his harshest comments for American television coverage. He is particularly worried about television's temptation to highlight the dramatic, the violent, the shocking parts of any story. This "imagespeak," he believes, dominates the public's perception of the news, even when accompanying commentary may try to provide context and balance. Somewhat surprisingly his overall conclusion is that experienced reporters eventually did a pretty good job of covering the intifada, despite problems in the early months. Lederman raises many issues that deserve attention but is short on answers. One wonders if there are "solutions" to the problems of selective perception and distortion that preoccupy him.

BEHIND THE MYTH: YASSER ARAFAT AND THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION. By Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker. New York: Olive Branch Press, 1992, 407 pp. $29.95.

No political leader in the Middle East has tried harder, and with considerable success, to symbolize the aspirations of his people than Arafat. In doing so he has cultivated an aura of mystery and mystique about his persona. The authors of this book intelligently probe behind the myths to try to untangle the role Arafat actually played in the emergence of contemporary Palestinian nationalism. The result is impressive as narrative history and as political analysis. No single book does a better job of presenting the Palestinian movement as it presently exists, with a fair

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assessment of both achievements and failures. Much of the material is familiar but has been supplemented by numerous interviews which add to the conventional wisdom.

DAWN OVER SUEZ: THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1952–1957. By Steven Z. Freiberger. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992, 288 pp. $26.50.

In recent years British and American archives on the Suez period have been opened, and a new wave of scholarship has resulted. This commendable effort concentrates on the precursors to Suez with emphasis on the quite different approaches to the region found in Whitehall and Washington. Eisenhower and Dulles are shown to have developed a fairly sophisticated, if ultimately unsuccessful, policy to tackle simultaneously the problems of decolonization, regional security and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author occasionally strays from his evidence and seems to believe that Eisenhower would have done better to have reached an accommodation with Nasser, but he never shows convincingly how that could have been done. Yet by tracing the seeds of the Suez debacle back to 1953 and explaining coherently the links between the Suez base negotiations, Project ALPHA, the Baghdad Pact, the Aswan decision and Project OMEGA, this book breaks new ground.

ABU NIDAL: A GUN FOR HIRE. By Patrick Seale. New York: Random House, 1992, 339 pp. $22.00.

In piecing together this fascinating portrait of the world's most notorious terrorist, Seale relied heavily on the late Abu Iyad, himself a victim of Abu Nidal. Seale makes clear that Abu Iyad and Abu Nidal were locked in a deadly struggle and that Abu Iyad had come to the conclusion that Abu Nidal was most likely working for the Israelis. Seale provides remarkable information about Abu Nidal as he sifts the evidence. In the end he comes very close to accepting the thesis of Abu Nidal as an Israeli agent, without being able to prove it. No doubt many Palestinians believe that Israel must be behind Abu Nidal. No doubt the Israelis have tried to penetrate the organization. And no doubt that Israel has benefited from some of Abu Nidal's actions. In the conspiracy-oriented Middle East, that may add up to near proof. But for an author whose previous scholarship on Syria has set such a high standard, this part of an otherwise intriguing book is disappointing and detracts from the credibility of the rest. Still, anyone curious about Abu Nidal and his organization will find no better source.

THE WALD REPORT: THE DECLINE OF ISRAELI NATIONAL SECURITY SINCE 1967. By Emanual Wald. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1992, 278 pp. $39.95.

The author, a colonel in the Israeli Defense Forces, published the Hebrew version of this scathing critique in 1987. According to Wald, the Israeli Defense Force has been a flawed structure since its inception, and its weaknesses have grown over the years as it has become more bureaucratic, rewarding loyalty over innovation. He attributes much of the IDF's decline to an unquestioning search for absolute security. With such an unattainable goal in mind, Israeli commanders win battles at greater and greater cost, but Israel fails to enhance its real security. Much of Wald's

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incisive analysis probably holds true for any large bureaucracy; at times his standards seem impossibly high, and a casual reader might conclude that Israel had never acquitted itself well on the battlefield. The value of the book lies in questioning the myths that have grown up around the IDF and in raising fundamental questions of strategy. When the author occasionally spells out what should have been done, his answers are not always convincing.

THE DEATH LOBBY: HOW THE WEST ARMED IRAQ. By Kenneth R. Timmerman. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1991, pp. 443. $21.95.

Each month brings new information about the extent of Iraq's programs for nuclear weapons, missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. How could the West not have known about this massive arsenal before the recent Gulf War? Timmerman's answer is that Western governments did know, since they were often responsible for the supplies of equipment and technology. The "death lobby," as the author labels it, was motivated primarily by greed, but also by the belief of some governments that an Iranian victory over Iraq would be a strategic disaster. This compelling indictment cannot be dismissed, although it suffers from obvious problems of instant histories. Sources are often lacking; the prose is sometimes purple; the focus is one-dimensional. Still, the overall account of Western complicity—especially German and French—in the Iraqi military buildup is persuasive and raises serious questions about whether arms control is a realistic prospect as long as billions of dollars are to be made by selling military technology and weapons.

PALESTINE AND EGYPTIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY. By Ghada Hashem Talhami. New York: Praeger, 1992, 190 pp. $45.00.

The focus of this carefully researched book is the place of the Palestinian issue in modern Egyptian political thought. As Egyptian leaders have tried to define the identity of their country as Arab, Mediterranean, Pharaonic, Islamic and simply Egyptian, they have correspondingly elevated or demoted the place of the Palestinian cause in their political platforms. The historical record is a reminder that this debate will continue as Islamic currents challenge the prevailing order, using the Palestinian issue as one means of questioning the political claims of the government. The author is strong on narrative and tells the story well, presupposing a fair amount of familiarity with the main events of twentieth-century Egyptian history. A solid contribution with few theoretical pretensions.

SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS, 1968–1988: IN THE SHADOW OF THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT. By Haim Shemesh. Boulder (CO): Lynne Rienner, 1992, 285 pp. $42.00.

Iraq was never quite comfortable with its strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, nor was Moscow sure that it could manage its relations with Baghdad in light of competing interests in the region. This workmanlike review of two decades of Soviet-Iraqi relations helps to account for the ups and downs of relations, placing special emphasis on Iraq's need for arms in its periodic conflicts with Iran. The going is often slow, but the research is impressive and the conclusions are sensible.

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Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

SOUTHEAST ASIAN CAPITALISTS. Edited by Ruth McVey. Ithaca (NY): Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1992, 218 pp.

Economists and political scientists have sought and offered explanations for the rapid growth of east Asia's newly industrialized countries. This is one of the first broad efforts by a group of specialists on southeast Asia to do the same. In a brilliant introductory essay, the volume's editor explores what she calls the three main explanations of capitalist development in southeast Asia: CC or Confucian culture, MM or the magic of the marketplace, and SS or the strong state. She then adds an important fourth: the international environment of growth that made available an abundance of foreign capital. McVey's essay is an intellectual tour de force.

THE HOPE AND THE REALITY: U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN. Edited by Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1992, 231 pp.

This well-edited volume of solid essays by American specialists on India fills an important gap. It is the first reliable account of U.S.-Indian relations since World War II. The essays are of uniformly high caliber; moreover, they come at an important moment when—as a result of the end of the Cold War and the new liberal economic policies of the Indian government—there are real prospects for a fundamental improvement in U.S.-Indian relations. There is a particularly thoughtful introduction by the editors.

THE JAPANESE QUESTION: POWER AND PURPOSE IN A NEW ERA. By Kenneth B. Pyle. Washington: AEI Press, 1992, 144 pp. $17.95.

There is a shortage of analyses of Japanese foreign policy with historical perspective. This slim but valuable monograph helps fill that gap. The author is a professor of history and a Japan specialist at the University of Washington. By judiciously weaving into his work the writings of many distinguished Japanese scholars and politicians, Pyle provides a provocative guide to Japan's continuing search for a "national purpose." He concedes that the weight of Japanese history and culture is undoubtedly on the side of a deeply ingrained and persistent ethnocentrism. But he sees an effort on the part of the Japanese elite to foster a national consensus behind what he calls a "new internationalism."

JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO THE GORBACHEV ERA, 1985–1991: A RISING SUPERPOWER VIEWS A DECLINING ONE. By Gilbert Rozman. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1992, 376 pp. $35.00.

This is a valuable, detailed case-study of Japanese perceptions of the rise of Gorbachev that sheds considerable light not only on this subject but on Japanese decision-making, domestic politics and attitudes toward the outside world. It is based on an exhaustive survey of Japanese newspaper and journal articles.

THE ASIAN-PACIFIC COMMUNITY IN THE YEAR 2000. Edited by Il Yung Chung. Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1991, 586 pp.

A group of Korean specialists look at developments in east Asian

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regional security, intraregional trade and technology transfers, the prospects for economic integration and new pressures on the U.S.-R.O.K. alliance.

THE DEFEAT OF A CONGRESSMAN AND OTHER PARABLES OF MODERN INDIA. By Mark Tully. New York: Knopf, 1992, 317 pp., $22.00.

Known for his evenhanded reporting and quick wit as a BBC correspondent for the past 25 years, Tully has written a fascinating book about India. In a collection of wonderful vignettes he conveys his obvious knowledge and love for the country and its people—an affection tempered with a rare objectivity that does not blind him to India's poverty or corruption and the contradictions between tradition and modernity. India's failure to shake off its immediate colonial past and to build a nation on the foundations of its own culture is what concerns Tully and what provides the most compelling part of the book. Instead of looking toward the West, he argues, the future of India lies in its own traditions and resources. He ends the book on an optimistic note and envisions a future India that "is not held up by the crumbling colonial pillars left behind by the raj but is genuinely India."

Patricia Lee Dorff

ONLY MAN IS VILE: THE TRAGEDY OF SRI LANKA. By William McGowan. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1992, 397 pp. $25.00.

Sri Lanka is a country whose reputation as an earthly paradise cannot be easily reconciled with its recent tragedies: a bloody civil war between the majority Sinhalese, most of whom are Buddhists, and the minority and largely Hindu Tamils. McGowan traveled to Sri Lanka in 1986 and spent two years as a reporter talking to the various Buddhist and Hindu factions. He is a deft writer with a keen eye for observation, and he shows how the roots of this violent war lie in the economic legacy of colonialism. Tracing the history and development of the conflict, McGowan provides a fascinating account of the war's tragic, mounting equation. He is doubtful that anything can save this country from its own internal flames.

Patricia Lee Dorff

Africa

Gail M. Gerhart

NIGERIA, AFRICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: FROM KENNEDY TO REAGAN. By Robert B. Shepard. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991, 208 pp. $24.95.

This book traces U.S.-Nigerian relations over six American administrations, situating the relationship within the context of U.S. policy toward other regions of the continent, particularly southern Africa, where Nigeria has sometimes claimed to have interests of its own at stake. Although little new information is marshalled regarding American policies in Africa, the lesser known Nigerian side of the relationship is presented in illuminating detail. Policy positions taken by Lagos are shown to reflect not only economic uncertainties but also Nigeria's volatile domestic politics, the personal styles of particular Nigerian leaders and the political self-image Nigeria has assumed as Africa's most populous and collectively egotistical

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nation. The author believes that America's erratic relationship with Nigeria holds lessons for policymakers who until recently have focused too narrowly on crisis intervention or routine maneuvers to block Soviet expansion in Africa. Sidestepping consideration of whether the "Third World" is itself still an appropriate category for policy formulation, he suggests that American diplomacy should be driven less by broad doctrines and more by flexible and well-informed assessments of "the peculiarities and particulars of specific Third World states."

FREE AT LAST? U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR. By Michael Clough, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, 143 pp. $14.95 (paper).

This study is a timely primer on U.S. policies in Africa, offering a succinct and critical analysis of past policy choices, plus a set of recommendations that should generate constructive debate. Clough, the senior Africanist at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that Africa's increasing geopolitical insignificance and its poor economic prospects will render it even more marginal to American interests in the future unless two things occur. First, U.S. global interests in the post-Cold War world need to be radically redefined to give priority to promoting democracy and economic development. Second, the constituencies for Africa within the United States need to be strengthened so that effective political pressures for aid to Africa can be brought to bear—mainly through Congress—on an executive branch likely to remain inert in the absence of strong domestic opinion. Clough believes that public interest lobbies for international human rights, development, environmental protection, women's welfare and humanitarian relief may gain political momentum in the 1990s. Some readers will probably feel that his stress on political realism places too little emphasis on the responsibility of the American government to promote development in the world's poorest region, with or without the support of public opinion. While the book properly castigates the "dismal" record of U.S. support for African dictators, it makes no mention of the modest but generally positive record of American bilateral development assistance.

KENYA: TAKING LIBERTIES. AN AFRICA WATCH REPORT. New York: Africa Watch, July 1991, 432 pp. $20.00 (paper).

In Jomo Kenyatta's time a system of plutocratic rule took shape in Kenya in which "big men" enjoying the president's favor manipulated emerging networks of patronage and political control. Plutocracy served the rich in glaring disproportion, but Kenya's parliamentary and judicial institutions offered some checks on the highhanded ways of the powerful, as did the voice of the semi-independent press. After the presidency passed in 1978 to Daniel arap Moi, names and faces within the plutocracy changed, and institutional constraints on elite power were steadily assaulted by the newcomers, producing a combustible combination of popular disaffection, elite paranoia and flagrant abuse of human rights. Africa Watch presents an itemized account of the Moi government's disregard for law and rights—the fullest such report available—and shows how outspoken critics in the church, the legal profession and elsewhere in Kenyan civil society have paid a high price for their courage.

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THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE. By Basil Davidson. New York: Times Books, 1992, 282 pp. $23.00 (paper).

In many parts of Africa ordinary people are worse off today than at the end of the colonial era. What or who is to blame? Davidson, Africa's preeminent popular historian, pursues a line of argument that is alternately subtle and romantically simplistic. He places ultimate responsibility at the door of non-Africans, aided and abetted by those Africans who too enthusiastically embraced alien ways, in particular the foreign political model of the nation-state. It is not clear what practical modern alternative to that model ever existed by the author's reckoning—he vaguely commends "community self-government" and "participatory democracy"—but his comparisons of the historical evolution of Africa with that of eastern Europe and, more briefly, Japan are thought-provoking.

CHANGING FORTUNES: WAR, DIPLOMACY, AND ECONOMICS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. By Robert Jaster, Moeletsi Mbeki, Morley Nkosi, and Michael Clough. New York: Ford Foundation/Foreign Policy Association, 1991, 203 pp. $12.95 (paper).

This volume is a contribution to the South African Update Series initiated in the mid-1980s as a follow-up to *South Africa: Time Running Out*, a 1981 report of a foundation-sponsored commission on American policy in southern Africa. The Update Series, now overtaken by events and shorn of its focus on policy recommendations, nevertheless stands as a useful and authoritative retrospective on the 1980s. *Changing Fortunes* reviews South African and superpower relations to interventions in southern Africa. It looks at the mixed results of efforts by those states to lessen their economic dependence on South Africa, as well as the rise and retreat of "constructive engagement" as an American diplomatic strategy dictated by suddenly obsolescent Cold War priorities. A fourth chapter, adopted from a 1989 U.N. report, notes the sickening toll in lives lost directly and indirectly as a result of these power rivalries: 1.3 million dead in Angola and Mozambique alone, a high proportion of them children. Five landmark documents are included as appendices.

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

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

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